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Foreword 
Australia and New Zealand mark the 30th anniversary of CER — Closer Economic 
Relations — in 2013. This is a significant milestone and an opportunity to consider 
the future of the economic relationship between our two countries. 
Building on the long history and pragmatic approach of trans-Tasman cooperation, 
CER has played a direct role in removing barriers to trade, and provided a 
framework for the development of complementary agreements, including those 
covering mutual recognition of standards and occupations, business law, and the 
movement of people ‘across the ditch’. The relationship has thrived on strong 
government-to-government links. Today, Australia and New Zealand are among 
the world’s most closely integrated economies, with CER at the core of this. 
In the lead up to this milestone, Prime Ministers Gillard and Key requested the 
Productivity Commissions to scope further initiatives that would strengthen the 
trans-Tasman economic relationship and improve economic wellbeing in both 
countries. This joint study looks back on what has been achieved, and forward to 
what more can be achieved as both countries pursue their shared aspirations in 
the Asian century. 
The Commissions are grateful to the individuals, businesses, unions, community 
groups and government officials who contributed to this study. Drawing on this 
input and further analysis, the Commissions have identified more than 30 policy 
initiatives to extend trans-Tasman integration that would benefit both countries. 
The proposed initiatives vary in their significance, complexity and timescales and 
some require more in-depth examination than has been feasible in a broad-
ranging scoping study. In tackling the new agenda, maintaining a pragmatic 
approach while being cognisant of the broader policy context and the need for 
CER to be open and outward looking, will remain as important as in the first 30 
years. 
The Commissions are confident that the actions recommended in this report would 
help maintain the vibrancy of the relationship and deliver further benefits to both 
countries in the years ahead. 
Gary Banks AO, Chairman Murray Sherwin CNZM, Chair 
Jonathan Coppel, Commissioner Dr Graham Scott C.B., Commissioner 
Australian Productivity Commission New Zealand Productivity Commission 
November 2012 
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Terms of reference 
Impacts and Benefits of Further Economic Integration of 
the Australian and New Zealand Economies — Joint 
Scoping Study by the Productivity Commissions of 
Australia and New Zealand 
Purpose of the study 
The Governments of Australia and New Zealand are firmly committed to strong 
economic relations between Australia and New Zealand, including boosting 
productivity through reducing the regulatory burden on business, increasing 
competition and encouraging closer economic cooperation, and to strengthening 
those relations further. The two countries have a long history of working together 
through the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement 
which first came into effect on 1 January 1983 and has involved successive 
rounds of integration of the Australia and New Zealand economies. This has been 
highly beneficial to both countries. 
At their annual leaders meeting, the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand 
agreed that, to promote further reform and economic integration, the Productivity 
Commissions of each country would conduct a joint study on the options for further 
reforms that would enhance increased economic integration and improve 
economic outcomes. The Commissions’ final report should be completed by 
1 December 2012 in order to inform the next meeting of leaders, expected to take 
place in early 2013. 
With 2013 marking 30 years of the operation of the Closer Economic Relations 
Trade Agreement, the Commissions’ report will help advise the Australian and 
New Zealand Governments on next steps in economic integration. 
The report should identify specific areas for further potential reform, the ways in 
which they might be best achieved, the likely impacts of potential reforms, any 
significant transition and adjustment costs that could be incurred and the time 
scale over which impacts are likely to accrue. 
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Scope of report 
The Commissions’ report to leaders should provide analysis on: 
• potential areas of further economic reform and integration, including 
identification of the areas of reform where benefits are likely to be most 
significant, with particular focus on critical issues for business like investment 
and productivity 
• the economic impacts and benefits of reform 
• any significant transition and adjustment costs that could be incurred 
• identification of reform where joint net benefits are highest 
• the means by which they might be best actioned 
• the likely time paths over which benefits are expected to accrue. 
Methodology 
The Commissions should provide an explanation of the methodology and 
assumptions used in its analysis. The Commissions should also provide guidance 
concerning the sensitivity of results to the assumptions used and bring to leaders’ 
attention any limitations or weaknesses in approaches to reform evaluation. 
Consultation and timing 
In the course of preparing the report, the Commissions should consult and hold 
public hearings as appropriate. While these consultations would inform the 
Commissions’ assessment, responsibility for the final report would rest with the 
two Productivity Commissions. 
The Commissions should produce both a draft and a final report. The 
Commissions’ final report should be submitted to leaders, through the Treasurer of 
Australia and the Minister of Finance of New Zealand, by 1 December 2012. The 
reports will be published. 
Bill English Wayne Swan 
Minister of Finance Treasurer 
Deputy Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister 
[Received 14 March 2012] 
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Abbreviations and explanations 
Abbreviations 
AANZFTA ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement 
ABS Australian Bureau of Statistics 
ACCC Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
ACTU Australian Council of Trade Unions 
ANZCERTA Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade 
Agreement 
ANZEA Australia New Zealand Economic Analysis model 
ANZLF Australia New Zealand Leadership Forum 
ANZSOG Australia and New Zealand School of Government 
ANZTPA Australia New Zealand Therapeutic Products Agency 
APRA Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
ASIC Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
BIE Bureau of Industry Economics 
BITRE Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics  
CER Closer Economic Relations 
COAG Council of Australian Governments 
CPM Carbon Price Mechanism 
DIAC (Australian) Department of Immigration and Citizenship 
EU European Union 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
FSANZ Food Standards Australia New Zealand 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GNI Gross National Income 
GTAP Global Trade Analysis Project model 
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HECS Higher Education Contribution Scheme 
HELP  Higher Education Loan Program 
JAS-ANZ Joint Accreditation System of Australia and New Zealand 
MFN Most Favoured Nation 
MRIC Mutual Recognition of Imputation Credits 
NOLS National Occupational Licensing System 
NZCC New Zealand Commerce Commission 
NZCTU New Zealand Council of Trade Unions 
NZETS New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme 
NZIER New Zealand Institute of Economic Research 
NZ PC New Zealand Productivity Commission 
NZS New Zealand Superannuation 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PC (Australian) Productivity Commission 
PMC Passenger Movement Charge 
PTA Preferential Trade Agreement 
RBA Reserve Bank of Australia 
RBNZ Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
RIA  Regulatory Impact Analysis 
RoGS Report on Government Services 
RoO Rules of Origin 
SAM Single Aviation Market 
SCV Special Category Visa 
SEM Single Economic Market 
TTCBS Trans-Tasman Council on Banking Supervision 
TTMRA Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement 
TTOIG Trans-Tasman Outcomes Implementation Group 
TTTA Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement 
VET Vocational Education and Training  
WTO World Trade Organisation 
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Explanations 
 
    
 
F1.1  Findings are set out in the body of the report, as this is. 
   
    
 
    
 
R1.1  Recommendations are set out in the body of the report, as this 
is. 
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Glossary 
Agglomeration 
economies 
A decrease in costs arising from the co-location of firms 
and/or people. For example both employers and labour 
benefit from markets with more potential employees and 
jobs. Cities form and grow to exploit economies of 
agglomeration. 
Airline 
designation 
An airline is designated under an air services agreement if it 
meets certain provisions intended to restrict the benefits of 
the agreement to the airlines of the signatory countries.  
Air services 
agreement (ASA) 
An agreement between governments regulating 
international air services between their countries. The 
agreement sets out the terms and conditions under which 
airlines can fly. 
Allocative 
efficiency 
How well resources are allocated across different uses so 
as to generate the greatest community wellbeing at a given 
point in time. 
Anti-dumping 
system 
An anti-dumping system seeks to counter the effects of 
‘dumped’ or subsidised imports on competing domestic 
industries. Dumping occurs when an overseas supplier 
exports goods to a country at a price below the normal value 
of the goods in the supplier’s home market.  
At the border 
barriers 
Measures that create transaction costs at the border. These 
commonly include tariffs, customs duties, biosecurity 
measures, and taxes and other levies on goods. 
Australia New 
Zealand 
Economic 
Analysis (ANZEA) 
model 
A global general equilibrium model derived from the GTAP 
model (see below) and database. It is simpler than the 
GTAP model, and is used to illustrate the economic 
implications (such as changes in prices, output and 
economic welfare) of integration. 
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Behind the border 
barriers 
Barriers to trade that operate inside a country, including: 
costs of complying with domestic regulation such as 
labelling requirements; or restrictions on foreign companies’ 
operations and investment. 
Benchmarking Identification and analysis of policies and processes that are 
leading practice in order for jurisdictions or organisations to 
learn from one another.  
Between the 
border barriers 
Barriers that increase the transaction costs involved in 
moving a good or service between two countries. These 
barriers relate mostly to transport costs and may include 
regulations that protect shipping or air services from 
competition. 
Cabotage In the context of air services and shipping, cabotage refers 
to the reservation of a country’s domestic trade — that is 
trade directly between domestic ports — for operators from 
that country. 
Dynamic 
efficiency 
How well resources are allocated to achieve the greatest 
possible community wellbeing over time. 
Economies of 
scale 
A decrease in the cost of production per unit of output as the 
volume of production increases. 
Franked dividend Payments by a company to shareholders on which the 
company has already paid tax. These payments carry 
imputation (also known as franking) credits. 
Freedoms of the 
air 
The basis of rights exchanged in air services negotiations, 
allowing designated airlines to fly to, from, beyond and 
between bilateral partners and other countries. 
Global Trade 
Analysis Project 
(GTAP) model 
A global computable general equilibrium model based on 
assumptions of perfect competition and constant returns to 
scale. The model can be used to analyse the economic 
effects of policy changes.  
Imputation credit A credit received by shareholders for the tax that has 
already been paid on their dividends by the issuing 
company. Also known as franking credits. 
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Liner shipping A shipping service that provides carriage for general cargo, 
in regularly scheduled services, between specified ports. 
Liners typically transport goods in modular containers.  
Māori terms Hapū: kinship group, clan, tribe, or subtribe (section of a 
large kinship group).  
Mana: prestige, authority, control, power, influence, status, 
spiritual power, charisma; as well as jurisdiction, mandate, 
or freedom. 
Marae: courtyard – the open area in front of the wharenui 
(meeting house) where formal greetings and discussions 
take place. Often also used to include the complex of 
buildings around the marae.  
Tino rangatiratanga: self-determination.  
Tohunga: a skilled person, chosen expert or priest. A person 
chosen as a leader in a particular field. 
Whānau: extended family or family group. 
Most favoured 
nation (MFN) 
status 
Allows the recipient country to receive trade advantages no 
less than those received by the ‘most favoured’ trading 
partner. This ensures that no country receives preferential 
treatment.  
Mutual 
recognition  
Recognising compliance with another jurisdiction’s laws or 
regulations. For example, under mutual recognition, if a 
product meets sale requirements in one jurisdiction it can be 
sold in the other jurisdiction without needing to meet that 
jurisdiction’s regulatory requirements.  
National 
treatment 
Foreign goods, services and factors are granted the same 
treatment under government provisions as those of 
domestic goods, services and factors. Departures from 
national treatment discriminate against foreign suppliers.  
Occupational 
licensing 
A system which controls entry and standards of practice 
within a particular occupation to those that meet a set of 
requirements or guidelines.  
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Preferential trade 
agreement (PTA) 
An agreement to lower (not necessarily eliminate) tariffs and 
other barriers to trade among the countries party to the 
agreement. PTAs usually include clauses that affect trade in 
goods and services, as well as investment. 
Prudential 
regulation 
Regulation on the operations of deposit-taking institutions 
such as banks, superannuation funds and other financial 
organisations, including insurance. Prudential regulations 
are designed to manage risks in the financial system, 
including ensuring the safety of depositor funds and the 
stability of the financial system. 
Quantitative 
restrictions 
Limits on the physical amounts of particular commodities 
that can be imported by a country. 
Ratemaking 
agreements 
International liner shipping agreements that include 
agreement to set or manage freight rates on a route and/or 
to limit capacity in order to raise rates above what they 
would be in the absence of the agreement. 
Regulatory 
harmonisation 
Alignment of differing regulations across jurisdictions. 
Regulatory harmonisation does not necessarily mean 
regulations are identical in each jurisdiction, but that they 
are consistent or compatible to the extent they do not result 
in barriers to trade, investment or labour mobility. 
Harmonisation is a more integrated method of regulatory 
coordination than mutual recognition, which recognises 
compliance across jurisdictions. 
Rules of Origin 
(RoO) 
Rules of Origin are used to define where a product was 
made and determine whether it qualifies for preferential 
treatment in the context of a PTA.  
Sensitive land Land of a particular type, such as farm land, that exceeds a 
particular area threshold, as detailed in New Zealand’s 
Overseas Investment Act 2005. 
Seventh freedom 
rights 
The right given to a designated airline to carry freight and 
passengers between two countries by an airline of a third 
country on a route with no connection in its home country. 
Structural 
adjustment 
Compositional shifts in the economy, such as changes in 
the relative size of industries, characteristics of the 
workforce and in the size and mix of activities within regions. 
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Trade creation A trade increase between partners in a PTA as a result of a 
preferential lowering of trade barriers.  
Trade diversion A decrease in imports between a PTA partner and third 
countries. This occurs when a tariff preference induces a 
PTA country to shift imports from a low cost third country 
supplier to a higher cost supplier from its PTA partner.  
Transaction costs The costs involved in exchange, such as transport costs, 
taxes, costs of regulatory compliance, and administrative 
costs. 
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Key points 
• The Australian and New Zealand economies have become closely integrated, 
beyond what could be expected with any third country. This has been facilitated by 
institutional, legal and cultural similarities, as well as geographic proximity. 
• Closer Economic Relations (CER) initiatives have contributed significantly to 
trans-Tasman integration over the past 30 years. Tariffs and quantitative restrictions 
have been eliminated on virtually all goods traded between the two countries; 
people move freely across the Tasman; and the CER agenda has expanded into 
new areas, such as services trade and behind-the-border regulatory barriers. 
• The Commissions’ assessment is that CER has produced benefits overall for 
Australia and New Zealand, even though evidence is limited in some areas. 
• Barriers to further integration remain and new issues will emerge. Addressing them 
is becoming more challenging, as the focus shifts to more complex areas, including 
the regulation of services. 
• To ensure that integration policies make the biggest contribution to both economies, 
future CER initiatives should continue to: be outward looking; take account of 
linkages with other agreements; and complement domestic policy improvement. 
• A ‘direction of travel’ towards a single economic market has been characterised by 
Prime Ministers in terms of a seamless market in which people and businesses can 
have a ‘domestic-like’ experience in either country. How far Australia and New 
Zealand go in this direction should emerge from good public policy processes 
focused on the achievement of net benefits. 
• This scoping study identifies more than 30 initiatives to promote beneficial 
integration. Most address regulatory barriers to services trade and commercial 
presence, and some remaining impediments to integration in goods, capital and 
labour markets. 
• Some of these initiatives will require more detailed consideration. 
• There is further potential for each government to cooperate with and learn from the 
other in policy development, service delivery and regulatory approaches. 
• Current governance approaches for CER are informal and flexible, and appear 
reasonably effective. This scoping study identifies some opportunities for 
improvement.  
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Overview 
The year 2013 marks the 30th anniversary of the historic Closer Economic 
Relations (CER) agreement between Australia and New Zealand. The close 
relationship goes back much further, with people moving freely across the Tasman 
since colonial times. Integration has increased over the past three decades, with 
trade, investment and people movement yielding benefits for both countries. 
Personal ties are extensive and deep, with some 480 000 New Zealand-born 
people living in Australia and around 65 000 Australian-born people living in New 
Zealand. The two countries have similar political, legal and economic institutions, 
as well as language and culture, leading to a relationship that the two Prime 
Ministers have recently described as being ‘like no other’ (Key 2011) and ‘family’ 
(Gillard 2011a). 
The CER agreement has a more prominent place in New Zealand than in 
Australia. More than half of New Zealand’s foreign direct investment comes from 
Australia and Australia is New Zealand’s largest export market. Australia’s 
economy is over seven times the size of New Zealand’s, so the commercial 
significance of New Zealand for Australia is smaller. New Zealand is nevertheless 
a major market for Australia’s manufactured exports and tourism industry, and 
Australians hold investments in New Zealand worth around A$74 billion. 
Against this backdrop, the Prime Ministers requested that the two Productivity 
Commissions jointly conduct a ‘scoping study’ to identify further initiatives to 
strengthen the trans-Tasman economic relationship and improve economic 
outcomes. The Commissions were asked to identify initiatives where joint net 
benefits would be highest and how they might best be implemented, noting any 
potentially significant transition and adjustment costs. 
Tables at the end of this overview outline the Commissions’ proposals for 
strengthening economic relations between Australia and New Zealand. The 
Commissions scoped a wide range of issues and focused on those most likely to 
offer joint net benefits. The broad scope of the study has inevitably limited the 
feasibility of undertaking an in-depth analysis of all the areas identified. Some of 
these will need more detailed consideration. 
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While the Commissions have used filtering criteria to identify the most promising 
initiatives, ranking reforms according to their likely joint net benefits is difficult to do 
with precision in such a broad-ranging scoping study. Indeed, feedback on the two 
grade star rating of recommendations in the draft report suggested that it would be 
of limited value for determining priorities for a future integration agenda. Moreover, 
no recommendations stand out in terms of providing markedly higher likely 
benefits, although some will obviously be more significant. The star rating system 
has therefore been removed from the final report. The packaging of initiatives into 
a coherent forward agenda that benefits both countries is primarily a matter for 
political judgment. 
What has been achieved? 
The genesis of CER was a meeting of Prime Ministers Fraser and Muldoon in 
Wellington in 1980, where it was agreed that, as the Australian Prime Minister 
expressed it: 
If the two countries can cooperate more closely in their own trading relationship, with 
each concentrating on what it can do best, it will help both countries to grow stronger 
and to compete in wider markets. We agreed in Wellington that any closer economic 
relationship must be outward-looking … 
The early years of CER saw major changes. Notably, tariffs and quantitative 
restrictions were eliminated on virtually all goods traded between the two countries 
by 1990, five years ahead of schedule. The CER agenda was extended from its 
initial focus on merchandise trade to cover trade in services, business regulation, 
taxation and government procurement. Provision was also made for greater 
cooperation between government agencies and engagement of New Zealand 
officials in meetings of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG). By 2004, 
these extensions were encompassed in the ambition of creating a ‘single 
economic market’ in which businesses, consumers and investors could operate 
‘seamlessly’ across the Tasman. 
Generally, economic integration increases the size of markets, which enables 
countries to capture scale advantages and specialise in activities they do relatively 
well. Consumers benefit from lower prices and increased choice, as cheaper 
imports take the place of more costly domestically-produced goods and services 
within more competitive market settings. There are also increased transfers of 
knowledge. Labour mobility provides workers with a wider range of employment 
opportunities and creates flexibility in the economy to respond to structural shocks 
and cyclical changes. 
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Further, CER appears to have helped change opinions about trade protection for 
manufacturing and thereby paved the way for unilateral reductions in general 
tariffs, particularly in New Zealand. In this way, CER bilateral trade arrangements, 
unlike many other preferential arrangements, may have acted more as a ‘building 
block’ than ‘stumbling block’ in the pursuit of wider reform and economic 
integration. 
Overall, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that CER has produced benefits 
for both Australia and New Zealand, even though there is uncertainty about the 
magnitudes. 
Key themes in further integration 
‘Closer’, but still politically separate 
Geographic proximity and commonalities between the two countries have enabled 
governments to pursue economic integration beyond what could be expected with 
any third country, while preserving the national interests of both countries. 
Australia and New Zealand are separate countries: political union is not a live 
option and this rules out some higher forms of integration. In particular, proposals 
for a monetary union would take integration to the point where it started to 
generate net costs. Following the recent euro area experience, such proposals 
would in any case have little support today. 
The political autonomy of the two countries has implications for the way the 
Commissions have applied ‘joint net benefits’ in this study (a term used 
interchangeably with net trans-Tasman benefits). The Commissions recommend 
policy initiatives which are likely to benefit both countries, even where the 
distribution of the benefits favours one country. They have made no attempt to 
rank recommendations on the basis of how these benefits would be distributed 
between or within each country. In cases where a policy initiative would provide 
joint net benefits, but would likely involve a net cost for one country, the 
Commissions report that finding for possible consideration by governments as part 
of a wider package of actions. 
Deeper integration requires careful assessment 
Implementing agreements to reduce behind-the-border barriers — typically 
regulatory in nature — is more complicated than reducing tariffs. Work programs 
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have taken many years in some cases. For example, the first consultation paper 
on establishing a joint therapeutic products agency was released in 2000, yet the 
new agency is not due to be operational until 2016. In other areas — such as a 
mooted merger of stock exchanges and the integration of banking supervision and 
competition policy regimes — deeper integration has not been achieved. 
In contrast, there is an ambitious agenda and progress has been made for areas 
such as business law reform. Some existing initiatives may need to be revisited as 
circumstances change. However, as advances are made, new integration 
opportunities will become less obvious, and judgments will require well executed 
public policy analysis. 
The ‘direction of travel’ matters more than the destination 
The benefits and costs of integration initiatives alter as technology, preferences 
and other factors change. This means that the end point — in terms of the extent 
of economic integration that provides the largest net benefits — cannot be 
specified in advance. It should evolve with changing circumstances and be based 
on good public policy processes focused on the achievement of net benefits. 
A set of principles, which provides a broad direction of travel for trans-Tasman 
integration, was endorsed by Prime Ministers in 2009. They point to a single 
economic market (SEM) characterised by features such as: 
• substantively the same regulatory outcomes in both countries, achieved in the 
most efficient manner 
• regulated occupations operating seamlessly between each country 
• achieving economies of scale in regulatory design and implementation 
• products or services supplied in one jurisdiction being able to be supplied in the 
other. 
Importantly, the Prime Ministers specified that in moving towards a single 
economic market, policy initiatives would need to pass a cost-benefit test. 
The history of the relationship shows that it is better to anchor the future of CER 
and SEM in sound governance arrangements that can quickly and effectively 
identify and address issues as they arise, than in a vision. 
   
Overview  7 
  
The bigger regional picture is important 
CER should remain outward-oriented, and not become too narrowly focused on 
the bilateral relationship. This was recognised by the original architects of CER — 
they understood that it should not get in the way of either country securing 
beneficial wider integration opportunities. 
The fact that multilateral efforts to promote trade liberalisation have lost 
momentum reinforces the need to consider trans-Tasman integration in a regional 
and global context. That means generally avoiding actions that would impede 
trade or investment with other countries and being alert to opportunities to extend 
trans-Tasman initiatives into broader regional and multilateral fora. 
Future trans-Tasman economic integration needs to fit well with the broader 
challenges and opportunities presented by the ‘Asian century’. Asia accounts for 
one third of global GDP, double what it was 50 years ago. The continued rise of 
Asia presents important opportunities for both countries — with benefits that 
potentially greatly outweigh those on offer through further trans-Tasman 
integration, significant though these may be. The best way for the two 
governments to position their economies to benefit from the ‘Asian century’ will be 
to enhance their productivity and competitiveness. 
Domestic policy has trans-Tasman effects 
Closer economic integration is one potential source of productivity gains. Larger 
gains, however, will come from domestic policy and regulatory reforms. Policy 
actions by one country to increase national income also bring benefits to the other 
country, through trade and investment. For example, for every 1 percent 
expansion in Australia’s economy, New Zealand’s exports are estimated to 
increase by 0.2 percent and its economy to expand by nearly 0.1 percent. 
Domestic productivity improvements that are encouraged by good policy in one 
economy often place competitive pressures on the other. Greater openness to 
trade and in capital and labour markets by one party can expose rigidities that 
impede adjustment and thus put pressure on the other government to address 
these. 
Good process matters 
Advancing the integration agenda will require good policy processes — both for 
selecting those initiatives that are likely to generate the largest net benefits and for 
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avoiding any that would be costly or too difficult to implement. In order to make the 
biggest contribution to both economies, CER initiatives should: continue to be 
outward looking; not impede trade opportunities with other partners; take account 
of linkages with other agreements; and complement initiatives to enhance 
domestic policy. Analysis of integration policy initiatives needs to take into account 
the indirect as well as direct costs and benefits, be proportionate to the importance 
of the issue being addressed, and be publicly available. 
Scoping the future CER agenda 
Opportunities to strengthen trans-Tasman economic ties can be classified using a 
framework based on what the European Union has termed the ‘four freedoms’ — 
relating to trade in goods and services, and the movement of capital and labour. 
Knowledge transfers and the integration or interaction of government functions are 
also considered. 
This study focuses on areas where there are unnecessary barriers to integration 
— whether created intentionally or unintentionally. They may arise between the 
borders of Australia and New Zealand (typically affecting international transport 
costs); at the border of one or both countries (for example, tariffs and biosecurity 
restrictions); and behind their borders. 
The last category refers to situations where countries take different approaches to 
domestic regulation, which may add to the cost of doing business across the 
countries. Often, this arises because foreign providers are not afforded national 
treatment; that is, they are not treated as if they were domestic firms. Of the 
28 specific initiatives considered in this study, most involve impediments to trade 
in services (figure 1). Behind-the-border regulation looms particularly large. 
The Commissions’ proposals fall into three categories. First, initiatives to which 
both Governments have committed and are currently underway. These should be 
completed as soon as possible. Second, recommendations for new CER initiatives 
assessed by this study to offer net benefits for both countries. Third, 
recommendations that further work be done to determine an appropriate course of 
action. 
The tables at the end of this overview list the Commissions’ findings and 
recommendations and indicate where they are dealt with in the report. Some of the 
more significant proposals are summarised below. 
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Figure 1 Areas potentially affected by recommendationsa 
 
a Number of areas substantially affected by the recommendations identified in chapter 4. Some 
recommendations are likely to affect more than one area. 
‘First freedom’: trade in goods 
The main remaining impediment to merchandise trade between Australia and New 
Zealand is the cost of CER ‘rules of origin’. Waiving these for all items where tariffs 
are no greater than 5 percent would reduce compliance and administrative costs 
for a significant proportion of trans-Tasman trade. This reform could be built on by 
reducing the few remaining tariffs that exceed 5 percent to that level. 
‘Second freedom’: trade in services 
A CER Protocol supports free trade in most services, but excludes some — more 
in Australia than in New Zealand. The current review of these exclusions should 
be completed and published. Exclusions should be removed unless retention is 
shown to generate net benefits. 
Reducing transport and telecommunication costs would facilitate trade across the 
Tasman. While the trans-Tasman air route is already quite competitive, two 
remaining regulatory barriers to competition could usefully be removed. For 
shipping, the exemption of ocean carriers from key parts of competition regulation 
is no longer necessary and removing it would generate gains. Australia has 
followed a different path from New Zealand in regulating coastal shipping. When 
reviewing the restrictions on coastal shipping, the Australian Government should 
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adopt a broad cost-benefit framework and draw on the experience of New Zealand 
with its different regulatory approach. 
Moves towards a more integrated telecommunications market raise complex 
issues. While the regulatory frameworks across the Tasman seem reasonably 
aligned, some remaining differences require closer examination. Governments 
should consider regulatory barriers to trans-Tasman trade in telecommunication 
services and options for their removal as part of future reviews of their respective 
telecommunications regulations. A joint departmental investigation into trans-
Tasman mobile roaming markets has found evidence of limited competition and 
high prices. Governments have announced that they will respond to the final 
recommendations of the joint investigation when they are released at the end of 
this year. 
‘Third freedom’: capital flows 
The main areas of interest are foreign direct investment, taxation, banking and 
insurance. 
The two Governments should implement the investment protocol they signed in 
2011, which increased the thresholds for screening trans-Tasman investment. 
There would be further benefits from extending this protocol to lessen the 
remaining investment restrictions in ‘sensitive’ areas, given the closeness of the 
two countries. 
An issue of greater concern to most business participants is that companies are 
not allowed imputation credits on trans-Tasman investment, meaning company 
income is taxed twice in the hands of an individual if it crosses the Tasman. This 
issue has been debated for more than 20 years, signalling the complexities and 
judgments involved. 
Mutual recognition of imputation credits (MRIC) could expand investment across 
the Tasman and bring efficiency gains. It could also lead to net income transfers 
between Australia and New Zealand, which are likely to be larger than the 
efficiency gains. 
A possible outcome is for one country to experience a loss in its gross national 
income (GNI) — an indicator of community welfare that measures the income of a 
country’s residents — at the same time that there is a greater gain for the other, 
leading to a trans-Tasman gain overall. 
Principally because Australian investment in New Zealand is larger than New 
Zealand investment in Australia, Australian income transfers to New Zealand 
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would probably be greater than transfers the other way, and Australia is likely to 
be made worse off. It is possible that both Australia and New Zealand's GNI would 
rise, but this would require markedly asymmetric investment responses. 
The two governments should announce either a process, preferably with a clear 
deadline, for determining whether there is an efficient, equitable and robust 
mechanism that would ensure a satisfactory distribution of the gains from MRIC; or 
that MRIC will not go ahead if they consider that such a mechanism is infeasible. 
In relation to banking, the two countries have adopted some differences in 
approach to prudential supervision. This area of regulation is evolving rapidly, with 
an existing trans-Tasman forum well placed to assess integration opportunities. 
‘Fourth freedom’: people movement 
There are opportunities to reduce the costs and complications of trans-Tasman 
travel through wider implementation of SmartGate arrangements at the border, 
and development of a trans-Tasman tourist visa for foreigners visiting both 
countries. 
A high degree of integration in the trans-Tasman labour market has been an 
historical fact and should continue. The current arrangements provide for an 
efficient matching of people to job opportunities across the two countries. 
However, when people move to job opportunities in the other country their 
residency status changes and they face different policies for welfare supports, 
access to services and in taxation systems and voting rights. The Commissions 
are not recommending integration of welfare, taxation or citizenship policies. 
However, the Australian and New Zealand Governments should provide clearer 
and more accessible information to prospective migrants, new arrivals and long 
term residents about their responsibilities and entitlements in their destination 
country. This would enable people to make better informed decisions about 
seeking work in the other country. 
The Governments could also achieve better alignment of policies that impact on 
the trans-Tasman labour market by addressing significant negative outcomes for 
long term residents and any substantive issues for temporary residents. 
There are taxation issues, particularly for workers who move back and forwards 
between the countries and for businesses employing such workers. There are also 
issues about access to public services and assistance for New Zealand citizens 
who have been in Australia for many years, many of whom have paid taxes for 
years. These mainly centre on long term resident non-Protected Special Category 
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Visa holders and include: limited pathways to Australian permanent residence and 
citizenship; no access to student loans for their children; and restricted access to 
some social security payments and other supports. Addressing these would 
require policy changes by the Australian Government, including: 
• developing a pathway for New Zealand citizens living long term in Australia to 
achieve permanent residency and/or citizenship 
• improving access for New Zealand citizens to tertiary education and vocational 
training through the provision of student loans, subject to a waiting period and 
appropriate debt recovery provisions 
• together with the New Zealand Government, reviewing, and making more 
explicit, the principles governing access to social security and further 
developing bilateral engagement on migration policies, within the context of 
CER, the single economic market and the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement. 
This would continue a tradition of pragmatic responses to problems that have 
arisen historically in respect of the trans-Tasman relationship. 
Benchmarking government and regulatory services 
There is considerable cooperation between the public sectors of Australia and 
New Zealand. This has developed organically as opportunities have emerged. It 
can improve regulatory outcomes and reduce the cost of providing government 
services. The two Governments should ensure that their agencies consider 
opportunities for further cooperation on a case-by-case basis. Additional 
performance benchmarking of government services and regulation could identify 
scope for improved service delivery and regulation, and enhance diffusion of best 
practices across the Tasman. 
Making it happen 
The areas identified for further policy action vary in their significance, complexity 
and timescales (see summary list in tables below). Some proposals require more 
in-depth examination than has been practical in a scoping study of this breadth. 
This report should assist governments in assessing priorities and sequencing 
policy actions. Effective ongoing management of the agenda will be crucial. 
Current approaches to CER governance are informal and flexible, and appear 
reasonably effective thus far. However, there are opportunities for improvements 
through: 
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• clearer leadership and oversight of CER, including of issues relating to the 
trans-Tasman labour market and associated movement of people 
• requiring new regulatory proposals to account for trans-Tasman implications, 
where relevant 
• identifying and taking opportunities for coordinated action in the quest for 
greater and better regional and multilateral integration 
• formal five-yearly public reviews of CER’s direction and achievements. 
Conclusion 
The 30th anniversary of CER is an opportunity to acknowledge its considerable 
achievements since 1983 and to reflect on future opportunities to strengthen the 
trans-Tasman relationship. The depth and breadth of the achievements of the first 
30 years of CER make the task of defining a new agenda a challenging one. 
Nevertheless, the Commissions consider that the recommendations outlined in 
this report will help to maintain the vibrancy of the relationship and set it up to 
deliver further benefits to both countries over the coming years. 
Findings and recommendations 
Table 1 Findings 
 Findings 
  
F2.1 The seven Single Economic Market principles, announced by the Prime Ministers in 
2009, provide a useful direction of travel for future CER initiatives. 
F2.2 Analysis of integration policy initiatives should take into account both direct and indirect 
costs and benefits, be proportionate to the importance of the issue being considered, 
and be publicly available. 
F2.3 Joint net benefits will be increased if policy initiatives are: outward looking; generally do 
not impede profitable exchange with other trading partners; take account of linkages with 
other agreements; and are consistent with domestic policy improvement over time. 
F4.1 Mutual recognition of imputation credits (MRIC) would be expected to result in a more 
integrated capital market and improve trans-Tasman economic efficiency. 
However, MRIC would lead to a greater fiscal cost for Australia than New Zealand and to 
some income transfers between Australia and New Zealand. Australian transfers to New 
Zealand could be expected to be greater than transfers the other way, although their 
precise magnitude is impossible to predict. A probable outcome would be a net income 
loss for Australia. 
F4.2 The Trans-Tasman Council on Banking Supervision is well positioned to progress any 
work relating to the further integration of Australian and New Zealand prudential 
regulation. 
F4.3 The prerequisite conditions for a trans-Tasman monetary union do not exist. 
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Table 2 Recommendations — Initiatives underway 
 Recommendation Rationale 
Time scale for 
implementation 
    
R4.1 The remaining outcomes in the business 
law single economic market program 
should be completed on time, unless it can 
be demonstrated that they would no 
longer generate net benefits. 
Some of the business law 
reforms are behind schedule. 
Delivering the program on 
time will reduce compliance 
costs, deepen markets and 
increase competition. 
Short term 
R4.2 The Australian and New Zealand 
Governments should proceed with the 
implementation of a single application and 
examination process for patents. The 
trans-Tasman intellectual property 
reforms, particularly those relating to 
patents, should be evaluated within three 
years of implementation. 
There are potential 
operational benefits from 
closer collaboration between 
the Australian and New 
Zealand intellectual property 
offices. 
Short term 
R4.3 The Australian and New Zealand 
Governments should give priority to 
implementing those recommendations of 
the Australian Commission’s 2009 review 
of the Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition 
Arrangement that were accepted by 
Governments. 
Encourage occupational 
licensing systems that 
facilitate the efficient 
movement of labour within 
and across the two countries. 
Short term 
R4.4 Governments should publish a progress 
report on implementing accepted 
recommendations of the 2009 review of 
the Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition 
Arrangement before the next review, 
scheduled in 2013. 
The progress of all Australian 
governments and the New 
Zealand Government in 
implementing 
recommendations from a 
previous review of mutual 
recognition is not transparent. 
Short term 
R4.5 Australian and New Zealand occupational 
regulators should share knowledge and 
lessons in developing efficient and 
effective occupational licensing systems. 
Relevant Australian and New Zealand 
regulators should be included in 
consultations around the development of 
national occupational licensing systems in 
the other country. 
As occupational licencing is a 
significant entry point into the 
trans-Tasman labour market, 
it is in the interests of both 
Governments to cooperate 
and monitor changes in the 
other country’s systems. 
Ongoing 
R4.6 Given the long time it is taking to set up 
the Australia New Zealand Therapeutic 
Products Agency, the Australian and New 
Zealand Governments should publish 
regular progress reports. Once the Agency 
has been established, the Governments 
should review the lessons for other 
potential regulatory harmonisation 
initiatives. 
A single trans-Tasman 
regulator could reduce costs 
of regulation and increase 
technical capability. It would 
also provide useful lessons 
for other areas of potential 
harmonisation. 
Short to 
medium term 
R4.7 The CER Investment Protocol should be 
enacted as soon as practicable. 
The Protocol should reduce 
administrative costs for 
government and compliance 
costs for firms, and improve 
capital allocation. 
Short term 
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Table 3 Recommendations — Proposed initiatives 
 
Recommendation Rationale 
Time scale for 
implementation 
 
R4.8 The Australian and New Zealand 
Governments should: 
• waive CER Rules of Origin for all items 
for which Australia’s and New 
Zealand’s Most Favoured Nation tariffs 
are at 5 percent or less 
• consider reducing any tariffs that 
exceed 5 percent to that level. 
Savings in administrative 
and compliance costs for 
government and business 
and improved resource 
allocation. 
Short to 
medium term 
R4.9 Where cost effective, quarantine and 
biosecurity agencies in Australia and 
New Zealand should continue to develop 
common systems and processes, and 
enhance their joint approach to risk 
analysis. 
Benefits through sharing of 
information and resources. 
Ongoing 
R4.10 The Australian and New Zealand 
Governments should complete the 
review of the exclusions from the Trade 
in Services Protocol, to consider whether 
retaining each exclusion would generate 
net benefits. The review should be 
published.  
The removal of exclusions 
has the potential to generate 
benefits from enhanced 
trans-Tasman competition. 
Exclusions have not been 
reviewed since 2008. 
Short term 
R4.11 The Australian and New Zealand 
Governments should remove the 
remaining restrictions on the single trans-
Tasman aviation market. 
Maintain (already 
significant) competitive 
pressure in the trans-
Tasman air services market. 
Short term 
R4.12 The Australian and New Zealand 
Governments should: 
• ensure that the objective of air services 
policy is explicitly directed at promoting 
net benefits for the community  
• pursue the most liberal air services 
agreements possible, by negotiating 
reciprocal open capacity and all air 
freedoms, including cabotage where 
appropriate  
• revise designation and ownership 
requirements. 
Enhanced competition, 
lower airfares, and an 
expanded range of services. 
Medium term 
R4.13 The Australian Government should 
reconfigure the Passenger Movement 
Charge as a genuine user charge for 
border services. The New Zealand 
Government should review its border 
passenger charges to achieve full and 
transparent cost recovery, in line with 
existing arrangements for cargo. 
Increased transparency, and 
potentially more equitable. 
Short term 
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Recommendation Rationale 
Time scale for 
implementation 
 
R4.14 The Australian and New Zealand 
Governments should remove — 
preferably on a coordinated basis — the 
exemption for international shipping 
ratemaking agreements from legislation 
governing restrictive trade practices. 
Increased competition and 
potentially lower costs for 
businesses. 
Short term 
R4.15 When reviewing the restrictions on 
competition for coastal shipping, the 
Australian Government should adopt a 
broad cost-benefit framework and draw 
on the experience of New Zealand with 
its different regulatory approach. 
Net benefits for the wider 
Australian economy and 
community, and may reduce 
trans-Tasman shipping 
costs. 
Medium term 
R4.16 Governments should undertake 
systematic monitoring, data collection 
and benchmarking of ports’ performance 
in Australia and New Zealand, building 
on existing initiatives. 
Identify opportunities to 
improve performance of 
ports and facilitate the 
diffusion of good practice. 
Ongoing 
R4.17 The Australian and New Zealand 
Governments should include in the next 
reviews of their respective 
telecommunications regulatory 
frameworks a term of reference to 
examine barriers to trans-Tasman trade 
in telecommunication services and 
options for their removal. 
Identify beneficial 
opportunities to further 
harmonise 
telecommunications 
regulation. Medium term 
R4.18 The Australian and New Zealand 
Governments should consider removing 
remaining restrictions on trans-Tasman 
foreign direct investment. The policy 
rationale and the costs and benefits of 
any restrictions, including exceptions to 
national treatment left in place, should be 
made clear. 
Further reduce the cost and 
uncertainty of trans-Tasman 
investment and more fully 
realise the benefits from the 
free movement of capital Medium term 
R4.19 The Australian and New Zealand 
Governments should either: 
• initiate a process, preferably with a 
clear deadline, for determining whether 
there is an efficient, equitable and 
robust mechanism that would ensure a 
satisfactory distribution of the gains 
from the mutual recognition of 
imputation credits (MRIC); or 
• if they consider that such mechanisms 
are infeasible, announce that MRIC will 
not go ahead. 
MRIC would be expected to 
improve trans-Tasman 
economic efficiency and 
result in a more integrated 
capital market. However, 
MRIC would lead to a 
greater fiscal cost for 
Australia than New Zealand 
and to some income 
transfers between Australia 
and New Zealand. A 
probable outcome would be 
a net income loss, of 
uncertain size, for Australia. 
A workable mechanism 
would need to address 
these imbalances and 
uncertainties. 
Short term 
   
Overview  17 
  
 
Recommendation Rationale 
Time scale for 
implementation 
 
R4.20 Taxation of non-resident employees 
should be considered when the double 
taxation arrangements between Australia 
and New Zealand are next reviewed. 
Reduce compliance costs for 
businesses with employees 
active in both trans-Tasman 
jurisdictions. 
Short to 
medium term 
R4.21 The Australian and New Zealand 
Governments should progress the further 
roll out of SmartGate and associated 
systems where it is cost effective to do 
so, focusing on departures from Australia 
and major regional airports. 
Extending availability of 
SmartGate would simplify 
customs and immigration 
checks for a larger number 
of eligible travellers. 
Short term 
R4.22 The Australian and New Zealand 
Governments should consider a ‘trans-
Tasman tourist visa’ for citizens from 
other relevant countries who wish to 
travel to both countries. The charges for 
this visa should be based on a cost-
recovery model, with agreed sharing of 
revenue and costs. 
Reducing visa requirements 
may encourage foreign 
travellers to visit both 
countries on a trip. 
Short term 
R4.23 The Australian and New Zealand 
Governments should give clear and 
coordinated, whole-of-government advice 
to Special Category Visa holders in 
Australia, and New Zealand citizens 
contemplating residence in Australia, 
both before and after arrival, on their 
obligations and entitlements. 
Better information would 
help New Zealanders 
contemplating a move to 
Australia understand the 
current provisions and plan 
accordingly. 
Short term 
R4.24 The Australian Government should 
address the issues faced by a small but 
growing number of non-Protected 
Special Category Visa holders living long 
term in Australia, including their access 
to certain welfare supports and voting 
rights. This requires policy changes by 
the Australian Government, including the 
development of a pathway to achieve 
permanent residency and/or citizenship. 
Existing provisions have 
created anomalies in 
relation to a number of 
issues faced by non-
Protected Special Category 
Visa holders living long term 
in Australia. 
Short term 
R4.25 The Australian Government should seek 
to improve access of New Zealand 
citizens to tertiary education and 
vocational training through the provision 
of student loans, subject to a waiting 
period and appropriate debt recovery 
provisions. 
The existing arrangements 
compromise the opportunity 
to build skills and 
capabilities for an increasing 
number of young New 
Zealand citizens who have 
lived in Australia for many 
years. 
Short term 
R4.26 Within the context of CER, the Single 
Economic Market (SEM) and the Trans-
Tasman Travel Arrangement (TTTA), the 
Australian and New Zealand 
Governments should: 
• review, and make more explicit, the 
principles governing access to social 
security 
Given the anomalies in 
current arrangements, there 
would be merit in reviewing 
the principles underpinning 
access to social security 
within the context of CER, 
the SEM and the TTTA. 
Medium term 
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Recommendation Rationale 
Time scale for 
implementation 
 
• further develop bilateral engagement 
on migration policies. 
Further, in order to maintain 
the integrity of an integrated 
labour market, there would 
be advantages to both 
countries from working 
towards more aligned 
immigration policies. 
R4.27 The Australian and New Zealand 
Governments should encourage 
government agencies to consider 
opportunities for trans-Tasman 
coordination in service delivery and 
regulation on a case-by-case basis. 
Greater coordination may 
reduce costs, encourage 
knowledge transfer, and 
increase technical 
capability. 
Ongoing 
R4.28 The Australian and New Zealand 
Governments should seek beneficial 
opportunities to undertake joint 
benchmarking. In particular, they should 
determine an appropriate approach for 
New Zealand to participate in the Report 
on Government Services produced under 
the auspices of COAG, and also in 
regulatory benchmarking studies 
undertaken in Australia. 
Benchmarking can help 
identify opportunities for 
improvement and facilitate 
the diffusion of good 
practice. 
Ongoing 
R5.1 The Australian and New Zealand 
Governments should create clearer 
leadership and oversight of CER, 
including of issues relating to the trans-
Tasman labour market and associated 
movement of people. The enhanced 
leadership and oversight should build on 
existing governance arrangements and 
the annual meetings of Prime Ministers 
and other Ministers. 
Help maintain momentum of 
the CER agenda, while 
providing greater continuity, 
cohesion and foresight. 
Short term 
R5.2 Regulatory proposals at the national level 
should consider opportunities for trans-
Tasman collaboration or alignment that 
would lower costs or deliver benefits for 
businesses and people active on both 
sides of the Tasman. 
There may be opportunities 
to design changes in a way 
that lowers transaction costs 
for businesses operating 
across the Tasman. 
Ongoing 
R5.3 The Australian and New Zealand 
Governments should continue to identify 
and take opportunities for coordinated 
action to achieve beneficial regional and 
multilateral integration, and greater 
leverage in international rule making and 
standard setting. 
There may be cases where 
coordinated action can lead 
to greater leverage in 
multilateral fora, including 
those related to international 
rule making and standard 
setting.  
Ongoing 
R5.4 The Australian and New Zealand 
Governments should undertake five-
yearly public reviews of CER to take 
stock of what has been achieved and 
learnt, and to ensure that the agenda 
remains relevant and forward looking. 
Reviews would provide an 
opportunity to focus on the 
broad CER agenda and 
learn from evaluation and 
research conducted in the 
interim years.  
Ongoing 
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1 Introduction 
Australia and New Zealand have distinct national identities and physical 
environments. They are also former British colonies, sharing much history and 
common endeavour. In the late 19th century they contemplated political union. 
While this did not eventuate, the two countries continue to have much in common, 
including in culture, institutions and values. And they are close geographically — 
Sydney being closer to Auckland than Perth. These factors have enabled them to 
develop a closer relationship than could be expected with any other country. 
The Australian and New Zealand Governments have helped foster closer 
economic relations over a long period by reducing barriers to trade and 
investment, and facilitating free movement of people. The inaugural Closer 
Economic Relations (CER) agreement was signed in 1983 — the Australia New 
Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA). The 
economic integration agenda has continued to evolve over the past three decades. 
Key features of the Australian and New Zealand economies are outlined in 
table 1.1. 
1.1 What have the Commissions been asked 
to do? 
At their annual leaders’ meeting in January 2012, the Prime Ministers of Australia 
and New Zealand agreed that the Productivity Commissions of each country would 
jointly conduct a scoping study on strengthening trans-Tasman economic 
relations. The study is to identify reforms that would boost productivity, increase 
competitiveness and drive deeper economic integration between the two 
countries. The Commissions were asked to provide analysis on: 
• potential areas of further economic reform and integration, including identifying 
those where benefits are likely to be most significant, with particular focus on 
critical issues for business, such as investment and productivity 
• the economic impacts and benefits of reform 
• any significant transition and adjustment costs that could be incurred 
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Table 1.1 Country profiles — Australia and New Zealanda 
Australia New Zealand 
Land area 
 7 692 000 km2   268 000 km2 
Population & 3 largest cities 
Australia 22 324 000 New Zealand 4 405 000 
Sydney 4 610 000 Auckland 1 377 000 
Melbourne 4 170 000 Wellington 393 000 
Brisbane 2 150 000 Christchurch 381 000 
Political system 
Federation of states (6 states and 2 mainland 
territories) with the Parliament of Australia 
and most state parliaments being bicameral. 
Unitary state with a unicameral parliament. 
Economic structure 
GDP (US$ billion) 1 486   162 
GDP PPP (US$ billion): 914   122 
GDP per person PPP (US$) 40 234   27 668 
Contribution to GDP (%) 
Services 80   79 
Manufacturing 9   14 
Mining 8   1 
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 3   6 
Exports 
Goods & services exports (US$ billions) 324.8   46.5 
Goods & services exports (% GDP) 22   29 
Key goods exports (US$ billions)  
 Iron ore & concentrates 66.8  Milk powder, butter & cheese 9.0 
 Coal 48.7  Meat  4.3 
 Gold 15.7  Logs, wood & wood articles 2.5 
Services exports (US$ billions) 52.1   10.1 
Trans-Tasman goods trade 
Trans-Tasman trade (% total trade) 3   23 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) 
FDI stock in country (US$ billions) 528.0   76.2 
FDI stock abroad (US$ billions) 352.7   19.5 
Government sector 
Government expenditure (% GDP) 37   42 
a Data are for 2011 (population data are for June 2011; FDI data are for December 2011), except for 
government expenditure as a proportion of GDP and trans-Tasman trade data, which are for 2009. 
GDP: gross domestic product. PPP: purchasing power parity. 
Sources: IMF (2012); OECD (2011c); RBA (2012); RBNZ (2012a); UN Comtrade database (2012); various 
Australian Bureau of Statistics and Statistics New Zealand publications. 
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• identification of reform where joint net benefits are highest 
• the means by which reforms might be best actioned 
• the likely time paths over which benefits are expected to accrue. 
This report is to inform the next meeting of Prime Ministers, scheduled for early 
2013. The terms of reference are included in the preface to this report. 
The timing of this scoping study is noteworthy in at least two respects. First, it 
occurs in the lead up to the 30th anniversary of the ANZCERTA. This anniversary 
provides an opportunity to take stock of what has been achieved and what 
remains to be done, and to consider how developments in our region should 
influence further trans-Tasman integration. In particular, it is important to ensure 
that CER acts as a ‘building block’ to broader integration in what is becoming 
known as the ‘Asian century’ (Henry 2012). 
Second, much of Europe is now going through an economic crisis. This crisis has 
complex causes, with one strand relating to the failure of economic integration to 
fully deliver on its promise (despite its evident successes). The European 
experience with economic integration, both positive and negative, can provide 
valuable lessons for Australia and New Zealand. 
1.2 Strengthening economic relations 
Government efforts to strengthen economic relations with other countries are 
commonly referred to as economic integration initiatives. A higher degree of 
integration could be expected to increase trade, and flows of capital and labour. 
Prices for goods, services and factors of production will tend to converge in two 
countries that are highly integrated, as the costs of exchange (or ‘transaction 
costs’) are lowered. 
What should the policy objective be? 
Increased economic integration expands the extent of markets, enabling countries 
to capture greater scale advantages and specialise in those things they do 
relatively efficiently. Resources ultimately shift to these activities and lower priced 
imports take the place of more costly domestically-produced goods and services. 
This is a dynamic process that encourages competition and innovation. 
Consumers benefit from lower prices and greater choice. The integration of labour 
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markets — a prominent feature of the trans-Tasman relationship — opens up 
opportunities for people to develop and apply their skills and earn higher wages. 
Government efforts to promote economic integration can achieve these types of 
benefits, but there are potential costs. Aligning regulations can be complicated, 
administratively costly and politically difficult, and sometimes produces results that 
are not a good fit for local circumstances. Achieving greater specialisation can 
bring significant benefits, but can also involve adjustment costs. Moreover, where 
integration is pursued bilaterally — the focus of this scoping study — there is a risk 
that it will be at the expense of productive exchanges with other countries. Higher 
levels of integration, such as through a monetary union, also carry their own risks, 
as demonstrated by the recent European experience. 
Accordingly, rather than promoting economic integration to the maximum extent 
possible, the policy objective should be to maximise the net benefits from 
integration, as implied by the terms of reference for this study. 
What role for governments? 
In market-based economies such as Australia and New Zealand, firms make their 
own decisions about whether to export to, or purchase inputs from, other 
countries. Likewise, individuals make independent purchasing decisions, often 
between domestic and imported goods and services. Individuals also decide 
whether to move to another country to work. 
Accordingly, the main way that governments can promote integration with other 
economies is by making it easier and less costly to exchange goods, services and 
capital, and for labour to move internationally in response to economic 
opportunities. Governments have a more direct role in pursuing worthwhile 
opportunities to integrate government functions. 
Examples of ways that governments promote economic integration include: 
• lowering or removing tariffs and other measures that deliberately favour 
domestic production over imports 
• removing regulatory barriers to competition, thereby encouraging greater 
market participation by both foreign and domestic firms 
• aligning so-called ‘behind-the-border’ regulations more closely with those of 
other countries (for example, aligning product safety regulations), saving 
exporters the expense of tailoring production to comply with country-specific 
regulations 
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• pursuing higher levels of integration, by adopting common monetary or fiscal 
policies. 
Governments directly influence the environment in which firms and individuals 
operate; however they are not the sole driver of economic integration. Geography, 
institutional and social/cultural factors, and the everyday operation of markets are 
also important. Markets can reduce transaction costs in many ways, including 
through innovation in communications, transport and logistics. For example, 
market-driven processes saw the costs of ocean freight fall by 80 percent (in real 
terms) between 1930 and 2000. This contributed to an uplift in trade and greater 
economic integration around the world. The costs of air passenger transport and 
international communications fell even further (OECD 2007). 
Accordingly, economic integration should be seen as something that governments 
can choose to promote or inhibit, through actions that reduce or increase 
transaction costs for firms and individuals. 
1.3 The Commissions’ approach 
The Commissions have been guided by the terms of reference and the ‘scoping’ 
nature of the study, while meeting the requirements of their enabling legislation 
(Productivity Commission Act 1998 (Cwlth); New Zealand Productivity 
Commission Act 2010). 
The Commissions’ approach has centred on identifying opportunities for the 
Australian and New Zealand Governments to lower the costs of exchange in ways 
that generate net benefits. Often these opportunities involve modifying existing 
policies that either deliberately or inadvertently make transaction costs higher than 
they need to be. 
Doing this has involved four main tasks: 
• First, gleaning insights from the 30 year experience with CER to help guide the 
future integration agenda — being cognisant of the economic challenges and 
opportunities that lie ahead for Australia and New Zealand. 
• Second, addressing unfinished business — CER initiatives to which both 
Governments have committed, but not yet completed. Issues include how to 
overcome delays to worthwhile reforms and identifying measures that should 
not proceed. 
• Third, identifying new integration initiatives with the potential to generate net 
benefits across the two countries. There are many potential initiatives, 
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spanning the traditional four economic freedoms (as set out in the Treaty of 
Rome 1957) — freedom of exchange of goods, services, capital and labour — 
together with the free exchange of knowledge. To make this task tractable 
within the context of a scoping study, filtering criteria have been used to identify 
those options with the most potential. In some cases, sufficient evidence was 
obtained to make specific recommendations. In others, areas were identified 
that potentially offer net benefits, but further work is needed to identify the best 
way forward. ‘Directions of travel’ were identified for the economic relationship 
over the longer term. 
• Fourth, as with all areas of public policy, implementation is important. The 
Commissions considered institutional and governance arrangements for 
managing the trans-Tasman economic relationship and what changes are 
warranted to advance the future agenda. 
The terms of reference request the Commissions to identify reforms where joint 
net benefits are highest. While the coverage of the scoping study and the time 
available has made addressing all the issues raised in submissions infeasible, the 
Commissions have identified the most promising areas for reform on the basis of 
the available evidence on the breadth and depth of particular impediments to 
integration. However, comparing the joint net benefits of potential reforms in those 
areas is challenging in the context of a broad-ranging scoping study. The 
discussion draft trialled an indicative, two grade ranking of the relative importance 
of potential reforms, but feedback suggests that it would be of limited value for 
determining priorities for a future integration agenda. It has also become clearer in 
preparing this final report that no reforms are ‘stand outs’ in terms of likely net 
benefits. Given the resultant risk that formal rankings of joint net benefits would be 
of little value and may even be misleading, such rankings have not been included 
in this final report. 
In any case, the packaging of initiatives into a coherent forward agenda that 
benefits both countries is primarily a matter for political judgment. Information on 
potential benefits and costs in each country that would arise from the different 
reforms, which can assist in such judgments, is included in the Commissions’ 
assessments, in chapters 4 and 5, and in the associated supplementary papers. 
1.4 Conduct of the scoping study 
The scoping study was announced at a meeting of the Prime Ministers of Australia 
and New Zealand, with the terms of reference being received on 14 March 2012. 
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The two Chairmen and Commissioners from each organisation led the study, 
supported by a cross-Commission team. 
The study was advertised in national and metropolitan newspapers in both 
countries, and promoted on the Commissions’ websites as well as on a joint study 
website. The Commissions engaged widely with stakeholders, drawing on input 
from participants through visits, roundtable discussions and written submissions. A 
technical modelling workshop on mutual recognition of company tax imputation 
credits was also held (appendix A). 
Sixty submissions were received in response to the issues paper released in April 
2012. A further 71 submissions were received in response to the discussion draft 
released in September 2012. 
Quantitative modelling has been undertaken to provide insights relevant to various 
parts of the study. Economy-wide modelling has been used to illustrate the wider 
effects of economic integration. 
Much of the detailed work undertaken for the study can be found in supplementary 
papers published on the study website. 
The Commissions are grateful to participants in this study for meeting with 
Commissioners and staff, participating in roundtables and making written 
submissions. 
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2 Framework for trans-Tasman 
integration 
 
Key points 
• Economic integration is about freedom of exchange, and the consequential flows of 
goods, services, capital, technology, knowledge and people. Economic integration 
often involves removing or lowering barriers or distortions created by government 
policy. These barriers can be intended (for example, tariffs and restrictions on 
foreign direct ownership) or unintended (for example, compliance costs caused by 
differences in business regulation). 
• Policies to encourage closer economic integration can improve the productivity of 
the Australian and New Zealand economies. Some policy initiatives can, however, 
impose net costs. 
• The key question for this study, given the existing close economic relations between 
the two countries, is which opportunities for further integration can improve the 
wellbeing of Australians and New Zealanders. 
• The Commissions’ approach is to recommend policy initiatives that provide net 
benefits for both countries, even where the distribution of benefits favours one 
country. However, where a policy initiative provides benefits in aggregate, but is 
likely to have a net cost for one country, results are reported for possible 
consideration by Governments as part of a wider package of actions. 
• The joint net benefits from further integration will be increased if policy initiatives are 
outward looking and generally do not impede profitable exchange with other trading 
partners. Initiatives should take account of linkages with other agreements and be 
consistent with domestic policy improvement. 
• Analysis of integration initiatives should take into account both direct and indirect 
costs and benefits, should be proportionate to the importance of the issue being 
considered, and be publicly available. 
• A ‘direction of travel’ towards a single economic market has been characterised by 
Prime Ministers in terms of a seamless market in which people and businesses can 
have a ‘domestic-like’ experience in either country. How far Australia and New 
Zealand go in this direction should emerge from good public policy processes 
focused on the achievement of net benefits. 
• The services sector is likely to be a key part of the future integration agenda, given 
its significance to both economies and common policy objectives in many areas.  
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Australia and New Zealand are closely integrated, both economically and socially. 
Personal ties are extensive and deep with more than 40 000 flights across the 
Tasman each year, around 480 000 New Zealand-born people living in Australia, 
and around 65 000 Australian-born people living in New Zealand. 
Commercially, Australia is New Zealand’s single largest export market and more 
than half of foreign direct investment (FDI) in New Zealand comes from Australia. 
As Australia’s economy is over seven times the size of New Zealand’s (on a 
purchasing power parity basis), the commercial significance of New Zealand for 
Australia is smaller but nonetheless important. For example, New Zealand is a 
significant market for Australia’s manufactured exports and Australians held 
investments in New Zealand worth about A$74 billion in 2010. 
There is considerable cooperation between government agencies. The two 
countries have similar political, legal and economic institutions, share the same 
language and have cultural similarities, leading to a relationship that New 
Zealand’s Prime Minister describes as being ‘like no other’ (Key 2011) and 
Australia’s Prime Minister describes as ‘family’ (Gillard 2011a). 
Governments provide the framework within which people and businesses make 
integration happen. In the case of Australia and New Zealand, this framework 
consists of many agreements and a commitment to a single economic market 
agenda. Although ‘the ditch’ is a natural impediment to trans-Tasman integration, 
falling transport costs and new communication technologies are reducing its 
significance. 
The key question for this study, given the existing close economic relations 
between the two countries, is which opportunities for further integration can 
improve the wellbeing of Australians and New Zealanders. 
This chapter describes the benefits from economic integration in general and from 
further integrating the Australian and New Zealand economies in particular. There 
are also costs that need to be accounted for or managed. Finally, the chapter sets 
out a conceptual framework to help ensure that policy initiatives to promote further 
integration maximise the net benefits — the difference between benefits and costs 
— that closer integration can bring. 
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2.1 Economic integration and the role of 
government 
Defining integration 
‘Economic integration’ is about the freedom of exchange of goods, services, 
capital, technology, knowledge and people between countries. All else equal, such 
integration expands as transaction costs are reduced (box 2.1). 
Benefits from economic integration include greater trade and increased mobility of 
labour, capital and knowledge, which in turn can generate benefits from 
specialisation and economies of scale. 
There are commercial incentives in markets to reduce transaction costs in a 
myriad of ways — including through innovation in communications, transport and 
logistics, through information and insurance markets, by adapting institutions 
including firm structures (such as multinationals), and through agglomeration. 
How governments influence integration 
Government policies influence transaction costs, thereby facilitating or hindering 
economic integration. Governments can intervene: between the borders of two 
countries through mechanisms that affect transport costs; at the border, by 
imposing barriers such as tariffs; and behind the border through, for example, 
consumer protection and food safety regulations, which affect market access for 
foreign producers. Table 2.1 provides examples of where such barriers might 
affect the movement of goods, services, capital and labour. There may also be 
impediments to knowledge transfers and to productive interactions between 
government organisations and services. 
 
Box 2.1 Transaction costs: why borders matter 
In the context of economic integration between countries, transaction costs refer to 
costs which are incurred in trade, or the movement of resources across borders. They 
include a variety of costs ranging from transport and regulatory compliance through to 
information-gathering and coordination. 
Transaction costs can be classified according to their causes — being either 
policy-related or structural — and where they occur relative to a particular border. The 
figure below is illustrative, allocating a selection of transaction costs according to 
whether they are mainly structural or policy-related. 
(Continued next page)  
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Box 2.1 (continued) 
Figure Transaction costs: types and determinants 
 
The extent of transaction costs applying to trade across a border has been referred to 
as the ‘thickness’ of that border. Thinner borders enable closer economic integration. 
While governments may want to reduce some transaction costs to facilitate economic 
integration, they may also wish to preserve the benefits of borders — such as tailoring 
regulatory systems according to their economic characteristics and citizens’ 
preferences. Accordingly, governments are more likely to be able to reduce the 
thickness of borders with countries with which they have more compatible institutions 
and governance. 
While policy-related transactions costs, such as tariffs, can be addressed directly by 
changing government policy, structural transaction costs resulting from geography and 
technology can only be influenced indirectly. For example, governments can improve 
transport efficiency by removing distortions in transport and infrastructure markets. 
Source: World Bank (2009).  
 
Government actions can affect transaction costs in three main ways. 
• Governments can reduce transaction costs by providing the institutional and 
legal platforms required for well-functioning markets, including the rule of law 
(to enforce contracts) and a robust system of property rights. These platforms 
can extend across national borders; for example, linking countries’ intellectual 
property regimes (discussed in chapter 4). 
• Some government policies, whether deliberately or inadvertently, increase 
transaction costs, impeding exchange and distorting economic activity without 
correcting a market failure. Such policies — for example, tariffs and other trade 
barriers — unambiguously reduce efficiency and community wellbeing. 
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Table 2.1 Organising framework, with illustrative impediments 
Type of 
exchange 
Point at which impediment occurs 
Between-the- 
borders 
regulation 
At-the-border 
regulation 
Behind-the-border regulation 
Lack of national 
treatment 
Other 
Goods Maritime and air 
transport costs 
Tariffs and  
non-tariff barriers 
Bias in government 
procurement 
Consumer  
law 
Services     
Mode 1:  
Cross-border 
trade 
Post and tele-
communications 
costs 
 Bias in government 
procurement  
 
Mode 2: 
Consumption 
abroad 
Transport costs Migration laws   
Mode 3: 
Commercial 
presence 
 Foreign 
investment  
laws 
Ownership 
requirements 
Impediments to 
establishment and 
operations 
Mode 4: 
Movement of 
persons 
Transport costs Migration laws Eligibility for 
government 
programs 
Occupational 
licensing 
Capital  Screening of 
foreign 
investment 
Ownership 
requirements 
Prudential 
regulation 
Labour Transport costs Migration laws Eligibility for 
government 
programs 
Occupational 
licensing 
• The third situation is more complex. When governments intervene to correct 
market failures, their intervention may increase transaction costs for domestic 
and foreign businesses and impede cross-border trade. If these interventions 
are efficiently implemented to address a clearly specified problem such as 
pollution, they will enhance community wellbeing even if they reduce trade. But 
if the transaction costs are unnecessarily high — say, because of poorly 
designed intervention — they may impede trade that could have benefited both 
countries. 
Only case-by-case analysis can reveal whether reducing transaction costs has net 
benefits. Box 2.2 provides a hypothetical example. 
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Box 2.2 Different product safety standards that increase transaction 
costs: improved wellbeing or a barrier to integration? 
Suppose that two countries have different product safety standards for electrical 
products. Exporters from the country with less stringent standards (A) have to redesign 
products for export to the other country (B). This is a transaction cost that may impede 
exports from country A to country B. But is this an economic problem? 
One way to remove the cost of redesigning the product for different markets would be 
for the two countries to harmonise their safety standards at the more stringent level of 
country B. But this will increase the prices that domestic customers in country A will 
have to pay for electrical products, although they will benefit from a higher level of 
safety. Another approach, mutual recognition, would enable producers in country A to 
export to country B without redesigning their products. But this may expose consumers 
in country B to products with lower safety standards, although they may benefit from 
lower prices. 
Whether to implement harmonisation or mutual recognition, or retain different 
standards in cases such as this, depends on factors such as: the extent of differences 
in attitudes and preferences; the number of firms operating in both jurisdictions; and 
the size of policy-related transaction costs.  
 
The challenge for policy makers is to ensure that transaction costs are not 
excessive, and do not unduly impede the movement of goods, services, labour 
and capital across borders. The benefits of international trade are more likely to be 
achieved under these conditions. Countries are able to specialise in producing 
those goods and services in which they have a comparative advantage, firms can 
reap scale economies in production and there is increased dynamism in local 
industries that are no longer sheltered from international competitors. Knowledge 
is transferred more freely across borders, and capital and labour move to higher 
value uses. 
These benefits, however, are associated with economic integration in general. 
This study is about economic integration between Australia and New Zealand. 
What are the potential benefits and costs of policies that focus on closer 
integration between Australia and New Zealand, in a world with other integration 
opportunities? 
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2.2 What are the potential impacts of 
trans-Tasman economic integration? 
To provide a framework for assessing policy initiatives, this section sets out the 
potential benefits of bilateral integration and then the potential costs. 
There are significant potential benefits 
Specialisation and economies of scale 
In small economies it is difficult to achieve scale economies by supplying only 
domestic markets. A free international trading environment enlarges markets, 
helping to overcome this problem. When there is free international trade, ‘the 
benefits of large country size fade away’ (Alesina and Spolaore 2005, p. 13), at 
least in relation to traded goods. When trade or other barriers remain, negotiating 
better market access to specific countries — particularly ones that are larger — 
becomes a means to specialise production, expand market size and achieve 
economies of scale. 
There is considerably less trade across the Tasman in services than in goods 
(chapter 3). Although the services sector is only partly amenable to cross-border 
trade, recent technological advances are making services more tradeable. For 
example, lower communication costs are making remote medical consultations 
feasible. This suggests that the services sector should be a focus of the future 
integration agenda, especially given that much of the agenda for integrating the 
goods sector has already been completed. 
Increased competition 
Many industries have only a small number of competitors due to the relatively 
small size of some markets in Australia, and even smaller markets in New 
Zealand. As the Chair of the New Zealand Commerce Commission observed: 
Being a small economy, New Zealand businesses understandably face challenges in 
acquiring the scale to operate efficiently and compete effectively, especially in global 
markets. The level of aggregation that may be tolerated in New Zealand markets is 
therefore higher than in some larger economies. (Berry 2011, p. 1) 
To the extent that integration between Australia and New Zealand increases 
market size, it may increase the number of competitors in markets and reduce 
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barriers for potential entrants. Greater competition can encourage firms to be more 
efficient and innovative. 
The relationship between competition, capital markets and innovative economies, 
where scale and specialisation play out, is important. It results in complex activity 
and greater productivity, which is difficult to quantify, although some evidence is 
presented in Chapter 3. 
Scale and government services 
Cooperation between governments can generate economies of scale that reduce 
the cost of the services they deliver. Food Standards Australia New Zealand 
(FSANZ) and the proposed Australia New Zealand Therapeutic Products Agency 
(ANZTPA) are examples of the two Governments jointly providing a regulatory 
service. 
The New Zealand regulatory impact statement on ANZTPA observed that: 
The economies of scale and removal of duplication that would result from regulating 
jointly with Australia would lower overall administrative and compliance costs. The 
actual impact on New Zealand would depend on how the costs were shared between 
the two countries in the longer term, but the overall compliance costs for New Zealand 
industry would be lower in a joint scheme. (ANZTPA 2002, p. 6) 
Integration of government services can involve considerable redesign of systems 
when values and preferences differ between countries — as the history of 
ANZTPA illustrates (chapter 3) — and so opportunities for joint provision need to 
be selected carefully. 
Labour mobility 
People mobility has been an important feature of the trans-Tasman relationship 
since the 19th century. Movement of people between countries — as currently 
applies under CER — allows labour to be allocated to its most productive use and 
to acquire new skills. The prospect of better employment opportunities abroad 
should encourage more people to pursue education, which can help raise 
productivity. Trans-Tasman labour flows have helped to address short-term 
imbalances in the Australian and New Zealand labour markets (PC 2010). 
The overall economic effects of migration depend on a complex set of factors. The 
Australian Commission (PC 2006a) identified various ways in which immigration 
and population growth might be linked to increased productivity and income per 
person, including through: effects on sectoral reallocation of economic activity; the 
   
Framework for trans-Tasman integration 35 
  
supply of labour; scale economies and competition; taxation; and government 
expenditure on services and transfer payments. The overall outcome is an 
empirical matter as some factors contribute positively and some negatively. 
Supplementary paper D discusses labour mobility in detail. 
Knowledge transfers 
Knowledge is a key source of innovation. The pathways through which knowledge 
can be transferred between Australia and New Zealand include: 
• business linkages, such as through ‘learning through exporting’ and through 
FDI. Foreign investment often brings with it new technology, some of which 
may be passed on to local firms, and new skills for local workers, which they 
take with them when they move to other employment. Knowledge transfer 
might be further enhanced if foreign firms find a larger, integrated, Australia-
New Zealand market more attractive in which to establish a presence. 
Chapter 4 discusses whether restrictions on FDI between Australia and New 
Zealand should be relaxed 
• integration within the government sector, as illustrated by the Australia and 
New Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG). ANZSOG was established in 
2002 by the New Zealand, Australian, and three state Governments and a 
consortium of universities and business schools from both sides of the Tasman. 
It provides Masters and leadership programs for public servants, and funding 
for research relating to public administration, with a trans-Tasman focus. 
Collaborative government funding of research projects is another example 
• cross appointments of senior staff 
• education exports, where students travel across the Tasman to study. 
Knowledge transfer can also happen in policy areas. A clearly superior policy 
approach in one jurisdiction might be adopted by others, particularly if there is 
transparent assessment, benchmarking, and evaluation of costs and benefits. 
Chapter 3 describes cases where policy knowledge has travelled across the 
Tasman. 
Promoting good domestic policy 
Domestic policies that improve the productivity of industries in one economy’s 
traded goods sector increase pressures on industries in the other economy to 
increase their productivity, in order to remain competitive (box 2.3). Greater 
openness to trade and factor flows can expose rigidities that impede structural 
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adjustment and thus puts pressure on governments to address those rigidities. 
The negotiation of integration agreements offers an opportunity to identify and 
leverage such initiatives. Integration agreements may reduce domestic concern 
over reform by making it a quid pro quo for improved market access in partner 
countries (PC 2010). The negotiation process also provides opportunities to 
identify best practices to improve regulation and policy development. 
 
Box 2.3 Modelling trans-Tasman effects of productivity improvements 
Productivity improvements in one country (country A) affect output in its trading partner 
(country B) through various mechanisms. 
• They increase the relative competitiveness of country A, expanding its global market 
share and output, and decrease that of country B, decreasing its output. 
• They increase returns to factors of production and incomes in country A, which 
increases demand for imports from country B and its aggregate output. 
• An increase in returns in country A causes factors to shift from country B to 
country A. This contributes to increasing aggregate output in country A and 
decreasing it in country B. 
The net effect on country B is an empirical matter, which depends on the nature and 
extent of its connections with other economies. 
The ANZEA model (box 2.9) was used to illustrate the effects of domestic policy 
initiatives in Australia and New Zealand. The two simulations consist of a 1 percent 
improvement in the productivity of all factor inputs in each economy, which translates 
into a 1 percent increase in GDP. 
Productivity improvements in New Zealand are estimated to have very little effect on 
Australia. There is a small substitution in favour of New Zealand sourced production in 
both Australia and New Zealand as a result of reduced production costs in New 
Zealand (in particular, in agriculture and food processing). This is compensated by an 
increase in New Zealand’s demand for Australian exports, which are required for 
additional construction activity and investment. 
Somewhat larger effects are at work when productivity improves in Australia. An 
increase in Australian income and consumption leads to an increase in Australia’s 
demand for New Zealand exports, most notably food and other manufactured products. 
This partly offsets the export contraction that New Zealand firms experience in other 
foreign markets as a result of increased Australian competitiveness. 
Source: Supplementary paper E.  
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Benefits for consumers 
Consumers benefit from a wider range of price and quality offerings when 
integration brings specialisation, exploitation of economies of scale, competition, 
mobility and better government services than would otherwise have been possible. 
There are also potential costs 
While bringing potential benefits, integration initiatives can give rise to costs that 
should be taken into account. 
Trade diversion 
Trade agreements that give member countries more favourable market access 
than to non-member countries can lead to ‘trade diversion’.1 This means that more 
profitable exchanges with non-members can be crowded out by the induced 
expansion of exchange among members, possibly to the extent that national 
incomes in the member countries decline, despite gains to producers. 
This issue is most commonly raised in the context of preferential tariffs on 
merchandise trade. Preferential easing of other cost-raising barriers at the border 
(such as screening of FDI or quarantine procedures), where this can be done 
without compromising legitimate government objectives, reduces costs on the 
exporting partner countries and could reduce prices for the importing partner. 
Prices could, however, be lower still if unnecessary barriers were removed for all 
trading partners (box 2.4). 
Many remaining barriers to trade in services and factor flows lie behind the border. 
In certain cases, these impediments will arise because foreign firms and 
individuals are treated differently from locals (for example, schemes that give 
preference to local suppliers). With integration, gains will flow to those foreign 
suppliers with preferential access to the local protected market. The local economy 
will gain from any increase in competition that lowers prices. In these cases, there 
would be no diversion from suppliers in non-partner countries, but there would be 
crowding out of local suppliers by lower-cost suppliers in the partner country with 
                                              
1 Investment diversion can also occur where investors in partner countries face lower 
barriers to foreign investment relative to investors in non-partner countries. 
Supplementary paper C on FDI has a description of investment diversion and its 
possible effects. 
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preferred access. Again, prices could be lower still if the local preference were 
removed from all imports that met the required quality standard. 
 
Box 2.4 Preferential easing of barriers at the border 
A preferential tariff provides the equivalent of an export subsidy to exporters in partner 
countries, as it increases their competitiveness relative to exporters in the rest of the 
world. If the resulting exports from partners simply replace lower cost ones from 
elsewhere (trade diversion) then the country giving the preferential treatment is worse 
off — total imports are unchanged but it has forgone tariff revenue to the benefit of 
exporters in partner countries. With reciprocity of preferential tariffs, each country could 
be worse off even though their exporters would be better off. 
For a country to benefit from giving a tariff preference, it is necessary (but not 
sufficient) for domestic prices of the import to decrease. In this case there will be 
benefits from the additional lower-priced imports (trade creation), but there will still be 
trade diversion losses from the replacement of lower-cost third-party goods with 
higher-cost partner-country goods. Thus, even in this more favourable circumstance, it 
is unclear whether giving a tariff preference yields national gains. Gains are more likely 
when partner country exporters are low-cost producers by world standards and their 
export supply is responsive to price changes. 
Where barriers at the border impose real costs on foreigners (such as screening of 
foreign direct investment capital or unnecessary quarantine procedures), preferential 
treatment (without compromising legitimate domestic policy objectives) would reduce 
costs for exporters in the partner country and generate gains to the importing country 
to the extent the domestic price fell. An expansion of exports from the partner would 
crowd out exports from third-party suppliers, but this diversion would not impose a cost 
on the importing country. That said, prices could be lower still if purely protective 
barriers were removed for imports from all countries.  
 
Behind-the-border barriers will often simply reflect a country’s way of doing 
business, or local circumstances and preferences. Harmonising regulations to 
reduce the costs for businesses operating across partner countries would 
inevitably require some change in regulations in one or both of the partner 
countries. Such changes could increase the cost of regulation for trade-exposed 
businesses in one or both countries, potentially reducing their international 
competitiveness.  
Implementation costs 
Integration initiatives typically create implementation costs for governments and 
the private sector. Most of the initiatives discussed in chapter 4 would require 
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negotiation, redesigning or setting up new systems, and training people to use 
these systems. 
Fiscal costs of labour mobility 
Trans-Tasman migration has implications for government expenditure on services 
(such as education and health) and transfer payments (such as social security). It 
also affects taxation revenue. While migration can lead to more efficient allocation 
of labour, open access to taxpayer-funded resources when there are uneven 
people flows can be a drain on budgetary resources in the destination country. 
There can also be pressures on the other country if, for example, emigrants return 
home when they become eligible for pensions, having worked and paid taxes in 
the source country. Chapter 4 considers options for balancing these opposing 
pressures. 
Trans-Tasman versus local preferences 
Regulatory integration usually involves some degree of acceptance by each 
country of the regulatory settings of the other. The gains from harmonising 
regulatory systems might be reduced if the agreed uniform regulations, standards 
or policy settings differ from what communities would otherwise choose. People in 
the two countries might prefer different trade-offs between costs and regulatory 
outcomes. The slow progress towards establishing ANZTPA is an example of 
disagreement about where this trade-off is best set. 
Potential risks for domestic policy 
While a bilateral agreement can encourage domestic policy improvements, 
focusing on bilateral initiatives could divert attention from the domestic policy 
agenda. Ai Group noted that it: 
… supports closer economic relations where the objective is to reduce the costs of 
doing business across the Tasman. However, Australia needs to consider resolving 
impediments to mutual recognition in the domestic Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) context before embarking on this in a trans-Tasman context. Careful cost 
benefit analysis also needs to be undertaken of any reforms to ensure that net 
economic benefits are achieved and maximised and there are benefits to both parties. 
(sub. 38, p. 3) 
And while economic integration provides opportunities to transfer policy knowledge 
across the Tasman, both countries should be receptive to better practices 
elsewhere. Federated Farmers of New Zealand noted that: 
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There is a perception in some quarters within New Zealand that adopting Australian 
policy, legislation, and institutions would in itself close the income gap between the two 
countries. Federated Farmers disagrees … 
The Federation believes that New Zealand should adopt the best possible policy, 
legislation and institutions regardless of where they originate, whether it be New 
Zealand, Australia, the UK, the US, or the rest of the world. (sub. 33, pp. 5–6) 
There is a risk that finalising an agreement becomes an end in itself and that 
negotiators accept a sub-optimal outcome. For example, changes to the duration 
of copyrights and other intellectual property provisions negotiated as part of the 
Australia United States Free Trade Agreement have reduced the likelihood of an 
appropriate balance between supplier and user interests in Australia’s intellectual 
property system (PC 2010). 
Chapter 3 includes a discussion on the relationship between the implementation of 
CER and the domestic policy agendas in Australia and New Zealand. 
Adjustment costs 
Integration may bring structural adjustment and distributional effects as production 
methods and patterns change. This can happen whether integration is driven by 
market pressures or policy changes. For example, integration can impact directly 
on an industry’s workers and owners by increasing the scope for specialisation. It 
can also indirectly affect the wider community (box 2.5). 
The transition costs of change are normally less long-lived than the benefits from 
moving resources to more productive uses. Nevertheless, adjustment costs can be 
concentrated in particular industries or regions. Small costs at a national level can 
be substantial for particular sectors or communities. 
Where it appears that a policy will generate significant adjustment costs, 
governments can respond by: 
• relying on generally-available adjustment measures (such as government 
provided job search services and the social security safety net) 
• accompanying the policy change with specific adjustment assistance measures 
(for example, financial compensation to those most affected) 
• modifying the policy to reduce adjustment costs, to allow people to plan for 
change (for example, phasing it in) 
• considering the case for modifying a policy following its initial implementation. 
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To improve on generally-available adjustment measures, specific measures need 
to be targeted, involve an equitable sharing of their financing costs, interact 
efficiently with other programs and policies, and be transparent and subject to 
appropriate accountability mechanisms (PC 2001). 
 
Box 2.5 Economic integration and ‘hollowing out’ 
‘Hollowing out’ typically refers to the transfer of high-value economic activities or 
capacities from one community to another, as a result of changes in economic forces 
(Easton 2007; OECD 2011a). 
The ‘hollowing out’ concern most relevant to this study is associated with 
agglomeration economies, which occur when economic activity gathers together, 
resulting in with high density and scale (World Bank 2009). A larger country may be 
better able to exploit such economies, leaving the smaller country to specialise in 
activities for which agglomeration economies are smaller or insignificant. Both capital 
and labour may then shift to the larger country (Fujita, Krugman and Venables 2000; 
World Bank 2009). This suggests that under certain conditions, increased trans-
Tasman economic integration could lead to a net flow of labour and capital to Australia, 
with resources moving in order take advantage of larger agglomeration economies — 
widening the gap in GDP per capita between the two countries over time 
(McCann 2009; Easton 2007). While this might be a legitimate concern, the following 
observations can be made. 
First, agglomeration diseconomies exist alongside agglomeration economies; for 
example, congestion and high land prices in cities. The preferred location for economic 
activities is dependent on the balance between these forces — and is different for each 
activity (Hugo 2011). Also, the location of some activities is determined by immobile 
inputs; for example, minerals and agricultural land (Becker, Glaeser and Murphy 1999). 
This suggests that productive economic activities will continue to be spatially 
distributed. 
Second, economic changes in Australia and New Zealand are driven by many factors. 
Global forces such as technological developments and changes in the relative scarcity 
of resources are important. Outcomes reflect the interaction of all these forces, and 
their individual effects are difficult to disentangle. 
Third, evidence does not support fears of a ‘brain drain’ of skilled workers from New 
Zealand to Australia (supplementary paper D). 
Fourth, economic integration is a means by which small countries can participate in 
and benefit from the wider and deeper markets of larger countries (World Bank 2009). 
Integration carries some risks. However, policy in small countries can best address 
these risks by enhancing the adaptability of communities within a productive and open 
economy (World Bank 2009) and targeting adjustment support where appropriate to 
directly-affected individuals or communities.  
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2.3 How much trans-Tasman integration? 
The benefits and costs of integration will alter as technology, preferences and a 
host of other factors change. This means that the end point — in terms of the 
extent of beneficial economic integration — will evolve with changing 
circumstances. It can be thought of as a moving target that should naturally 
emerge from good public policy processes focused on the achievement of net 
benefits. 
Some submitters suggested that both the direction of travel and the end point 
matter and that the Commissions should develop a vision for the economic 
relationship. The Australia New Zealand Leadership Forum stated that the draft 
report ‘could, and should, be strengthened by providing a clear strategic vision for 
the economic relationship between Australia and New Zealand’ (sub. DR120, 
p. 1). The Commissions consider that the history of the relationship shows that it is 
better to anchor the future of CER and SEM in sound governance arrangements 
that can quickly and effectively identify and address issues as they arise, than in a 
vision. Chapter 5 looks at strengthening governance arrangements for this 
purpose. 
This conclusion is consistent with the seven principles for the Single Economic 
Market (SEM) that Prime Ministers announced in 2009 (box 2.6). New Zealand’s 
Minister of Commerce explained that: 
… the single economic market vision is not an articulated grand outcome but one built 
on principles that should govern our approach and accelerate the construction of key 
regulatory outcomes that will deliver a low-cost, innovative, and more seamless 
trans-Tasman operating environment for businesses. (Power 2009) 
While the first six SEM principles were developed in the context of business 
regulation, the Commissions consider that they provide a ‘direction of travel’ for 
future CER initiatives more generally. 
The seventh principle — to optimise net trans-Tasman benefit (referred to as ‘joint 
net benefits’ in the study terms of reference) — provides an over-arching test for 
the other six. It conveys that the other principles in box 2.6 should not be 
interpreted as objectives to be achieved in an absolute sense. For example, it is 
unlikely to be consistent with optimising joint net benefits for persons in Australia 
and New Zealand never to have to engage in the same process or provide the 
same information twice. Individuals who earn income in both countries, for 
instance, are likely to have to fill in tax returns in both countries unless tax systems 
are harmonised. Nevertheless, policy initiatives that reduce duplication of 
information provision are likely to be part of the single market agenda. 
   
Framework for trans-Tasman integration 43 
  
Building on the seventh SEM principle, the Commissions have sought to identify 
initiatives that would improve the wellbeing of the Australian and New Zealand 
communities. 
 
Box 2.6 Single Economic Market principles 
In 2009, the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand announced seven principles 
for the SEM. 
1. Persons in Australia or New Zealand should not have to engage in the same 
process or provide the same information twice. 
2. Measures should deliver substantively the same regulatory outcomes in both 
countries in the most efficient manner. 
3. Regulated occupations should operate seamlessly between each country. 
4. Both Governments should seek to achieve economies of scale and scope in 
regulatory design and implementation. 
5. Products and services supplied in one jurisdiction should be able to be supplied in 
the other. 
6. The two countries should seek to strengthen joint capability to influence 
international policy design. 
7. Outcomes should seek to optimise net trans-Tasman benefit. 
Source: Rudd and Key (2009).  
 
 
    
 
F2.1 
 
The seven Single Economic Market principles, announced by the 
Prime Ministers in 2009, provide a useful direction of travel for 
future CER initiatives. 
   
    
2.4 Identifying the most promising initiatives 
Selecting initiatives for analysis 
There are many areas in the economy where opportunities for integration could be 
explored — tariffs, transport costs, migration laws, consumer protection and 
government procurement are just a sample (table 2.1). For each of these areas, 
there are many possible impediments to integration, and many options for 
addressing each impediment. 
   
44 Strengthening trans-Tasman economic relations 
 
The Commissions have focused on areas that seemed most likely to offer joint net 
benefits. They have then considered how much analysis to undertake in each of 
these areas, to test these expectations. There is no formula for doing this. To 
inform judgments about which areas might yield the largest joint net benefits, the 
Commissions used a set of filtering criteria, based on those used in similar scoping 
studies (box 2.7). 
 
Box 2.7 Filtering criteria for integration initiatives 
Criteria encouraging inclusion: 
• width of reach (the number of entities and/or value of activity affected) 
• depth of reach (the extent to which entities are affected, including by high 
compliance costs) 
• information that the issue is critical for stakeholders from previous reviews, from 
submissions to the study, and from the Commissions’ engagement program 
• barriers that do not impose large costs, but ‘add up’ or cause unnecessary irritation 
and prevent a ‘domestic like’ experience in the other country 
• any other information that reform would generate large gains. 
Criteria discouraging inclusion: 
• likely high costs of the preferred policy option 
• affects an area where national autonomy matters. 
Sources: Australian and New Zealand Productivity Commissions, drawing on Business Regulation and 
Competition Working Group (2011) and Regulation Taskforce (2006).  
 
Most of these criteria need little explanation. However, the role of national 
autonomy is less obvious. Many options for bringing about a closer relationship 
between Australia and New Zealand involve trading off some policy autonomy. 
This is not unusual, as there are many areas where national governments accept 
some loss of autonomy (for example, to local government or to international 
bodies, such as the World Trade Organisation) in order to achieve an overall 
benefit. But there will be limits on how large a reduction of autonomy is acceptable 
or indeed efficient. 
The impact of CER on the Māori population is an important issue for New Zealand 
to take into account when new policy initiatives are being considered (box 2.8). 
The New Zealand Government will need to recognise any valid concerns that 
further integration initiatives are inconsistent with Treaty of Waitangi obligations. 
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Box 2.8  Trans-Tasman integration impacts for Māori 
The Treaty of Waitangi places upon the New Zealand Government a responsibility to 
consider the impact of policy decisions on Māori. 
The Māori economy historically included a strong focus on international trade, and 
there is ongoing interest in developing and maintaining international markets. The 
Māori Economic Development Panel (2012) noted that there is significant room for 
growth within the Māori economy. This, however, requires stronger connections with 
foreign markets. As such, trans-Tasman integration initiatives that aim to create a more 
‘domestic-like’ business environment are likely to generate benefits for Māori 
businesses, many of which view Australia as a natural extension of their ‘home base’. 
There are varying views among Māori about the merits of closer economic relations. 
Nga Hapu o Niu Tireni expressed concern that measures to enhance the trans-Tasman 
economic relationship impinge on the rights of Māori under the Treaty of Waitangi: 
…we have seen major breaches [of the Treaty] with the formation of the Trans Tasman 
Food Standards Authority which undermines the mana and tino rangatiratanga of Hapu and 
whanau management of their own food in our home, farms, businesses, and marae, and 
also the Trans-Tasman Agency on Therapeutic Products which affect hapu and tohunga to 
practice our traditional medicines without consultation to hapu.a (sub. 20, p. 4) 
While integration initiatives can raise questions about national autonomy, closer 
economic relations with Australia and the New Zealand Government’s ability to respect 
the Treaty of Waitangi are not necessarily incompatible. 
a Māori words are explained in the glossary.  
 
In the limit, economic integration could extend to political union. The Commissions 
have not detected support for this option in either Australia or New Zealand, which 
is in any event outside the study’s terms of reference. Ruling out political union 
rules out or limits the scope for some economic integration initiatives that would 
necessitate adherence to common political and policy positions, such as a 
monetary union, common fiscal policy and harmonised tax systems. 
While the consequential loss of autonomy may rule some policy options out of 
scope, many others do not raise autonomy concerns, particularly where 
preferences are similar in both countries. In these cases, the Commissions used 
the criteria in box 2.7 (other than the last one) to select areas for further analysis 
(chapter 4). 
How much analysis? 
Equally important to selecting initiatives for analysis, is gauging how much 
analysis is needed to demonstrate that a proposal is the right one, while avoiding 
the risk of ‘paralysis by analysis’. This is a common problem in public policy, and is 
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particularly significant when there is a large number of potential policy initiatives 
and there are multiple policy approaches to each of them. For example, table 2.2 
lists some of the different approaches to the coordination of behind-the-border 
regulation. 
Table 2.2 Types of regulatory coordination 
Type of coordination Trans-Tasman illustration Strengths (S) and weaknesses (W) 
Unilateral   
Borrowing (New Zealand 
independently models a 
policy on Australian policy 
or vice versa) 
New Zealand plans to 
introduce a single business 
number 
S: Lower compliance costs for trans-Tasman 
businesses 
W: Countries may interpret laws differently; 
consistency lost if one country alters its laws 
and the other does not 
Unilateral recognition of 
regulatory settings 
New Zealand recognises 
Australian safety standards 
without requiring Australia 
to reciprocate 
S: Lower business compliance costs; simple to 
implement 
W: Home country stakeholders have less say in 
overseas regulator’s decision making and 
limited or no appeal rights  
Cooperative   
Cooperation between 
regulators and 
enforcement agencies 
Competition, tax and 
customs agency information 
sharing and enforcement 
assistance 
S: More effective enforcement of business 
activity that crosses borders 
W: Higher administrative cost 
Mutual recognition  Trans-Tasman Mutual 
Recognition Arrangement 
S: Lower business compliance costs 
W: Countries may have differing preferences 
for level or type of regulation; home country 
stakeholders have less say in overseas 
regulator’s decision making; administrative cost 
of recognising more than one regime 
Adopting common rules for 
separate institutions 
Planned joint regulatory 
regime for Patent Attorneys  
S: Lower business compliance costs; reduced 
costs in law-making; efficiencies in interpreting 
and applying the law 
W: Inefficiencies if countries differ in 
preferences for level or type of regulation; 
administrative cost of ensuring common 
understanding of rules; higher cost of running 
separate institutions. 
Adopting common rules, 
and establishing a single 
trans-Tasman institution 
Australia New Zealand 
Therapeutic Products 
Agency (in progress) 
S: Lower business compliance costs; reduced 
costs in law-making; efficiencies in interpreting 
and applying the law; economies of scale 
W: Inefficiencies if preferences for level or type 
of regulation differ; cost of establishing a single 
regulator; loss of country-level flexibility; each 
country has less say in regulator’s decision 
making. 
Source: Adapted from Goddard (2002). 
Comparing options means assessing their costs and benefits, to discover the one 
that generates the largest joint net benefits. Some costs (for example, 
implementation costs) are direct and quantifiable; others may not be, yet still need 
to be considered. For example, if reducing a tax that is distorting Australia-New 
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Zealand commerce leads to a loss of revenue that has to be replaced by 
increasing another tax, the distortionary effects of this replacement tax should be 
included in the analysis. 
The Commissions have used an economy-wide model to illustrate orders of 
magnitude of some integration initiatives considered in chapter 4 (box 2.9). 
 
Box 2.9 Australia — New Zealand Economic Analysis model 
The Australia–New Zealand Economic Analysis (ANZEA) model has been used to 
illustrate mechanisms at work in integration, especially where the outcome is an 
empirical matter that depends on a large number of assumptions. The ANZEA model is 
a multi-country general equilibrium model derived from the GTAP model and database. 
The GTAP model has been widely used to analyse the effects of policy initiatives. 
A general equilibrium model represents — at an aggregate level — all economic 
transactions that take place within and between economies. It includes data and 
behavioural equations that describe international trade in goods and services, the use 
of labour, capital, land and other inputs in production, incomes paid to households, 
private and government consumption and investment, and taxes and transfers. 
The ANZEA model differs from the GTAP model in two respects. First, the ANZEA 
model is built on a comparatively simple structure and has fewer equations than the 
original GTAP model. This simple structure facilitates modifications of the model to 
address issues relevant to the study and sensitivity analysis. Second, the ANZEA 
model accounts for bilateral capital flows at the industry level, which enables analysis 
of initiatives that relate to the commercial presence of services and FDI more broadly. 
The ANZEA model divides the global economy into 25 separate economies including 
Australia and New Zealand, as well as the USA, the EU and the main economies in 
Asia. 
Supplementary paper E provides details of the model and simulations.  
 
Analysis can, however, be resource-intensive and time consuming. And there will 
be limits to what is feasible. Hence judgments have to be made about the 
appropriate depth of analysis, and about the point at which conclusions can be 
reached, based on the underlying concepts and available quantitative 
assessments. The appropriate depth of analysis will be influenced by factors such 
as the size of potential costs and benefits (as suggested by the criteria in box 2.7), 
the number of feasible options, the availability of pre-existing evidence and 
analysis, and the cost of obtaining new data. A detailed analysis would take into 
account both direct and indirect costs and benefits, but the breadth and depth of 
analysis needs to be proportionate to the importance of the issue at hand. 
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This means that a proportionate approach will in some cases require detailed 
analysis, whereas in other cases options can be more readily ruled in or out 
(box 2.10). 
 
Box 2.10 Depth of analysis  rules of thumb 
A ‘proportionate’ approach would see some initiatives being ruled in or out without the 
need for extensive analysis. For example, the slow progress towards the national 
harmonisation of occupational health and safety regulation in Australia is a sign that 
the costs of achieving trans-Tasman agreement in this area are likely to be high in the 
foreseeable future. Unless the benefits of integration are expected to be very large, it 
seems reasonable to conclude without a great deal of analysis that the net benefits are 
unlikely to be positive. 
The costs of trans-Tasman integration are also likely to outweigh the benefits when 
national governments have different objectives, reflecting different community 
preferences. For example, as the ACTU and the NZCTU point out, ‘many health and 
safety standards incorporate an element of judgement over acceptable risk that may 
differ between societies’ (sub. 17, p. 6). 
On the other hand, situations where the two Governments have common objectives 
and similar policy instruments would be stronger candidates for integration, warranting 
less detailed analysis, because the costs are likely to be lower.  
 
 
    
 
F2.2 
 
Analysis of integration policy initiatives should take into account 
both direct and indirect costs and benefits, be proportionate to 
the importance of the issue being considered, and be publicly 
available. 
   
    
2.5 Desirable features of trans-Tasman 
integration initiatives 
Initiatives that are compatible with broader integration and complement 
domestically-focused reforms are more likely to generate net benefits, and so the 
Commissions have sought to identify options with these characteristics. 
Compatibility with broader integration 
Trans-Tasman agreements sit within the context of both countries having other 
bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements. This has two implications. 
   
Framework for trans-Tasman integration 49 
  
First, analysis of bilateral integration policy options should examine implications 
arising from other trade agreements to which either Australia or New Zealand is a 
party. For example, does a change to a CER agreement trigger changes in other 
agreements? 
Second, a non-preferential approach to reducing barriers to trade avoids diversion 
effects and typically yields larger benefits (box 2.4). This was recognised at the 
inception of the CER by the intention that it be outward-looking, including through 
strengthening trading relationships with third countries. 
There are, however, exceptions to this non-preferential approach. For example, 
mutual recognition of occupational licensing is based on acceptance by both 
governments of the standards in the other country. While extension of mutual 
recognition to other countries would extend markets, automatic multilateral 
extension could require a country to accept service providers from a third country 
whose standards are considered to be unacceptable. It is also difficult to envisage 
either government extending the freedom of trans-Tasman labour mobility 
multilaterally. 
The general presumption in favour of non-discriminatory approaches, alongside 
the existence of significant exceptions, suggests that bilateral initiatives should not 
stall progress towards multilateral or plurilateral liberalisation unless there is a 
clear case for doing so. This can be achieved by aiming for non-discriminatory 
policies that permit similar arrangements with other trading partners, unless the 
benefits of a discriminatory approach clearly exceed its costs. 
Initiatives should complement domestic policies 
Both Australia and New Zealand have a strong interest in good public policy 
across the Tasman and bear some of the (opportunity) cost of poor policy in the 
other country. While many domestic policy initiatives do not feature on the 
trans-Tasman agenda, there are interdependencies that, if managed well, can 
promote both countries’ domestic policy reforms. 
First, it is in each country’s interests to implement some initiatives unilaterally that 
are also on the trans-Tasman agenda. For example, reducing one country’s tariff 
barriers is nationally beneficial, irrespective of what the other country does. Taking 
this insight into discussions about the next steps for CER, rather than holding out 
for offsetting concessions, will accelerate progress. 
Second, some domestic policies may increase, or create the potential to increase, 
trans-Tasman integration. For example, reforms to either country’s transport 
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sectors that contribute to reducing trans-Tasman transport costs would facilitate 
integration. The costs involved in harmonising regulatory frameworks will be lower 
where there are nationally agreed approaches within Australia. 
Third, political and bureaucratic effort needs to be allocated efficiently between the 
domestic and trans-Tasman policy agendas, which is more likely to happen when 
there is: 
• proportionate, publicly-available analysis of options (as discussed earlier) 
• an effective governance framework 
• regular evaluation and benchmarking of policy initiatives, to inform government 
decisions about whether to extend, amend or end an initiative. 
 
    
 
F2.3 
 
Joint net benefits will be increased if policy initiatives are: 
outward looking; generally do not impede profitable exchange 
with other trading partners; take account of linkages with other 
agreements; and are consistent with domestic policy 
improvement over time. 
   
    
2.6 Cross-country distributional effects 
The benefits from removing barriers to integration between Australia and New 
Zealand may be distributed unevenly. A further consideration is how to take 
account of the large number of Australian and New Zealand citizens who live in 
the other country. 
Transfers between countries 
Policies that deliver efficiency gains for the two economies in aggregate might 
involve income transfers between them. One view is that only policies that 
generate benefits for both countries should proceed. An alternative view (box 2.11) 
is that an uneven distribution of benefits, or even losses to one country, from a 
particular integration initiative, should not matter provided a ‘win-win’ outcome can 
be achieved overall. If the two countries agreed not to seek immediate reciprocity, 
but rather to act in the confidence that their cooperative actions will benefit both in 
the long term, more policy initiatives are likely to be accepted, certain 
complementary packages of initiatives could become attractive, and joint net 
benefits could be larger than otherwise. 
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The underlying reasons for the difference between these two views may be found 
in the limited use of formal compensation mechanisms between the two countries. 
Some commentators may have limited confidence that informal compensation will 
occur through the ‘swings and roundabouts’ of initiatives that benefit one country 
or the other over time. 
 
Box 2.11 A ‘balanced benefits’ approach 
In a speech in 2010, Mr Simon Power (then New Zealand Minister of Commerce) 
considered whether net benefits should be measured on a case-by-case basis or as a 
package. 
The net trans-Tasman benefit] principle is explicitly designed to encourage both sides to 
think about and address issues in the context of strengthening the trans-Tasman economy. 
It requires each of us to move beyond a narrower national benefit calculation on an issue-by-
issue basis. 
The principle is designed to encourage both sides to address co-ordination issues in the 
longer-term context of the New Zealand and Australian economies becoming more deeply 
integrated and our respective national interests being more deeply linked to the health of the 
Australasian economy. 
The principle encourages an overall balanced benefits approach across the range of areas 
under the Outcomes framework and more broadly to achieve the goals of a more seamless 
market. It allows for trade-offs. 
This means that sometimes New Zealand may concede something in the interest of 
achieving other objectives and advancing the goal. At other times Australia will. 
Source: Power (2010).  
 
Cases where a policy change would benefit both countries are recommended by 
the Commissions, even where the distribution of the benefits favours one country. 
The Commissions have made no attempt to rank recommendations on the basis of 
how these benefits would be distributed between or within each country. 
A different approach is appropriate in the event that a policy initiative provides joint 
net benefits, but is likely to have a net cost for one country. Neither Commission 
considers that it could recommend an option in isolation that disadvantaged its 
country’s citizens, even if there are net trans-Tasman gains overall. In this event, 
the Commissions report the proposal and its potential impacts, for consideration 
by governments as part of a wider package of actions. Governments are better 
placed to combine multiple initiatives into a package that provides a win-win 
outcome over time. 
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Impacts on trans-Tasman residents 
There are different options for taking account of the impacts of trans-Tasman 
residents (citizens of one country who live in the other) (box 2.12). 
 
Box 2.12 Accounting for trans-Tasman residents 
A national cost-benefit analysis would assess the effects of policy changes at a 
national level, based on the welfare of residents. Spatial aspects of integration — such 
as the potential for ‘brain-drain’ — raise a question about the welfare of citizens, 
wherever they reside, versus the welfare of residents, because the two can diverge. 
With about 10 percent of New Zealanders living in Australia, and projection of a further 
400 000 or so New Zealanders leaving New Zealand in the next 15 years (Yang and 
de Raad 2010), this is a significant issue. That said, population movements and their 
motivations are complex. Although many New Zealanders migrate, a significant 
proportion return, and many other migrants from around the world settle in New 
Zealand and Australia. 
People who move between the two countries gain from having an opportunity to move 
to their location of choice. There are other effects, particularly associated with the 
taxation and social security systems. For example, elderly immigrants may receive 
pension and health entitlements in their new country without having contributed 
through taxation in that country. On the other hand, young emigrants have typically 
benefited from subsidised education before moving to another country where they pay 
taxes. 
Options for considering the impacts on these residents in a cost-benefit framework 
include: 
• not separately identifying the potential net benefits accruing to citizens of one 
country who live in the other 
• always separately identifying the potential net benefits accruing to citizens of one 
country who live in the other and attributing them to their country of citizenship 
• identifying the potential net benefits separately only in the case of policies that affect 
disproportionately the citizens of one country living in the other. 
The ACTU and NZCTU support the second option, arguing that when considering the 
benefits and costs for each country, the outcomes for citizens of one country who are 
resident in the other should be identified separately (sub. 17). However, for many 
issues it would be difficult to do this, and those separate impacts will likely be 
negligible.  
 
For most issues, it would be both difficult and unnecessary to identify separately 
the impacts of policy initiatives on these people. As Lloyd points out: 
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… there are few issues in which the choice of the current New Zealand population or 
the current population plus NZ-born people living in Australia will make a difference to 
the policy choice. (sub. 5, p. 13) 
Some issues, however — such as entitlements to social security benefits 
(discussed in chapter 4) — do affect trans-Tasman residents disproportionately. In 
these cases, the Commissions have separately identified the impacts on these 
residents. 
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3 CER — achievements and 
implications for the future 
 
Key points 
• CER dates from the 1983 ANZCERTA agreement. It started slowly, but rapid 
progress on economic integration was made after a review in 1988. Tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions on virtually all goods traded across the Tasman were 
eliminated by 1990 and the CER expanded into services trade and 
behind-the-border regulatory barriers. 
• Since 1990, CER initiatives have incrementally increased the extent of 
trans-Tasman integration. Progress has also been made through informal 
engagement between government agencies. 
• There have been marked similarities in economic policy approaches taken in the 
two countries, and mutual policy learning has been a feature of the relationship. 
• CER has been highly successful in removing explicit restrictions on trade and 
substantial progress has been made on reducing other barriers to integration. 
• Australia and New Zealand have greatly reduced their import barriers against other 
countries, producing large benefits for both countries. It is likely that CER helped 
pave the way for wider reductions in tariffs, particularly in New Zealand. 
• CER has produced net benefits for Australia and New Zealand, notwithstanding 
uncertainty about the magnitudes. 
• Following the 30 year experience with CER, it is apparent that: 
– economic integration initiatives should generally be outward looking 
– the shift in focus towards reducing barriers to services trade and investment 
should continue 
– further integration is becoming more difficult as the focus shifts to these more 
complex areas 
– domestic reform remains important for lifting productivity, and CER can play a 
useful complementary role 
– regulatory harmonisation can be costly and will only be the best option in some 
circumstances 
– a pragmatic approach to setting integration priorities, and light-handed 
governance arrangements have worked well 
– political leadership is likely to remain important to progressing integration.  
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3.1 Evolution of the CER agenda 
The first trade agreement between Australia and New Zealand, signed in 1922, 
extended British preferential tariff rates across the Tasman on some goods. 
However, trade relations between the two countries were not a high priority until 
the 1960s (BIE 1995). Australia and New Zealand were more competitors than 
trade partners as both countries concentrated on agricultural and resource exports 
and sought to protect domestic manufacturers from import competition (including 
from one another). 
By contrast, most Australians and New Zealanders have been free to move across 
the Tasman since pre-colonial times. In 1973, formalisation of the free flow of 
people occurred through the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement (TTTA), which 
allows all citizens of Australia and New Zealand to travel, work and reside in both 
countries indefinitely (supplementary paper D). With the exception of the European 
Union, such free movement of people is rare. 
Australia and New Zealand began to pay greater attention to their bilateral trading 
relationship in the mid 1960s, in part because of concerns about the 
consequences of the United Kingdom joining the European Economic Community 
(BIE 1995). In 1965, the New Zealand Australia Free Trade Agreement was 
signed. This was a ‘positive list’ agreement, with tariff reductions and relaxation of 
quantitative trade restrictions applying only to an agreed list of products on each 
side. 
New products were intended to be added to the list over time, but the process for 
doing this floundered. Some sense of the tortuous nature of the negotiations can 
be gained by considering the three additions made in 1976: 
• meat extract preparations in solid forms (for example, Oxo) 
• heraldic badges and crests (polyester) 
• photomechanical process plates (not aluminium grained and anodised, and not 
further worked) for use as lithographic printing plates (Holmes 2003, p. 16). 
No additions at all were made in the following year. This glacial rate of progress 
was attributable to both the process and the philosophy underlying the agreement. 
It had been decided not to expand duty-free coverage to goods where this might 
harm domestic producers in either country (Alchin 1990). 
By the late 1970s it was clear to both Governments and to some in the business 
community that a new approach to improving economic relations was needed. In 
New Zealand, support came from various politicians, senior government officials 
and business leaders who shared a view that the domestic economy should be 
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redirected from import-substitution to export-led economic growth. (There were 
also sections of business in New Zealand that remained strongly opposed to trade 
liberalisation.) On the Australian side, the Government was keen to respond to the 
rise of other trading blocs and manufacturers sought the improved access to New 
Zealand markets that the existing agreement had not delivered (Alchin 1990). 
Inception of ANZCERTA and early years 
Following earlier ground work by Deputy Prime Ministers Anthony and Talboys, a 
meeting between Prime Ministers Fraser and Muldoon in Wellington in 1980 set in 
train negotiations for what became the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic 
Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA) (box 3.1). Both Governments sought an 
outward-looking agreement that promoted broader regional integration. The 
Australian Prime Minister stated: 
If the two countries can cooperate more closely in their own trading relationship, with 
each concentrating on what it can do best, it will help both countries to grow stronger 
and to compete in wider markets. We agreed in Wellington that any closer economic 
relationship must be outward-looking, helping to strengthen our trading relationships 
with third countries, particularly in the South East Asian and Pacific Regions. 
(Fraser 1980, quoted in Snape, Gropp and Luttrall 1998, p. 508) 
 
Box 3.1 What exactly is CER? 
The Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (1983) is one 
of the few agreements with ‘Closer Economic Relations’ in its title. However, some 
subsequent agreements are known as ‘protocols’ to the agreement, giving the 
impression of being linked to the original ANZCERTA document. Other agreements 
seem to stand alone, although they also cover integration issues. And since 2004, the 
concept of a single economic market (SEM) has resulted in initiatives across a range of 
issues. 
It is not clear that there are meaningful distinctions between labels such as ‘CER’, 
‘CER and related agreements’ and ‘SEM’ (which some might consider to be a 
rebranding of the evolving CER agenda). Accordingly, this report uses the terms ‘CER’ 
and ‘CER agenda’ to refer collectively to all of these trans-Tasman integration 
initiatives. ANZCERTA is used to refer specifically to the 1983 agreement.  
 
The ANZCERTA came into force in 1983. Under the agreement, both countries 
agreed to extend preferential market access to each other. The stated objectives 
were to: 
• strengthen the broader relationship between Australia and New Zealand 
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• develop closer economic relations through a mutually beneficial expansion of 
free trade between the two countries 
• eliminate barriers to bilateral trade in a gradual and progressive manner under 
an agreed timetable and with a minimum of disruption 
• develop trade between the two countries under conditions of fair competition. 
In addition, the ANZCERTA served as a means of exposing the tradeable goods 
sectors in both countries to greater international competition. It included: 
• the gradual elimination of tariffs on all goods not specified in the annexes to the 
agreement by 1988 (that is, a ‘negative list’ approach) 
• the progressive elimination of quantitative restrictions by 1995 (such 
restrictions, in the form of import licences, were a major element of New 
Zealand’s protectionist policies) 
• a commitment to work towards the elimination of export subsidies on goods 
traded between Australia and New Zealand. 
The initial agreement has been characterised as ‘cautious, even timid’ (Scollay, 
Findlay and Kaufmann 2011, p. 22). The ‘negative list’ consisted of a large number 
of manufactured products for which the phasing out of trade restrictions and 
support schemes was delayed or scheduled to occur over a longer period. There 
were also modified arrangements for some agricultural products, including dairy 
products, wheat, sugar and tobacco. 
The Australian Bureau of Industry Economics found that manufacturing industries 
affected by immediate reductions in trade restrictions accounted for only 
5.5 percent of total trans-Tasman manufactured trade in 1986-87 (BIE 1989). 
Industries scheduled for later liberalisation (through the negative list) accounted for 
44 percent of manufacturing trade, while around 50 percent were in sectors that 
were free of trade restrictions before 1983. The share of bilateral trade in 
manufactured goods immediately affected was thus quite small. However, trade in 
this relatively small group grew rapidly after CER came into force (BIE 1989). 
There were some tensions in the early years of ANZCERTA. New Zealand 
business was concerned about the growing use of production subsidies in 
Australia to compensate for reductions in tariff protection. Australian exporters 
complained that New Zealand competitors received an unfair advantage from a 
20 percent devaluation of the New Zealand dollar. There was also an escalation in 
anti-dumping actions between the two countries (Scollay, Findlay and 
Kaufmann 2011). 
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Despite limited effects in the early years, the strengths of ANZCERTA were that it 
was comprehensive, with procedures that although gradual, were automatic and 
progressive. These features gave industries time to adjust, while avoiding 
protracted political renegotiations. 
Rapid progress after the 1988 review 
The political environment was conducive to making progress on trans-Tasman 
integration when the first review of ANZCERTA took place in 1988. Both the 
Australian and New Zealand Governments had embarked on domestic economic 
reform agendas that were complementary with increased trans-Tasman integration 
(box 3.2). Alchin (1990) has also suggested that Australia developed a renewed 
sense of the importance of the relationship after the United States suspended its 
security obligation to New Zealand under the ANZUS Treaty. 
The review culminated in the signing of the CER Second Phase Agreements in 
August 1988. These accelerated the liberalisation of goods trade, so that 
remaining tariffs and quantitative restrictions on virtually all goods traded between 
the two countries were eliminated by 1990, rather than 1995 as originally 
scheduled. Agreement was also reached to eliminate anti-dumping actions on 
trade between the two countries. 
Beyond this, much of the focus was on pushing the CER agenda into new areas, 
to free up trade in services and reduce behind-the-border barriers to trade and 
investment caused by differences and deficiencies in standards, regulations and 
policies. Second Phase Agreements included the: 
• CER Services Protocol, committing the countries to eliminating restrictions on 
the trade in services by 1989, except for prescribed industries 
• Protocol on the Harmonisation of Quarantine Administrative Procedures, 
seeking to achieve consistent quarantine administration in both countries 
• Memorandum of Understanding on Technical Barriers to Trade, committing 
both countries to harmonising technical specifications and testing procedures 
• Memorandum of Understanding on Harmonisation of Business Law, committing 
both countries to work towards identifying and pursuing potential areas for 
harmonisation with the aim of reducing transaction costs for firms that operate 
in both markets 
• Agreement on Standards, Accreditation and Quality, aiming to achieve a single 
system for product standards and accreditation (this led to the Joint 
Accreditation System of Australia and New Zealand (JAS-ANZ) in 1991). 
   
60 Strengthening trans-Tasman economic relations 
 
 
Box 3.2 Three decades of shared economic reform 
Both Australia and New Zealand commenced wide ranging economic reforms in the 
mid 1980s. In essence, the reforms aimed to free up markets, promote competition and 
ensure prices provided appropriate market signals. During the 1980s and 1990s: 
• the reduction in tariffs that had begun in the 1970s continued, and quantitative 
import controls were abolished 
• financial and capital markets were significantly liberalised, including floating the 
currencies and the removal of interest rate and capital controls 
• there was a shift from centralised wage fixing to enterprise bargaining and individual 
employment contracts 
• inflation targeting commenced and reserve bank independence was formalised 
(1989 in New Zealand, and 1993 and 1996 respectively in Australia) 
• many government business enterprises were commercialised, corporatised and/or 
privatised and some network sectors, such as electricity, were opened up to 
competition 
• major reforms to the public sector were introduced, including frameworks for sound 
fiscal management and accountability, and output-based budgeting (Maher 1995; 
Goldfinch 2006). 
These reforms were influenced by international economic thought, and by direct 
linkages and learning between the two countries. For example, New Zealand officials 
visited Australia to examine the float of the Australian dollar carried out in December 
1983, before floating the New Zealand dollar in March 1985 (Goldfinch 2006). 
The composition of reforms in each country over this period were similar, but with 
some differences in timing, sequencing and detail. For example, New Zealand 
introduced a broad-based consumption tax in 1986, while a similar tax was not 
introduced in Australia until 2000. New Zealand is said to have adopted more of a ‘big 
bang’ approach, whereas Australia took an incremental approach to reform 
(Brash 1996). 
Subsequent reforms built on earlier measures and strengthened links between the two 
countries. For example, in Australia, the 1995 National Competition Policy reforms and 
the 2005 National Reform Agenda sought to establish a broad competition policy 
framework that does not impede economic activity, productivity, or constrain the scope 
of markets for infrastructure and other services (Banks 2010). These reforms have 
been progressed through the Council of Australian Governments (COAG). New 
Zealand is a member or observer on the majority of the COAG ministerial councils, and 
in some cases has voting rights where issues impact on the Trans-Tasman Mutual 
Recognition Arrangement (Goldfinch 2006). 
Recent economic reforms have included: the establishment of pension reserve funds in 
order to meet future superannuation liabilities (2003 in New Zealand and 2006 in 
Australia); and the introduction of market-based policy instruments to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions (2008 in New Zealand and 2012 in Australia).  
 
   
CER achievements and implications 61 
  
The priority given to CER fluctuated during the 1990s, with pressure for deepening 
integration coming mainly from the New Zealand side (Lloyd 1995). Scollay, 
Findlay and Kaufmann (2011, p. 35) report: 
… the maintenance of momentum owed much to the intensive programme of regular 
meetings established between various groups of officials and ministers to give effect to 
the understandings reached between the two governments, as well as the formal 
reviews of ANZCERTA which took place, for example, in 1992 and 1995. 
The CER agreements made during the 1990s were largely about following through 
on commitments made in 1988. The main agreements were the: 
• Agreement Concerning a Joint Food Standards System (or ‘Food Treaty’) 
(1996), establishing what is now called Food Standards Australia New Zealand 
(FSANZ) (box 3.3) 
 
Box 3.3 A case study: trans-Tasman food safety regulation 
Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ) was set up to develop a joint food 
standards code under the Food Treaty (1996). The Australia New Zealand Food 
Standards Code (ANZFS Code) was adopted by both Governments in 2002. 
The Food Treaty aimed to harmonise food standards between the two countries, 
reduce industry compliance costs and help remove regulatory barriers to trade in food. 
The ‘single-regulator/many jurisdictions’ model sees FSANZ researching and 
developing changes to the ANZFS Code, which are incorporated, subject to 
amendment, into the Food Acts of New Zealand and each of the Australian states and 
territories. The ANZFS Code covers food standards that apply in both countries, as 
well as food hygiene standards and primary production standards that apply in 
Australia only. Enforcement and interpretation of the code is undertaken by different 
regulators in each jurisdiction (including local governments in Australia). 
Despite the joint approach, the food safety system is not fully harmonised between 
Australia and New Zealand, or even across the Australian states. The Food Treaty 
contains provisions that allow New Zealand to opt out of jointly set standards relating to 
safety and health outcomes, environmental concerns and trade or cultural issues. New 
Zealand also has separate food hygiene standards for consumer food safety that are 
more prescriptive than Australia’s (PC 2009b). 
FSANZ is generally regarded as a success, despite operating in a complex 
multi-jurisdictional environment where regulatory differences remain. Submissions to 
the scoping study were largely positive about the joint food safety regulator. In 
particular, the Australian Food and Grocery Council (sub. 22) supported retaining 
FSANZ as the lead agency and mechanism for developing food regulation in Australia 
and New Zealand, and the New Zealand Food and Grocery Council (sub. 34) also 
strongly supported the joint food standards setting system, while not supporting an 
expansion of its scope.  
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• Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement (TTMRA) (1996), aiming to 
allow producers and people in registered occupations to meet only a single set 
of regulatory requirements to do business in Australia and New Zealand 
• Australia New Zealand Government Procurement Agreement (1997), creating a 
single trans-Tasman government procurement market. 
Implementing agreements to reduce behind-the-border barriers has been 
complicated and time consuming. A striking example is the Australia New Zealand 
Therapeutic Products Agency (ANZTPA), which is due to commence by 2016, 
17 years after Ministers agreed to explore a joint agency (box 3.4). 
 
Box 3.4 The long journey to a joint therapeutic products agency 
Therapeutic goods are one of the exemptions in the Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition 
Arrangement (TTMRA). Following the signing of the TTMRA in 1996, various options 
for harmonising regulation of therapeutic goods were explored. The preferred option 
was to create a joint regulatory scheme administered by a single regulator — the 
Australia New Zealand Therapeutic Products Agency (ANZTPA). One reason for this 
was that the increasing complexity of therapeutic products was making it difficult for 
New Zealand in particular to maintain the necessary level of regulatory capacity. The 
journey towards the introduction of the ANZTPA has been a long and difficult one, and 
it is yet to be completed: 
1999 Australian and New Zealand Ministers agree to explore the viability of 
establishing a joint agency. 
2000 A consultation paper on a possible framework for a joint agency is released. A 
regulatory impact analysis for a joint therapeutics agency finds modest net 
economic gains for both countries. 
2003 The Agreement for the Establishment of a Joint Scheme for the Regulation of 
Therapeutic Products (the Treaty) is signed. The Therapeutic Products Interim 
Ministerial Council is established to facilitate the creation of the joint regulatory 
scheme and joint agency. 
2006 Enabling legislation is introduced in New Zealand, but fails to pass, due to 
concerns that the proposal would make complementary medicines and natural 
health products (including those used in Māori medicine) more expensive and 
that some could become illegal. 
2007 Negotiations suspended (but the Treaty remains in place). 
2011 The Prime Ministers sign a statement of intent to implement the ANZTPA 
progressively over a period of up to five years. The New Zealand Government 
announces it will develop a separate framework for domestic regulation of 
complementary medicines and natural health products. 
Sources: Gillard (2011b); TGA (2012).  
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Towards a single economic market 
Countries in the Asia-Pacific region, including New Zealand and Australia, actively 
pursued preferential trade agreements at the start of the new millennium (box 3.5). 
Scollay, Findlay and Kaufmann (2011, p. 58) report: 
These developments raised questions over the degree of priority that both countries 
would in future place on their bilateral relationship, especially as they chose to pursue 
their new preferential arrangements individually rather than jointly. Rather than allow 
the bilateral economic relationship to wither, however, the two countries decided 
instead to try to rejuvenate it. 
 
Box 3.5 The broader trade policy context 
Australia and New Zealand are members of a number of bilateral, regional and 
multilateral trade and investment agreements. Both countries have also undertaken 
significant unilateral trade reform. 
Both countries are foundation members of the World Trade Organization and its 
long-standing predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, as well as 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. 
New Zealand has signed many bilateral preferential trade agreements, including Free 
Trade Agreements with China and Malaysia, and Closer Economic Partnership 
agreements with Hong Kong, Singapore and Thailand. It is also a member of the 
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (known as the P4 Agreement) and the 
Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations. It is negotiating agreements with 
India, Korea, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and with Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan. New Zealand is also part of the negotiations on the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement, an extension of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic 
Partnership. 
Australia has signed preferential trade agreements with Chile, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand and the United States. It is currently negotiating agreements with China, the 
GCC, India, Indonesia, Japan and Korea. It is also negotiating with other countries to 
join the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. Similarly it is negotiating, along with New 
Zealand, an extension of the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations 
(PACER Plus). 
Australia and New Zealand are also both members of a trade agreement with the 
10 ASEAN nations (the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement). Both 
countries are also negotiating a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
Agreement with the ASEAN countries and China, Japan, India and South Korea. 
There are many single-issue international organisations that impact on global trade 
levels and patterns, covering intellectual property, telecommunications, banking, 
shipping, aviation and the environment issues (PC 2010). Australia and New Zealand 
are members of many of these organisations.  
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This rejuvenation was effected through establishing a Single Economic Market 
(SEM) agenda in 2004. This involved a continuation of the existing integration 
agenda, but with new impetus given to efforts to harmonise elements of business 
law. 
• A 2004 review by the Australian Commission led to enhanced cooperation 
between the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) and 
the Commerce Commission New Zealand on cross-border competition and 
consumer issues (PC 2004a). 
• The Trans-Tasman Council on Banking Supervision was established in 2005 to 
promote a joint approach to banking supervision and to deliver a more 
seamless regulatory environment in banking services. 
• A Treaty on Mutual Recognition of Securities Offerings was signed in 2006. 
In the first two cases, ‘full integration’ options were considered but were rejected 
because assessed costs exceeded benefits. On competition and consumer 
protection regimes, the Australian Commission concluded: 
Full integration, requiring identical laws and procedures and a single institutional 
framework, would have high implementation and ongoing costs, change the operation 
of the existing national regimes and achieve only moderate benefits. 
(PC 2004a, p. xiv) 
On banking regulation, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand reported that various 
options were assessed in the mid 2000s, including: 
… the creation of a single new regulator as well as a model in which the Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority would become the supervisor for banks operating on 
both sides of the Tasman. The [New Zealand] Government concluded at that time that 
the risks and costs associated with a single regulator model outweighed any benefits. 
(sub. 12, pp. 4–5) 
The creation of the Australia New Zealand Leadership Forum was also part of the 
move to add momentum to the CER agenda. This forum is a business-led initiative 
designed to further develop Australia and New Zealand's bilateral relationship as 
well as joint relations in the region. It brings together leaders from business, 
government, academia and the public sector. The Forum plays an active role in 
supporting progress on trans-Tasman integration initiatives (ANZLF, sub. 15). 
In 2009, the Australian and New Zealand Prime Ministers agreed to a set of SEM 
principles. A list of trans-Tasman outcomes spanning areas of business law and 
designed to accelerate and deepen trans-Tasman regulatory integration was also 
agreed. 
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The Trans-Tasman Outcomes Implementation Group, jointly chaired by 
representatives of the Australian Treasury and New Zealand Ministry of Business, 
Innovation and Employment, was set up to oversee implementation of the agreed 
outcomes. The Implementation Group’s most recent progress report noted the 
considerable progress toward achieving many of the outcomes. It also drew 
attention to some areas where progress was slowing (box 3.6). 
Recent developments in the trans-Tasman economic relationship include: 
• The signing of an Investment Protocol in 2011. The Protocol, which is yet to be 
enacted, reduces restrictions on trans-Tasman investments. 
• Implementation of a framework for the effective resolution of trans-Tasman civil 
disputes and regulatory enforcement, through legislation passed in 2010 and 
2012 (Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department, sub. DR129). 
 
Box 3.6 Single Economic Market: progress made but more to do 
The Trans-Tasman Outcomes Implementation Group (TTOIG) assessed that, as at 
September 2012, one of the 19 medium term outcomes had been completed, 12 were 
on track for completion by the end of 2014, four were slowing or on hold, and two have 
been removed, with ministerial agreement. Eight short term outcomes have been 
completed and one has been delayed. 
Insolvency law: The Australian and New Zealand Governments have agreed to create 
a single cross-border insolvency proceeding with equivalent outcomes for insolvents in 
both countries. A cross-border working group is currently considering a discussion 
paper, which should be released for public consultation early in 2013. Joint policy 
approval is expected to be sought in mid to late 2013. 
Financial reporting policy: Governments have agreed that entities can use a single 
set of financial statements to meet the requirements in both countries. This outcome 
has been achieved for publicly accountable for-profit entities and is on track for 
non-publicly accountable for-profit entities. The TTOIG has removed the outcome for 
private not-for-profit entities because very few entities would benefit from 
harmonisation. Two other outcomes achieved are that auditors registered in one 
country can operate in the other, and that financial reporting standards bodies in 
Australia and New Zealand have functional equivalence. 
Financial services policy: Governments have agreed to: make comparable the 
required disclosures by issuers of financial products (on track); enable recognised 
financial advisers to operate across the Tasman without the need for further approvals 
(completed); align corporate trustee regimes for financial products (slowing, because of 
other priorities in Australia); and align business regulatory obligations in relation to 
anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (on track). 
(continued next page)  
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Box 3.6 (continued) 
Competition policy: Governments have agreed that firms operating in both markets 
should face the same consequences for anti-competitive conduct (on track), and that 
Australian and New Zealand competition and consumer law regulators share 
information for enforcement purposes (delayed). High level cross membership between 
the ACCC and the New Zealand Commerce Commission has been achieved. 
Business reporting: Governments have agreed to deliver a standard set of 
representations of electronic financial and performance data for the purposes of 
business-to-government reporting (on hold) and a single business identifier for use in 
both countries (on track). 
Corporations law: Governments have agreed that trans-Tasman businesses should 
only need to file company information once in order to meet the requirements of both 
governments. Progress has been made but is currently slowing. 
Personal property securities law: Governments had agreed to a single 
trans-Tasman register for personal property securities. However, the TTOIG has 
removed this outcome because finance stakeholders in both countries have expressed 
little interest in it. 
Intellectual property law: Governments have agreed to introduce a single regulatory 
framework for patent attorneys, a single trademark regime, a single application and 
examination processes for patents filed in both countries, and a single plant variety 
right regime. Progress is on track for all outcomes except the plant variety rights 
regime (slowing). 
Consumer law: Governments have agreed to: harmonise consumer law enforcement 
and consumer credit requirements; streamline arrangements for mutual recognition of 
product safety standards; harmonise or coordinate product labelling regimes; and 
introduce equivalent approaches to trade measurement regulation. All outcomes have 
been achieved except the one relating to consumer credit, which is on track. 
Source: TTOIG (2012).  
 
3.2 Achievements of CER 
Various commentators have concluded that CER compares favourably to other 
preferential trade agreements. For example, in the mid 1990s Lloyd argued: 
The CER between Australia and New Zealand has already achieved some 
notable successes in relation to non-border policies as well as in the traditional 
coverage of trade liberalisation; and it is the most clean and the most outwardly 
open of all of the regional trading arrangements approved under the GATT. 
(1995, p. 267) 
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More recently, Scollay, Findlay and Kaufmann concluded that: 
Economic integration between Australia and New Zealand, with the Australia New 
Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA) as its central 
instrument, is today widely regarded as a success story. (2011, p. 18) 
This section explores the achievements of CER in reducing barriers to trade, 
investment flows and the movement of people, increasing trans-Tasman trade and 
factor flows, and producing net benefits for both countries. 
Trade in goods is largely liberalised 
The CER agenda has reduced transaction costs for trade in goods between 
Australia and New Zealand in various ways. 
• Tariffs and quantitative restrictions on goods have been fully liberalised 
between the two countries for goods deemed to have originated in the partner 
country under the CER rules of origin. 
• Rules of origin have been amended over the life of the agreement, in part with 
an aim of reducing compliance costs. 
• Administrative procedures for biosecurity and quarantine have generally been 
harmonised, and customs authorities in both countries cooperate on 
trans-Tasman issues. 
• A mutual recognition agreement (TTMRA) allows goods that can be sold in one 
country to be sold in the other without meeting further regulatory requirements, 
with some exceptions (such as industrial chemicals). 
• Neither country allows its businesses to initiate anti-dumping claims against 
businesses of the other. 
• Standards for food safety have been aligned and a single trans-Tasman food 
authority develops standards. 
Influence on trade 
As described above, CER initiatives have largely eliminated at-the-border barriers, 
while behind-the-border barriers have also been reduced. This would be expected 
to result in increased trade in goods between Australia and New Zealand, relative 
to what would have occurred otherwise. 
However, there are many other influences on trans-Tasman trade, one of which is 
changes in trade barriers with other countries. From 1983 to 1990, as 
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trans-Tasman at-the-border trade barriers were eliminated, a substantial gap 
opened up with protection rates for other countries. However, this gap soon 
narrowed as both countries reduced trade restrictions unilaterally on a ‘most 
favoured nation’ basis. Figure 3.1 shows the reduction in trade restrictions and 
other forms of assistance to domestic manufacturers in Australia and New Zealand 
over time. 
Accordingly, CER would be expected to have lifted trans-Tasman goods trade up 
to 1990 relative to trade with other countries. However, after 1990 trade policy 
increasingly encouraged Australian and New Zealand exporters to look to other 
markets and this would be expected to have resulted in a decrease in the 
proportion of trans-Tasman trade (other things being equal). Reductions in 
behind-the-border barriers brought about through CER would be expected to 
partially offset this influence, although other factors are also prevalent (figures 3.2 
and 3.3). 
Figure 3.1 Falling effective rates of assistance to manufacturinga 
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a The effective rate of assistance is a combined measure of tariff, budgetary and regulatory assistance 
(including quantitative measures such as quotas), expressed as a proportion of an industry’s value added. As 
quantitative and other forms of assistance have largely been eliminated in New Zealand, the nominal ‘most 
favoured nation’ (MFN) rate of tariff assistance can be used as a proxy for the effective rate of assistance — 
although it is not a perfect substitute. 
Sources: Duncan, Lattimore and Bollard (1991); MED (2003); NZIER (2010); OECD (1985, 1991); 
PC (2012a). 
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Figure 3.2 Trans-Tasman merchandise trade, 2010 prices 
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Source: UN Comtrade database (2012). 
Figure 3.3 Trans-Tasman merchandise trade as a share of total trade 
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Source: UN Comtrade database (2012). 
Trends in New Zealand’s exports to Australia are reasonably consistent with these 
expectations. The share of New Zealand’s exports destined for Australia increased 
from 13 percent immediately before CER to 22 percent in 1991 (although the 
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upward trend pre-dates CER). Thereafter this share remained fairly flat 
(figure 3.3). Australia has become New Zealand’s largest trading partner based on 
the value of imports and exports. 
By contrast, the share of Australia’s exports destined for New Zealand remained 
between 5 and 6 percent throughout most of the past 30 years (figure 3.3). This 
has declined to around 3 percent over the past few years, despite the value of 
Australia’s exports to New Zealand being at historically high levels. This is largely 
due to the rising share of mineral and energy exports to Asia. New Zealand is now 
Australia’s seventh largest trading partner. 
New Zealand exports mainly manufactured goods to Australia, including 
processed food. Other exports include light crude oil and gold. Australia is New 
Zealand’s most diversified export market. Australia’s exports to New Zealand are 
also dominated by manufactured goods, including computer parts, medicaments, 
passenger motor vehicles and processed food (DFAT 2012; UN Comtrade 
database 2012). Evidence suggests that trade in processed food in particular has 
been boosted by CER initiatives (box 3.7). 
 
Box 3.7 Trans-Tasman trade in processed food has increased 
Trade in processed food products between Australia and New Zealand has grown 
substantially over the last three decades. Integration in this sector has progressed to 
the extent that ‘the trans-Tasman market for food has become almost an extension of 
the domestic market of both countries’ (MAF 2011, p. 21). New Zealand exports to 
Australia include wine, dairy products, other processed food (including baked goods 
and confectionary) and seafood. Australian exports to New Zealand include oils and 
fats, and cereals. As shown in the figure below, the proportion of each country’s food 
product exports to the other has steadily increased since CER commenced. 
CER initiatives removed barriers to trans-Tasman trade in processed food in two main 
ways. First, bilateral trade restrictions on many food products were lowered, and 
eventually removed. For instance, the tariff on wine valued above $2 per litre was 
reduced from A$0.65 per litre in Australia and NZ$0.85 per litre in New Zealand in 
1985 to zero in 1990. Similarly, tariffs on preserved milk and butter in Australia were 
reduced to zero from A$0.05 per kilogram and A$0.10 per kilogram respectively 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1983; Customs Tariff Act 1982 (Cwlth); BIE 1995). 
Fonterra stated: 
Since the establishment of the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade 
Agreement in 1983, the trans-Tasman dairy market has been open to trade from both 
countries. Fonterra and its predecessors have built up a substantial business in Australia 
under this framework. (sub. 14, p. 2) 
(continued next page)  
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Box 3.7 (continued) 
Second, regulations concerning food standards have been progressively harmonised 
since 1995 under the Food Treaty (box 3.3). A major milestone was the introduction of a 
joint food standards code in 2002, which likely contributed to the sharp increase in trade 
that occurred about this time. The Food Treaty was complemented by the 
Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement which came into effect in 1998, 
removing regulatory barriers to the sale of goods between Australia and New Zealand. 
The Australian Food and Grocery Council reports that under this regime: 
… for the most part, food regulation in the two countries is uniform, and in those few areas of 
non-uniformity, there is no trade barrier that prevents the compliant good of one country from 
being sold in the other. (sub. 22, p. 8) 
In addition to CER, other market and policy developments have contributed to increased 
integration of food products markets. These include: 
• the merger of the New Zealand Dairy Board with two cooperative dairy companies, to 
form a single cooperative entity (Fonterra) (this provided Fonterra with the scale and 
capability to make acquisitions, particularly in Australia) 
• Progressive Enterprises acquiring Woolworths NZ in 2002, followed by Woolworths 
Australia acquiring Progressive Enterprises in 2005 
• the entry of the German supermarket chain Aldi into the Australian market in 2001 
(this coincided with the introduction of ‘store brands’, which created opportunities for 
New Zealand firms to break into the Australian market). 
Figure Trans-Tasman trade in processed food products, 2010 prices 
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Source: UN Comtrade database (2012). 
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Econometric studies can be employed to attempt to isolate the trade effects of 
trade agreements from other influences. Studies have found that CER has 
increased trade across the Tasman (box 3.8). For example, the Australian 
Commission concluded that CER had had a positive, though small impact 
(PC 2010). 
At least some of the increased trade between partner countries resulting from 
preferential trade agreements can come at the expense of trade with other 
countries (as discussed in chapter 2). This is known as ‘trade diversion’ — as a 
result of reduced barriers being offered to one (or more) countries, goods imported 
from lower-cost suppliers are displaced by goods from higher-cost suppliers due to 
the latter facing lower barriers. 
Trade diversion erodes the potential gains from measures seeking to increase 
trade openness. The significance of trade diversion depends on the differences 
between preferential and non-preferential trade restrictions. 
Only a few econometric studies have sought to assess the impacts of CER on 
trans-Tasman and wider trade. Some early studies found that the CER may have 
been, on balance, trade creating, but two more recent studies suggest that CER 
has been net trade diverting (box 3.8). 
Net benefits 
The question of whether CER’s influence on trade in goods has produced net 
benefits for Australia and New Zealand is partly dependant on whether it has been 
net trade creating or trade diverting. Trade creation generates benefits from 
increased specialisation, economies of scale, competition and consumer choice as 
discussed in chapter 2. By contrast, trade diversion means shifting trade from 
lower-cost to higher-cost suppliers. 
The more recent studies referred to in box 3.8, and in particular PC (2010), have 
benefited from developments in theory, data and statistical methods. These 
studies typically find that CER has been net trade diverting. While recognising that 
the results of such studies could not be considered definitive, the Australian 
Commission observed: 
… the analysis suggests that the preferential nature of the [ANZCERTA] agreement 
appears to have altered the focus of many exporters (and importers) in these 
economies to the smaller markets within the agreement, forgoing some of the potential 
gains that would otherwise have been expected from exploring trading opportunities in 
markets elsewhere. (PC 2010, p. 143) 
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Box 3.8 Past analyses of CER’s impact on merchandise trade 
Assessing whether a particular agreement is trade creating or trade diverting is not 
straightforward, because there are often difficulties in isolating the impacts of trade 
agreements on trade flows from those caused by growth, changes in market conditions 
and shifts in policy settings. Further, most studies do not account for potential scale 
effects associated with access to larger markets or productivity improvements that 
might arise from greater import competition (although such effects will normally be 
correlated with the net trade creating effects of the agreement, positive or negative).  
Against that background, past studies of CER (and other preferential trade 
agreements) have yielded varying results: 
• The Australian Bureau of Industry Economics (BIE) examined the impact of CER on 
Australian manufacturing industry in 1989, and concluded that CER likely had had a 
small trade creating effect in affected sectors. It noted that any trade diversion 
effects of CER were likely outweighed by the separate trade creation effects of 
simultaneous general reductions in tariffs. The benefits of CER were attributed 
principally to rationalisation within industries, and specialisation across industries. 
• BIE (1995) undertook modelling that indicated that CER had had a small positive 
impact on gross domestic product and welfare in both countries. 
• Adams et al. (2003) found that a large number of trade agreements were net trade 
diverting, including CER. However, the authors noted that the results were less 
robust for agreements with few members, such as CER, and that their treatment of 
transport costs was likely to have underestimated the increasing attractiveness of 
Australia and New Zealand trading with other countries. 
• DeRosa (2007) found that most preferential trade agreements have had net trade 
creating effects, but results for CER were often negative, although they varied with 
model specification. 
In a more recent study of the impacts of trade agreements, including CER, the 
Australian Commission drew on data on trade flows between 140 countries for the 
period 1970–2008 (PC 2010). It also introduced methodological innovations to address 
deficiencies identified in earlier studies. While recognising the need for careful 
interpretation of the results, the Commission estimated that CER had had a small 
positive impact on trade between Australia and New Zealand, but a larger negative 
impact on both countries’ trade with the rest of the world.  
 
While it seems probable that CER caused net trade diversion in the past, the 
potential for trade diversion has been greatly reduced, as recognised by a number 
of study participants, including Lloyd (sub. DR62) and Greig (sub. DR123). Both 
countries have reduced barriers to imports generally and entered into agreements 
that extend preferential tariff rates to other countries. Moreover, CER may have 
helped bring about these broader tariff reductions, by helping to change opinions 
about trade protection for manufacturing, particularly in New Zealand (Scollay, 
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Findlay and Kaufmann 2011). The broader tariff reductions have greatly reduced 
tariff preferences for trans-Tasman trade. 
Accordingly, it is unclear whether CER reductions in tariffs and quantitative 
restrictions on goods trade yielded overall net benefits or net costs for Australia 
and New Zealand in the past. What is clear is that CER tariff preferences are now 
low and so would be expected to provide only a modest ongoing boost to 
trans-Tasman trade, with minimal incentive for trade diversion. Therefore, any 
ongoing economic effects of CER tariff preferences are likely to be small. 
The net benefits calculus for CER initiatives that aim to reduce behind-the-border 
barriers to goods trade is somewhat different. Such measures can increase 
trans-Tasman trade, but have a lower propensity to give rise to trade costs. 
Reducing behind-the-border barriers can also save on resources devoted to 
complying with and enforcing regulations. For example, mutual recognition of 
product standards results in firms only having to comply with one set of regulations 
rather than two. This can increase the gains from trade even if it does not increase 
the quantity of trade. 
One source of evidence on the influence of behind-the-border CER initiatives on 
trans-Tasman trade is provided by the Australian Commission’s Review of Mutual 
Recognition Schemes. This review examined the Mutual Recognition Agreement 
that operates within Australia as well as the TTMRA. The Review found: 
The views expressed by participants to this review, along with analysis undertaken by 
the Commission, suggest that the schemes have been effective in increasing the 
mobility of goods and labour within Australia and across the Tasman …. In so doing, 
they have almost certainly promoted efficiency, by allowing people and products to 
move to those uses that contribute more to community wellbeing. (PC 2009b, p. xxiii) 
However, initiatives to reduce behind-the-border barriers are sometimes costly to 
achieve, as demonstrated by efforts to introduce the ANZTPA (box 3.4). While this 
initiative may in time prove to be worthwhile, so far considerable time and 
resources have gone into this process in expectation of future gains. 
Trade in services is partly liberalised 
Many services (such as banking, education and health services) that previously 
have been considered purely domestic activities are becoming more tradeable due 
to new communication technologies. The increasing importance of services trade 
has led to multilateral efforts to liberalise such trade, most notably through the 
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General Agreement on Trade in Services, which commenced in 1995. The CER 
Services Protocol pre-dates the General Agreement on Trade in Services. 
Under the CER Services Protocol both countries agreed to treat service providers 
in the other country in the same way as they treat their own (the ‘national 
treatment’ principle). Each country maintains some protections for particular 
services inscribed on a ‘negative list’ specified in an Annex to the Protocol. Articles 
10 and 20 of the Protocol provide for the items on the list to be reviewed regularly, 
‘with a view to the liberalisation of trade in such services and whether, and if so 
how, removal from the Annex could be achieved’. The number of exclusions on 
this list has been progressively reduced, as domestic economic reforms removed 
restrictions on competition in areas such as health insurance services, workers’ 
compensation insurance and some postal services. 
The remaining exclusions, specified in an Annex to the Protocol dated March 
1999, are in the areas of air services, broadcasting, third-party motor vehicle 
insurance, postal services and coastal shipping for Australia. Air services and 
coastal shipping are the only remaining New Zealand exclusions. 
The exemption from the Protocol applies only to some aspects of the services 
concerned. For example, in the case of the Australian inscriptions: 
• coastal shipping: the exemption applies to cabotage policy 
• broadcasting and television: limits on foreign ownership as set out in the 
Broadcasting Services Act 1992 
• third-party insurance: compulsory third-party motor vehicle insurance 
• postal services: the exclusive right, set out in legislation, of Australia Post to 
carry letters for reward within Australia, whether the letters originated inside or 
outside Australia, subject to four specified exceptions. 
Even though air services are excluded in both countries, substantial progress to 
open this sector to competition has been made through the Single Aviation Market 
Arrangements and Open Skies Agreements. 
The BIE (1995) reported that the main significance of the CER Services Protocol 
was that it created an outward looking framework for services trade. Features of 
this framework include the use of a negative list (which prevents the exclusion of 
new services as they become tradeable) and the elimination of export subsidies 
for trans-Tasman trade. Ochiai, Dee and Findlay (2009) found the CER Services 
Protocol to be relatively liberal compared to other agreements in the Asia-Pacific 
region. This was mainly due to CER having few excluded sectors and no 
reservations that apply across all sectors. 
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As with goods, there have also been efforts to reduce barriers to services trade 
caused by regulatory differences between Australia and New Zealand. For 
example, the Trans-Tasman Council on Banking Supervision was established in 
2005 to promote a joint approach to banking supervision and to deliver a more 
seamless regulatory environment in banking services. 
Influence on trade and net benefits 
Available data shows that two way trade in services between Australia and New 
Zealand amounted to about A$6 billion in 2010 (figure 3.4). New Zealand is a 
considerably more important destination for Australia’s services than for its 
merchandise, receiving 6 percent of services exports versus 3 percent of 
merchandise exports. 
Figure 3.4 Trans-Tasman services trade, 2010 prices 
 
Source: ABS (2011b). 
The value of New Zealand’s services exports to Australia has grown over the last 
10 years, while there is no clear trend in the value of Australia’s services exports 
to New Zealand. However, little can be inferred from these data about the effects 
of CER on services trade, due to there being only 10 years of data and because 
the data is far from comprehensive (for example, it excludes trade via commercial 
presence). As such, there is value in examining the experience of particular 
services sectors. Some sectors have experienced marked increases in 
trans-Tasman trade since CER commenced and CER initiatives may have played 
a role (table 3.1). 
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Table 3.1 Effects of CER in selected services sectors 
Sector Role of CER and other factors 
Air services  
 Since 1992, Australia and New Zealand have 
negotiated agreements that have progressively 
strengthened competition in the trans-Tasman air 
services market. While Qantas and Air New 
Zealand continue to dominate the market, more 
airlines now fly across the Tasman. Low-cost 
carriers have emerged and there has been an 
increase in the diversity of routes. As a result of 
greater competition, downwards pressure has been 
placed on airfares, resulting in broad community 
benefits. 
CER-related agreements have made the 
trans-Tasman market one of the most 
liberal in the world. They allow fifth 
freedom rights (under which carriers from 
third countries are able to operate), as 
well as seventh freedom rights for cargo 
services. Eligible Australian and New 
Zealand airlines are also able to operate 
domestically in each country. Ownership 
restrictions have also been relaxed. 
Financial services  
 Australian banks now own almost 90 percent of the 
New Zealand banking sector. There is also a high 
level of Australian ownership of the New Zealand 
insurance industry. The integrated financial 
systems have played a role in each country’s 
economic growth. Sound allocation of capital has 
enabled funding of economic opportunities, while at 
the same time encouraging efficiency in financial 
services. 
Unilateral financial market deregulation in 
both countries appears to have been the 
major driver of increased trans-Tasman 
integration. However, it seems likely that 
the CER has produced benefits by 
harmonising certain regulatory 
procedures in ways that reduce 
transaction costs. 
Telecommunications  
 Until the late 1980s, telecommunications markets 
in both countries were dominated by vertically 
integrated, government-owned monopolies. Both 
markets now have significant trans-Tasman and 
international commercial presence. For example: 
TelstraClear (purchased by Vodafone from Telstra 
in 2012), operates in New Zealand; and AAPT 
(owned by Telecom NZ), operates in Australia. 
Greater integration has generated benefits from 
increased competition and the availability of foreign 
skills and technology. Consumers and producers 
face lower prices and improved availability of 
services. 
Technological change, domestic policy 
reform, and CER and WTO agreements 
have driven integration. From 1989, 
microeconomic reforms in both countries 
opened markets to new entrants. The 
CER Services Protocol and the WTO’s 
Basic Agreement on Telecommunications 
supported these reforms, furthering 
integration. CER initiatives, such as the 
harmonisation of consumer and 
competition law played a role by reducing 
business costs in the sector. 
Establishing a commercial presence is the primary way that many services are 
traded internationally (Hardin and Holmes 1997). This could involve, for example, 
a New Zealand architecture firm establishing an office in Australia. Establishing a 
commercial presence usually involves foreign direct investment (FDI). This means 
that there is a close link between services trade and investment. 
Investment flows have increased substantially 
Until recently CER had not made progress in formally liberalising investment flows 
between the two countries. An Investment Protocol has now been signed, but is 
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yet to be enacted. Despite this, there are some CER initiatives that have reduced 
barriers to firms expanding across the Tasman. 
There is cooperation on securities regulation in both markets, including mutual 
recognition of securities offer documentation. The Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC) found that this measure had reduced the cost of 
firms extending offers across the Tasman by between 55 and 95 percent 
(ASIC 2009). There are agreements resolving issues of double taxation of 
personal income (although little progress has been made on removing double 
taxation of company profits) and an agenda to continue harmonisation of business 
law. There is also an agreement between competition regulators in each country. 
Relevant competition legislation concerning misuse of market power has been 
amended to consider its impacts in the trans-Tasman market. 
A large number of firms now do business across the Tasman (through both trade 
and investment), although they continue to face some barriers. Box 3.9 provides 
some insights into their experiences. 
The lack of a CER investment protocol has not prevented a strong bilateral 
investment relationship developing between Australia and New Zealand. Australia 
is the largest foreign investor in New Zealand with Australians holding investments 
worth around A$74 billion in New Zealand in 2010. FDI (that is, investment where 
the foreigner creates, or gains a significant interest in, a local firm) makes up over 
half of this investment (ABS 2012a). In the other direction, New Zealand is 
Australia’s ninth largest source of foreign investment. In 2010, New Zealanders 
held investments worth around NZ$34 billion in Australia, just under a fifth of which 
was FDI (SNZ 2011). 
Figure 3.5 shows that the stock of Australian FDI in New Zealand has more than 
tripled in real terms over the past 18 years. The stock of New Zealand portfolio 
investment in Australia has more than doubled over this period. 
The rise in the stock of Australian FDI in New Zealand may be explained by a 
variety of factors. Capital has become more mobile across national borders 
generally. In addition, movements in exchange rates and labour costs are likely to 
have made some Australian investments in New Zealand more attractive. New 
Zealand made extensive changes to regulation of its finance sector between 1984 
and 1987, including removing restrictions on foreign firms, including Australian 
firms, from acquiring New Zealand banks. CER initiatives are likely to have also 
played a role, but it is difficult to isolate their effects. 
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Box 3.9 Firm level experience with trans-Tasman integration 
In 2004, the New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development commissioned a study to 
better understand the complex web of trans-Tasman business connections 
(ACIL Tasman and LECG Economics-Finance 2004). Firms from various sectors were 
interviewed, including manufacturing, health IT, telecommunications, legal services, 
banking, food and beverage, travel and retail. The study found that: 
• over half of the New Zealand firms saw growth across the Tasman as crucial, while 
nearly all of the Australian firms saw it as incidental to wider ambitions 
• it was more common for relatively small New Zealand firms to expand into Australia 
than vice versa (small Australian firms tend to grow by expanding into other 
Australian states first) 
• reasons for involvement across the Tasman include incremental revenue and 
economies of scale, proximity and similarity, market diversification, outgrowing 
home markets, and a test market or learning experience for subsequent expansion 
elsewhere 
• there were different types of integration experiences, covering different stages of the 
production and distribution chain (weak integration was often confined to distribution 
and sales, while strong integration generally involved multiple points in the process 
of production (and sometimes design) 
• many New Zealand firms found Australia difficult, especially at first, due to 
‘bureaucratic hurdles, a strong need for local networks and a more ruthless 
business culture’ (p. ix) 
• spin-offs from integration included: better positioning for eventual expansion 
elsewhere; greater interest from Australian venture capitalists; cross-fertilisation of 
ideas and products that can then be used elsewhere; improved ability to manage 
stocks through intra-firm trade; and improved career prospects for staff 
• intermediaries, such as law firms, banks and telecommunication firms, have 
facilitated integration and been stimulated by it. 
Barriers to integration identified by respondents included: travel, transport and 
communication costs; legal, bureaucratic, insurance and other start-up costs in 
Australia; tax differences; differences in legal systems; regulatory differences; and 
rules of origin. 
The Business Operations Survey provides more recent information about international 
engagement by New Zealand firms (SNZ 2012). The 2011 survey found that of New 
Zealand firms that export, 76 percent export to Australia (17 percent export to Australia 
only and 59 percent to Australia and other countries). The proportion of firms that 
exported solely to Australia was higher in services sectors, such as construction, 
finance and insurance and communication services. Barriers to exporting to Australia 
included limited experience in expanding beyond New Zealand and limited access to 
finance.   
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Figure 3.5 Stocks of trans-Tasman investment, 2010 pricesa,b 
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a In 2010, foreign direct investment (FDI) plus portfolio investment made up 61 percent of total Australian 
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Zealand portfolio investment in Australia in 2001 was unavailable and has been intercalated from 2000 and 
2002 data. 
Source: ABS (2012a). 
Inward FDI produces significant benefits for Australia and New Zealand. The 
OECD (2005) argues that liberalisation of FDI is associated with increased 
investment, trade and economic growth in the host country. New Zealand 
Treasury (2009) has stated that FDI inflows have improved economy-wide 
productivity by allowing domestic firms to access international supply chains, new 
technologies and foreign expertise and skills. Recent growth in Australia’s mining 
sector has been financed in part by a more than four-fold increase in FDI in the 
sector between 2001 and 2010 (PC 2012b). In terms of trans-Tasman flows, 
Australia accounts for over half of all FDI in New Zealand. Makin, Zhang and 
Scobie (2008) estimated that foreign investment in New Zealand between 1988 
and 2006 (including direct and portfolio flows) increased incomes by NZ$3300 per 
worker and national wealth by NZ$14 000 per person (in 2007 dollars). 
As international supply chains have developed, intra-firm trade has played an 
increasingly important role in economic integration (De Backer and Yamano 2012). 
Such trade can involve a firm producing an intermediate good for export to an 
affiliated company that undertakes further processing. For example, Cadbury, as 
part of a decision to specialise production across the whole trans-Tasman market, 
now produces chocolate crumb at its upgraded Dunedin factory for export to 
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Australia, where it is made into block chocolate. Data from the Australian Taxation 
Office indicates that intra-firm trade with New Zealand accounted for 6.2 percent of 
Australia’s total intra-firm trade in 2010 (ATO unpublished). This is significantly 
higher than the 3.7 percent of Australia’s total trade in goods and services that 
was with New Zealand in that year. Approximately 25 percent of Australian firms 
that engaged in intra-firm trade did so with affiliates in New Zealand. FDI facilitates 
intra-firm trade by allowing the establishment of foreign affiliates. 
The free movement of people remains a key feature 
Free movement of people between Australia and New Zealand far pre-dates CER, 
but remains an important aspect of trans-Tasman integration. From this base, 
there have been some CER initiatives that have had some influence in addressing 
barriers to people movement, such as TTTA, TTMRA and SmartGate (an 
automated passenger clearance system). However, changes have also been 
made to limit access to social security for some New Zealand citizens living in 
Australia (supplementary paper D). 
People have moved between Australia and New Zealand since pre-colonial times, 
with a long history of labour exchange at all skill levels (DoL 2010). Since the 
1970s, there has been a substantial increase in New Zealand-born people living in 
Australia, outpacing growth in Australian-born people living in New Zealand 
(figure 3.6). 
The proportion of people living in Australia who were born in New Zealand has 
increased from around 1 percent in the early 1970s to just over 2 percent in 2006. 
In contrast, the proportion of New Zealand’s population born in Australia has 
steadily fallen from around 5 percent in the early 1900s to just under 2 percent by 
2011 (supplementary paper D). 
The TTTA and TTMRA are likely to have had an influence on trans-Tasman 
people movement. The TTTA formalised existing freedom of people movement, 
and extended freedoms to some citizens that previously faced restrictions. The 
TTTA and TTMRA have benefited both countries by allowing people to move to 
higher value employment, although there are some concerns in New Zealand 
about the number of people emigrating (supplementary paper D). The free 
movement of people has assisted in the development of business links between 
Australia and New Zealand (Greig, sub. DR123).  
Analysis suggests that economic factors — mainly higher wages in Australia — 
have been the main ongoing drivers of net migration flows of New Zealanders to 
Australia (DIAC 2011; Green, Power and Jang 2008; Hamer 2008; Stillman and 
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Velamuri 2010). Poot (2009) highlights the correlation between divergence of real 
incomes on either side of the Tasman from the late 1960s and migration flows 
from New Zealand to Australia. 
Figure 3.6 Australia’s New Zealand-born population has increased sharply 
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Sources: ABS (2012b); Poot (2009). 
Intergovernment cooperation is extensive 
Collaboration between the Australian and New Zealand Governments is extensive 
and takes many forms, including: 
• annual meetings of Prime Ministers 
• regular ministerial and officials meetings (table 3.2) 
• New Zealand ministers and officials being members, along with Australian 
federal and state counterparts, of many COAG Ministerial Councils 
• shared representation on other councils, boards and other bodies (such as the 
appointment of Commissioners from the other country to the ACCC and the 
New Zealand Commerce Commission) 
• joint ventures or other unincorporated activity 
• joint body, company or other incorporated institution (such as FSANZ and 
JAS-ANZ). 
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Table 3.2 New Zealand ministerial and government agency interactions 
with counterparts in Australia, 2012a 
New Zealand 
agency 
Ministerial meetings Officials meetings Other interaction 
Number of 
groups 
Total 
number of 
meetings 
per year 
Number of 
groups 
Total 
number of 
meetings 
per year 
Number of 
bilateral 
instruments 
Staff 
exchanges 
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade 8+ 10+ 14 17+ 6 1 
Ministry of 
Business, 
Innovation and 
Employment  
9 10+ 14+ 21+ 9 – 
The Treasury 2 2 1+ 1+ – – 
Inland Revenue 
Department – – 2+ 2+ 4 – 
Ministry for Primary 
Industries 4 7+ 6+ 10+ 6 1 
New Zealand 
Defence 
Force/Ministry of 
Defence 
3+ 3+ 2+ 5+ 2 1 
New Zealand 
Customs Service 1 1 2 2+ 3 1 
Ministry of 
Education 2 2+ 2 2+ – – 
Ministry for the 
Environment 1 2+ 3 3+ – – 
New Zealand 
Police 1 2 2 6+ – 1 
Ministry of Civil 
Defence and 
Emergency 
Management 
1 1 1 4 2 – 
Ministry of Health 1 3 1 3 1 – 
Department of 
Internal Affairs  2 3 8+ 10+ 3 – 
Others surveyed 3 2 5+ 8+  7 1 
a These data are drawn from a non-comprehensive survey of New Zealand government agencies that interact 
with Australian counterparts. Meetings planned for the remainder of 2012 are included. – Nil or rounded to 
zero. 
Sources: NZ PC and New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 
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The CER agenda is developed and progressed through such collaboration, both 
formally and informally, including initiatives to coordinate regulations. The 
relationships and shared understanding developed through 
government-to-government contact have allowed each country to learn from the 
policy approaches of the other. This has allowed policy and regulatory frameworks 
to move closer together, which promotes increased integration. 
Although Australia and New Zealand have mostly negotiated regional and bilateral 
trade agreements individually, they have sometimes taken a joint approach. The 
most notable example of Australia-New Zealand joint cooperation with other 
regional fora is the ASEAN Free Trade Area-CER dialogue. This initiative dates 
back to 1995. Since then, Australia and New Zealand have jointly negotiated 
further agreements with ASEAN, including the AFTA-CER Closer Economic 
Partnership, signed in 2002. Negotiations for a free trade area involving the 
10 countries of ASEAN as well as Australia and New Zealand commenced in 
2005. The agreement creating the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade 
Area (AANZFTA) came into force in 2010. AANZFTA provides for the progressive 
reduction or elimination of tariffs, market access commitments for services, and 
investment liberalisation commitments. 
In social policy, both countries have agreed to reciprocal emergency health access 
for short term visits by residents of the other, and recognise child support 
determinations made by each jurisdiction. In addition, agreements have been 
made about access to social security for trans-Tasman migrants. 
Summing up — CER has produced net benefits for both 
countries 
The data presented above on trade, investment and people movement suggest 
that the Australian and New Zealand economies have become closely integrated 
and that CER has played a role in this. The conclusion is consistent with other 
measures of integration (box 3.10). 
CER has been successful in removing explicit restrictions on trade and substantial 
progress has also been made in reducing behind-the-border barriers. Until 
recently, little progress had been made in reducing formal barriers to 
trans-Tasman investment, but this has not prevented a strong bilateral investment 
relationship from developing. Free movement of people between Australia and 
New Zealand was in place long before ANZCERTA commenced and this key 
feature of the relationship has been maintained. 
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Box 3.10 How integrated are we? 
Measures of economic integration are often based on the extent to which a single 
market operates across national borders. Increasing cross-border flows of goods, 
services, capital, people and information should lead economies to display increasingly 
consistent characteristics. 
Assessments of integration from this perspective are based on ‘de facto’ measures of 
economic interdependence, as opposed to ‘de jure’ measures of policy barriers to 
integration. As such, one weakness is that they capture both policy and non-policy 
factors. So they cannot, for example, distinguish between the impacts of CER and 
improvements in transportation and communications technology. However, they 
provide a useful complement to assessments of policy barriers and have been widely 
used to measure integration in other economically close countries (see, for example, 
European Commission 2008). 
What do these techniques reveal about economic integration across the Tasman? 
First, the Australian and New Zealand business cycles have become more 
synchronised over recent years. This could be indicative of increased integration, 
driven by demand-side spillovers and financial linkages, or simply reflect greater 
synchronisation of the world business cycle. Perhaps more conclusively, price changes 
for the same products have become more strongly correlated across Australia and 
New Zealand over the medium to long term, and financial markets appear highly 
integrated. These results indicate that significant progress has been made towards 
achieving a single trans-Tasman market. 
Notwithstanding this progress, the international border between Australia and New 
Zealand is estimated to be considerably ‘thicker’ than state boundaries within Australia. 
For example, the linkages between economic cycles and relative prices are tighter 
across states than they are across the Tasman. Greater economic interdependence 
across Australian states reflects internal trade and people flows that are much larger 
than between New Zealand and Australia. In addition, trans-Tasman price movements 
in services markets are less correlated than in goods markets, indicating a greater 
extent of market fragmentation. Consequently, this suggests that the opportunities for 
future economic integration across Australia and New Zealand predominantly lie in the 
services sector. 
Source: Conway, Meehan and Zheng (forthcoming).  
 
As documented above, the CER agenda is made up of many agreements dealing 
with diverse issues. CER has also progressed through close 
government-to-government contacts and cooperation. This has promoted a subtle 
process of mutual learning that has improved domestic policy in both countries, 
and brought regulatory and policy approaches closer together. 
The quantitative evidence on the benefits and costs of CER is not definitive. To 
some degree this simply reflects the difficulty of isolating CER’s effects from other 
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policy and market influences. There is evidence of trade diversion in merchandise, 
but the potential for this to occur has diminished greatly as both countries have 
dismantled trade barriers more broadly. 
Some CER initiatives have worked better than others. For example, it is clear that 
TTMRA has enabled transaction costs to be reduced on a broad front. It is 
reasonable to infer that this has brought considerable benefits and, as the cost 
associated with this initiative is modest, that net benefits have resulted. In contrast, 
efforts to harmonise the regulation of therapeutic goods through the creation of a 
trans-Tasman regulator have been protracted and costly, with the gains remaining 
prospective. 
However, in the main CER has avoided integration options that would be costly to 
secure. This is evident, for example, in the approach taken to more closely 
aligning competition and consumer protection regimes. 
It is also likely that CER has helped engender reform to broader policy settings in 
Australia and New Zealand. CER appears to have helped to change opinions 
about trade protection for manufacturing and paved the way for unilateral 
reductions in tariffs generally, particularly in New Zealand (Scollay, Findlay and 
Kaufmann 2011). In this way, and unlike some other bilateral or regional 
agreements, CER appears to have acted more as a ‘building block’ than 
‘stumbling block’ in the pursuit of wider integration. Wider integration has in turn 
brought large benefits, including higher standards of living in both countries. 
Overall, the Commissions’ assessment is that CER has produced net benefits for 
Australia and New Zealand, notwithstanding uncertainty about the magnitudes. 
3.3 Implications for the future agenda 
Experience with CER over the past 30 years yields some insights that are relevant 
to the future trans-Tasman integration agenda. 
Future progress will require careful assessment 
The early years of CER saw major advances, with restrictions on virtually all goods 
traded between the two countries eliminated by 1990. The agenda then moved 
into new areas, such as services trade and behind-the-border regulatory barriers. 
Implementing agreements on reducing behind-the-border barriers has proven 
more complicated than the early agenda focused on merchandise trade. 
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That said, there is an ambitious agenda of business law reform, and progress 
towards integration in many other areas. However, as advances are made, new 
integration opportunities are becoming less obvious. Extending or deepening the 
trans-Tasman integration agenda will generally require tackling more complex and 
difficult areas of policy and regulation. This makes it particularly important to 
identify those initiatives that offer a satisfactory payoff. Good public policy 
processes will be instrumental in ensuring that the best policy initiatives are 
selected. 
Policy initiatives to encourage economic integration 
should be outward looking 
CER was established to be outward oriented, rather than focusing inwards on the 
bilateral relationship. Originally motivated by the need to find replacements for 
European markets, the trans-Tasman integration agenda now needs to ‘fit’ with the 
broader challenges and opportunities being created by the rise of Asia (box 3.11). 
 
Box 3.11 Australia and New Zealand in the Asian Century 
The Australia in the Asian Century white paper, released by the Australian Government 
in October 2012, argues that the extraordinary ascent of Asia means that Australia is 
‘entering a truly transformative period in our history’ (Australian Government 2012, 
p. 1). It reports that Asia’s share of global output increased from 20 percent in 1970 to 
36 percent in 2010, and that this share is forecast to reach 47 percent in 2025 (based 
on GDP adjusted for purchasing power parity). Asia accounted for two-thirds of 
Australia’s goods trade in 2010 and this proportion is rising. 
The white paper summarises the opportunities created by the rise of Asia as follows: 
The Asian century offers a wealth of opportunities and career choices in a variety of 
businesses (including small and medium-sized enterprises), especially for Australia’s young 
people: 
- in mining and resource related sectors — continued economic development in the region 
will drive demand for energy and mineral resources 
- in tourism, sport, education, the arts and creative industries, professional, banking and 
financial services, and science and technology — thanks to growing affluence in Asia 
- in agriculture — rising food demand, connected to rising populations and an expanding 
middle class in Asia, offers an opportunity for Australia to be an important supplier of 
high-value food, requiring greater investment by agribusinesses to boost output and 
research, adapt to regulatory change and build capacity 
(continued next page)  
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Box 3.11 (continued) 
- in manufacturing and services — as Australian businesses join regional and global value 
chains and over time become increasingly integrated and specialised, they will offer 
high-value and innovative products and services 
- in environmentally sustainable growth, natural resource management, infrastructure 
development, urban design and health and aged care — as Australians leverage their 
expertise to do business with their neighbours. (Australian Government 2012, p. 8) 
There is also recognition that not all parts of the Australian economy are facing the 
same opportunities and that some industries and regions are working through difficult 
transitions, due in part to intense competition from a rapidly industrialising Asia. 
The proportion of New Zealand’s trade accounted for by Asia has increased from 29 to 
43 percent over the last 30 years. The opportunities and challenges for New Zealand in 
the Asian century are broadly similar to those for Australia, but with greater emphasis 
on agriculture, and less on mining and resources. Over the last two years the New 
Zealand Government has published country and regional strategies, known as NZ Inc 
strategies, with the first two publications focusing on India and China and another 
under way on ASEAN.  
 
Australia and New Zealand’s trade and investment links with Asia mean that what 
happens in Asia has repercussions for the trans-Tasman partners (box 3.12). 
At the same time that Asian economies have expanded, multilateral efforts to 
promote trade liberalisation have lost momentum. The Doha Round began 
11 years ago, but is yet to be concluded and its future is uncertain. This has 
reinforced the need to consider trans-Tasman integration in a broader regional and 
global context. It means avoiding actions that impede integration with other 
countries and extending trans-Tasman initiatives to reap further gains from 
broader integration in multilateral fora and at a wider regional level. Finding ways 
to ensure that trade and investment creation predominates more generally should 
continue to be an objective for CER. 
The rise of Asia presents great opportunities for both countries — with benefits 
that potentially far outweigh those on offer through further trans-Tasman 
integration, significant though these may be. The best way to position both 
economies to capture the benefits of the ‘Asian Century’ will be to enhance their 
productivity and competitiveness. This means that each country needs to remain 
outwardly focused, and continue to pursue domestic policies that enhance 
efficiency and improve productivity. 
Opportunities for Australia and New Zealand from growth in Asian economies 
depend on there being sufficient flexibility and business capability to respond to 
changing patterns of demand. Hence, it is important that the integration initiatives 
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and domestic reforms develop in ways that increase the capability of both 
economies to adjust to, and make the most of, changing economic circumstances. 
 
Box 3.12 Transmission of Asian growth to Australia and New Zealand 
The ANZEA model was used to illustrate the effects on Australia and New Zealand of 
growth in Asia. The first-round expansion was modelled as a uniform expansion in 
labour and capital (and corresponding incomes) in all Asian economies. 
Asian growth of 10 percent contributes to gross national product (GNP) growth in 
Australia and New Zealand to a small extent — far less than 1 percent (see table). 
Growth in Asia: 
• increases demand for Australian and New Zealand exports 
• improves Asian competitiveness, crowding out Australian and New Zealand exports. 
At the industry levels, growth in the Asian construction sectors (especially in China) 
translates into increased demand for Australian mineral exports. Growth in Asian 
consumer demand (especially in ASEAN) translates into increased demand for 
agricultural products, especially dairy and meat products from New Zealand. 
Lower bound results in the table are associated with high substitutability between 
domestic and imported products. Growth in input supplies in Asia decreases production 
costs and prices. To the extent that cheaper domestic products can be substituted for 
imports, this domestic production crowds out Australian and New Zealand exports. This 
is especially the case for agriculture. Upper bound results occur when low substitution 
is assumed — the expansion effect dominates as Asian economies expand their use of 
unique Australian and New Zealand products and little crowding out occurs. 
Table Economy-wide effects of 10 percent growth in Asia, percent 
 Australia New Zealand 
GNP 0.02 – 0.11 0.00 – 0.12 
Exports 1.07 – 1.83 0.02 – 0.86 
Value-added   
 Agriculture 0.12 – 0.50 0.12 – 0.29 
 Mining 1.40 – 2.00 0.38 – 0.67 
Exports to Asia   
 Agriculture 1.83 – 3.11 2.16 – 3.09 
 Mininga 4.62 – 5.16 5.13 – 5.69 
a Mining accounts for only 0.64 percent of New Zealand exports. Thus even a relatively large percentage 
change in mining production contributes only small changes to New Zealand output. In contrast, mining 
accounts for more than 21 percent of Australian exports, and contributes significantly to Australian output. 
Source: Australian Commission estimates.  
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CER also has the potential to be a model for reducing integration barriers in the 
Asia-Pacific region. That said, there are aspects of CER that are unlikely to be 
able to be extended to countries that do not share the two countries’ institutional 
similarities. For example, mutual recognition of occupational licencing would not 
be likely to work well between countries with very different licencing requirements. 
Finally, an integrated Australasian economic area with similar (high-quality) 
regulatory approaches, greater critical mass in high-value competencies and 
relatively seamless internal interactions can position itself as a more attractive 
economic region in the eyes of Asian businesses and consumers. 
The focus has shifted towards the services sector 
CER began as a trade agreement, and gradually evolved to have a broader 
coverage. This is consistent with the evolving composition of the Australian and 
New Zealand economies. In common with other developed countries, both 
economies are oriented towards services, which in aggregate account for around 
80 percent of each country’s GDP (gross domestic product) (chapter 1). Moreover, 
there has been a significant increase in the share of services in global trade, 
particularly with developed countries. 
While manufacturing was more important at the inception of CER — which is one 
reason why trade in manufactures was the focus of the initial agreement — it 
remains significant in both economies. That said, with the services sector 
dominating and with barriers to trade of manufactures having been substantially 
reduced under CER, initiatives that affect services trade and investment could be 
expected to absorb an increasing share of future policy effort. 
Scale remains an issue 
A driver for CER was the expectation that improved access to trans-Tasman 
markets, in an environment where access was being denied to Europe, would 
enable firms in both countries to specialise and achieve economies of scale. 
Thirty years on, the small scale of domestic markets remains an issue, particularly 
for New Zealand. Australia and New Zealand rank 13th and 55th respectively 
amongst world economies when size is measured by GDP (IMF 2012). Australia’s 
population and labour force are each approximately five times the size of New 
Zealand’s and its GDP is over seven times as large (on a purchasing power parity 
basis). In terms of population, New Zealand is about the same size as 
Queensland, Australia’s third largest state. These size differences have increased 
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over time because of Australia’s higher trend rate of growth in both population and 
GDP per person. 
The difference in size of the two economies carries over to individual industries 
and sectors. For example, the Australian telecommunications market has between 
four and five times as many customers as New Zealand’s across fixed line, mobile 
and internet services. Industries with large fixed costs such as telecommunications 
and transport infrastructure suffer higher unit costs in small markets and are forced 
to pass these on to customers. Small markets also limit the scope for competition 
to drive efficiency and innovation (Berry 2011). 
Both countries also face the challenge of their distant location from major markets 
and from places that are prime sources of creativity and innovation. According to 
empirical estimates in one study (Boulhol and de Serres 2010), the GDP per 
person of both countries is around 10 percent less than it would be if their distance 
from world economic activity was around the average for OECD countries. 
The challenges of size and distance highlight how important it is that CER remains 
outward oriented. They also explain why New Zealand firms place such 
importance on having access to the Australian market. Services delivered by 
commercial presence, as well as government services and regulatory functions, 
have better opportunities to reap economies of scale and scope in an integrated 
trans-Tasman market. 
The combined GDP of Australia and New Zealand would rank as the 12th largest 
world economy. This is only one place higher than Australia on its own, but 
obviously represents a significant increase in ranking for New Zealand. It follows 
that closer integration is likely to be particularly attractive to New Zealand. It is 
through the twin track of a larger ‘domestic’ market and greater international 
integration that CER can contribute most effectively to overcoming the problems of 
scale. 
People mobility is beneficial, but brings with it some 
complex issues 
Large numbers of people on both sides of the Tasman have taken advantage of 
opportunities to move between the two countries, for both short and long-term 
visits (or permanent migration). This has brought gains, particularly for those 
involved, but some complex issues have arisen. 
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In particular, there are concerns about: 
• adjustment costs, including possible ‘hollowing out’ of the New Zealand 
economy (chapter 2) 
• whether New Zealanders who have lived and worked in Australia for an 
extended period have appropriate access to social security entitlements and 
pathways to citizenship 
• potential future costs to the New Zealand Government from New Zealand 
citizens returning after an extended absence and then accessing the age 
pension. 
CER should continue to complement domestic reform 
Domestic imperatives in each country, rather than CER, were the primary drivers 
of the market-based reforms that commenced in the 1980s. Yet, as box 3.2 shows, 
there have been marked similarities in the policy approaches taken in the two 
countries, with Australia leading in some cases (such as in the removal of capital 
controls and floating the exchange rate) and New Zealand leading in others (such 
as central bank independence and the goods and services tax). While the 
countries have taken their own approaches to economic policy, cooperation with 
and learning from the other have also been a feature. 
A further important implication is the need to strike the right balance between 
domestic reform, trans-Tasman reform and other regional and multilateral reforms. 
Developing and implementing policy absorbs resources and the scarce time of 
ministers, parliamentarians, officials, and private-sector players. The wrong 
balance can have large opportunity costs. Consideration of trans-Tasman 
integration initiatives must take this into account, particularly given the ongoing 
importance of domestic reform for productivity growth. 
Pragmatism can be a virtue 
CER has benefited from the pragmatic approach taken by governments and 
bureaucracies over the years. In general, effort has been focused on areas 
identified as being important to business and consumers, and for which practical 
and politically feasible solutions could be anticipated (Scollay, Findlay and 
Kaufmann 2011). Institutional arrangements for managing the integration agenda 
have been kept simple and light-handed. Some joint institutions have been 
established, but supranational institutions have been avoided. 
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A pragmatic approach has also been useful in relation to the unequal nature of the 
trans-Tasman relationship. As noted, Australia has a much larger economy and 
this means that trans-Tasman integration is a ‘higher stakes game’ for New 
Zealand. In the main, both Governments have understood this imbalance and 
worked constructively with its consequences. On the Australian side this has 
meant appreciating that integration brings larger adjustment pressures for New 
Zealand which need to be managed. On the New Zealand side, it has meant 
understanding that integration is a lesser priority for Australia, and that progress 
needs to be made when opportunities arise. In some cases, the best option for 
New Zealand may be to simply adopt Australia’s regulatory approach. 
The future CER agenda should retain this pragmatic approach, within the 
conceptual framework developed in chapter 2. 
Harmonisation is challenging 
Implementing a reduction in tariffs is generally straightforward. By contrast, 
decisions to pursue regulatory harmonisation or other mechanisms to reduce 
behind-the-border barriers are usually more challenging. Agreement must be 
reached on the extent to which regulatory differences should be removed and 
whether institutional changes should be made (such as moving to a joint 
regulator). Implementation may require extensive changes to legislation, 
administrative procedures and regulatory institutions. For example, consideration 
needs to be given to how laws relating to privacy, Ombudsman oversight and the 
review of decisions should apply to joint regulators (Office of the Australian 
Information Commissioner, sub. DR74). 
The experience with regulation of food safety and therapeutic goods demonstrates 
the challenges of harmonisation (boxes 3.3 and 3.4). The success of FSANZ 
suggests that some level of flexibility for countries to respond to domestic issues 
and preferences within a harmonised regime can help to reduce the costs 
associated with the loss of national autonomy. The perceived lack of such 
flexibility in the original arrangements proposed for therapeutic products appears 
to have contributed to delaying the introduction of the ANZTPA. Further, the case 
of FSANZ illustrates the point that harmonisation across the Tasman has a higher 
probability of success if it builds on reform and alignment that has already 
occurred across Australian jurisdictions. 
The scope of ANZTPA’s activities is to include the enforcement of regulations, 
while FSANZ does not perform this function. Accordingly, ANZTPA represents a 
more far-reaching model for harmonisation, and this has also contributed to the 
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delays and costs of its introduction. The lesson here is that more complex forms of 
harmonisation generally bring added costs and so should only be embarked on 
where the net benefits can be substantiated as larger than for alternative options. 
More broadly, harmonisation efforts should draw on the best regulatory 
approaches in both countries. Aligning regulatory arrangements changes the 
magnitude and incidence of regulatory costs (compliance costs for businesses and 
broader efficiency costs). These effects should be considered when evaluating 
harmonisation proposals, as noted by some industry participants (box 3.13). 
 
Box 3.13 Benefits and risks of harmonisation — industry perspectives 
Many submissions called for greater alignment of regulatory arrangements between 
Australia and New Zealand. For example, the Pharmaceuticals Industry Council made 
the case for harmonising the rules and regulations for conducting clinical trials for new 
pharmaceutical products: 
Harmonising … would allow faster, easier and ultimately cheaper access to research sites 
across the two jurisdictions. This would not only give researchers the ability to recruit more 
patients into clinical trials, but also give patients in both jurisdictions faster access to new 
healthcare technologies. (sub. 43, p. 3) 
However, it noted a risk of harmonisation: 
… Australia and New Zealand must ensure that a more harmonised system builds on 
existing strengths of each jurisdiction and does not impose one’s weaknesses on the other. 
(sub. 43, p. 3) 
In a similar vein, Accord Australasia noted that closer alignment of Australia’s chemical 
regulations with those of New Zealand could significantly reduce industry costs while 
maintaining good health and safety outcomes. However it also cautioned: 
… we also do not believe that the regulatory requirements in either country should be 
increased to achieve this end — outcomes should optimise net trans-Tasman benefit. 
(sub. 54, p. 10) 
Fonterra referred to an instance where it believed harmonisation was desirable. It also 
emphasised the importance of selecting the right model for harmonisation: 
Laws relating to criminalisation of cartels should be harmonised, but not by adopting the 
Australian model. There is no sound policy basis for criminalising cartels, in particular no 
evidence that criminalisation increases compliance where there are already significant 
sanctions for breaches of the relevant laws. (sub. 14, p. 3) 
Standards Australia noted the challenges associated with harmonisation, specifically in 
the context of standards, but observed that there were opportunities: 
Where economic imperatives differ between countries, the harmonisation of standards can 
often prove challenging and avoiding a ‘race to the bottom’ is critical. However, the 
aforementioned high rate of adoption of international standards both regionally and 
internationally is an excellent opportunity to achieve harmonisation. (sub. 44, p. 2)  
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The immediate benefits of harmonisation generally accrue to firms and individuals 
who already operate across or move between different jurisdictions. 
Harmonisation may also induce some firms and individuals to extend their 
activities from one to both countries. However, for those who continue to operate 
entirely within one jurisdiction, harmonisation can be a negative. There may be 
one-off costs from the need to change systems to suit new rules and ongoing 
costs if the new regulations are more onerous. Accordingly, it is important to 
consider the costs and benefits of harmonisation on a case-by-case basis. 
There are many areas of regulation where harmonisation even across Australia’s 
own jurisdictions has not been achieved. Where this is the case, the prospect of —
and potential benefits from — harmonising across the Tasman can be much 
reduced. In these and other cases, mutual recognition provides a worthwhile 
alternative as demonstrated by the TTMRA. Mutual recognition can also act as an 
effective precursor to harmonisation. 
Political leadership is important 
Trans-Tasman integration initially had little active support from the business 
community in Australia and New Zealand, and strong vested interests opposed it. 
The steps taken during the New Zealand Australia Free Trade Agreement era and 
the early years of CER depended on advocacy by individual politicians, although 
key business leaders, academics and government officials also played an 
important role. Although many of these steps were small, they were important in 
building a constituency for change. Political leadership was instrumental in 
achieving the breakthrough reforms arising from the 1988 review. At various times 
political support has been important in regaining momentum for further integration.  
Public opinion surveys suggest that there is support in both Australia and New 
Zealand for at least the current extent of integration, although the recent problems 
in Europe may create public scepticism about further trans-Tasman integration 
initiatives. History suggests that political leadership is likely to continue to play an 
important role in carrying forward the CER agenda. 
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4 Opportunities for further 
integration 
 
Key points 
• This chapter identifies 28 policy initiatives to strengthen trans-Tasman economic 
relations in ways that could yield joint net benefits. 
• Most address regulatory barriers (typically behind the border) to services trade and 
commercial presence, and some remaining impediments to integration in goods, 
capital and labour markets. 
• Some involve initiatives underway (initiatives to which both Governments have 
committed but have not yet completed). Others are new initiatives, some of which 
will require more detailed consideration. 
• There is also greater scope for each Government to cooperate with and learn from 
the other in policy development and service delivery. 
• Waiving rules of origin for traded goods for which tariffs are at 5 percent or less 
would reduce compliance and administrative costs for a significant proportion of 
trans-Tasman trade. Building on this reform, each country could reduce tariffs that 
exceed 5 percent down to that level. 
• While the trans-Tasman air route is already quite competitive, two regulatory 
barriers to competition on this route could usefully be removed. 
• The exemption of ocean carriers from key parts of competition regulation is no 
longer necessary and should be repealed. 
• The two Governments should implement the Investment Protocol they signed last 
year and consider removing the remaining restrictions. 
• Mutual recognition of tax imputation credits (MRIC) on trans-Tasman investment 
could expand investment and bring efficiency gains, but would involve sizeable 
fiscal losses and income transfers, which are more likely to leave Australia worse 
off. The two Governments should either initiate a process for determining whether 
there is an efficient, equitable and robust mechanism to ensure a satisfactory 
distribution of the gains from MRIC; or announce that MRIC will not go ahead if such 
a mechanism is considered infeasible. 
• Different social security and tax systems have placed some New Zealanders 
resident in Australia for long periods in anomalous situations. The Australian 
Government should enhance information for arriving and long term resident New 
Zealanders; address the issues faced by non-Protected Special Category Visa 
holders living long term in Australia including by developing pathways to citizenship; 
and seek to improve their access to tertiary education. 
• Within the context of the CER, the SEM and the TTTA, the Australian and New 
Zealand Governments should review the principles governing access to social 
security and further develop bilateral engagement on migration policies.  
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This chapter assesses initiatives to further integrate the Australian and New 
Zealand economies. Some are ‘initiatives underway’, that is, initiatives to which 
both Governments have committed, but have not completed (section 4.1). Others 
are new initiatives (sections 4.2–4.6). The areas and impediments covered in 
these sections have been selected drawing on the filtering criteria outlined in 
box 2.7. Most involve impediments to trade in services. Regulations behind the 
border are particularly important (figure 4.1). 
Figure 4.1 Areas potentially affected by recommendationsa 
 
a Number of areas substantially affected by the recommendations identified in chapter 4. Some 
recommendations are likely to affect more than one area. 
The chapter also considers initiatives that the Commissions consider should not 
proceed (section 4.7). 
The Commissions’ analysis is summarised in this chapter. Supplementary papers 
examine many of the initiatives in more depth. 
4.1 Initiatives underway: key areas to deliver 
The Commissions have identified four areas — business law, mutual recognition 
of occupational licensing, therapeutic products regulation and the CER Investment 
Protocol — in which the Australian and New Zealand Governments have 
committed to policy initiatives that have not been completed at the time of writing. 
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Business law reforms are mostly on track 
The program as a whole 
In September 2012, the Trans-Tasman Outcomes Implementation Group (TTOIG) 
reported that one of the 19 medium term outcomes in the business law SEM 
program had been completed, 12 were on track for completion by the end of 2014, 
four were slowing or on hold, and two have been removed, with ministerial 
agreement (box 3.6). Eight short term outcomes have been completed; one has 
been delayed. The delays to outcomes were explained as follows. 
• Aligning corporate trustee regimes for financial products: Other priorities in 
Australia continue to delay the review of the corporate trustees regime for 
debentures. 
• A standard set of financial and business performance data for reporting to 
governments: Progress in New Zealand has been affected by the creation of 
the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. It is expected that the 
outcome will be further progressed in 2013. 
• A single plant variety rights regime: It may be difficult to achieve a single 
application process for trans-Tasman plant breeder’s rights until New Zealand 
ratifies the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
Convention 91. The intellectual property regulators are considering revising this 
outcome so that it does not depend on this ratification. 
• Sharing confidential information between competition and consumer law 
regulators in both countries: The necessary legislation has been passed in both 
countries. The memorandum of understanding between the two competition 
agencies will need to be revised to comply with new statutory requirements. 
• Single filing of company information: Financial reasons have delayed progress 
in both countries, although the relevant regulators are exploring how to make 
progress within current funding (TTOIG 2012). 
The TTOIG should complete those parts of the business law integration program 
for which it remains responsible according to the specified timetable, unless it 
considers that the net benefits are no longer evident or need further investigation. 
A single application and examination process for patents 
A single application and examination process for patents, which is part of the 
business law reform agenda, is intended to simplify the process for those seeking 
a patent in both Australia and New Zealand and to facilitate closer coordination 
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between the Australian and the New Zealand Intellectual Property Offices. A 
facility that allows for a single patent application will be introduced in 2013, while 
joint examinations will be phased in from 2014 (TTOIG 2012). Separate patents 
will still be granted in each jurisdiction, avoiding the need for full alignment of the 
two countries’ patent laws. 
This initiative should have benefits for both countries. The patent examination 
process is complex, and it may be increasingly difficult for small countries to 
maintain the necessary capacity to conduct effective examinations (Barton 2004). 
Closer cooperation between the Australian and New Zealand Intellectual Property 
Offices will offer knowledge transfer and greater specialisation which can improve 
the ability of both offices to respond to current and future demands (TTOIG 2012). 
On the cost side, the New Zealand Institute of Patent Attorneys (NZIPA, sub. 30) 
and the intellectual property firm Baldwins (sub. 45) suggest that a single process 
would increase applications by overseas owners of intellectual property for patents 
in both countries (when previously they would have only applied in Australia), to 
the disadvantage of New Zealand innovators. The NZIPA (sub. DR89) suggests 
that the experience of countries that have recently joined the European Patent 
Convention — a regional patent system that shares some similarities with the 
proposed trans-Tasman reforms — supports this contention.  
IP Australia (sub. DR89, p. 5) accepts that the single examination process could 
increase patent filings in either country, but for two reasons expects any increase 
to be ‘modest’. First, although the proposed reform is anticipated to reduce costs, 
the commercial viability of seeking patent protection in an additional jurisdiction 
depends on a range of other costs associated with prosecuting, maintaining and 
enforcing patent rights. Second, Australia and New Zealand are both members of 
the Patent Cooperation Treaty, an international patent law treaty, which already 
provides a streamlined approach for filing applications in multiple jurisdictions. As 
such, the proposed changes merely present another option for applicants who 
wish to file in Australia and New Zealand. IP Australia also suggests that 
increased patent filing will not necessarily diminish local innovation. It notes that 
the threshold for granting a patent (for example, the required levels of 
inventiveness and disclosure) has a more important impact, and that both 
countries are taking steps to strengthen the thresholds for granting patents. 
As evident in the contrasting opinions raised in submissions, the impact of a joint 
application and examination process on the rate of patent filing is difficult to predict 
— particularly given that many other factors also influence the decision to seek 
patent protection. The extent to which innovation opportunities might be 
constrained by increased patent filing in either country is also unclear. 
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On balance, given the potential operational benefits from closer collaboration 
between the Australian and New Zealand Intellectual Property offices, the 
Commissions consider that this reform should be completed within the current 
TTOIG process and timeframes. As noted in chapter 5, arrangements to review 
the effectiveness of major programs are an important part of good governance 
and, as a general rule, significant trans-Tasman initiatives should include a 
commitment to cost-effective evaluation. The trans-Tasman intellectual property 
reforms, particularly those relating to patents, should be evaluated within three 
years of implementation to assess their economic impacts and to identify lessons 
that can be drawn from this collaboration. 
 
    
 
R4.1 
 
The remaining outcomes in the business law single economic 
market program should be completed on time, unless it can be 
demonstrated that they would no longer generate net benefits. 
   
    
 
    
 
R4.2 
 
The Australian and New Zealand Governments should proceed 
with the implementation of a single application and examination 
process for patents. The trans-Tasman intellectual property 
reforms, particularly those relating to patents, should be 
evaluated within three years of implementation. 
   
    
Mutual recognition schemes 
The trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement (TTMRA) seeks to promote 
economic integration by reducing regulatory impediments to the movement of 
goods and provision of services across the Tasman. In the case of goods, mutual 
recognition enables goods produced in or imported into one jurisdiction, and that 
may lawfully be sold in that jurisdiction, to be sold in a second jurisdiction without 
meeting additional regulatory requirements in that jurisdiction. In the case of 
services provided by a range of occupations, mutual recognition means that 
registration in an occupation in one jurisdiction is sufficient grounds for registration 
in the equivalent occupation in another jurisdiction (PC 2009b). Mutual recognition 
principles do not apply in circumstances that are covered by provisions for 
exclusions, exceptions and exemptions (temporary and permanent). 
The Australian Commission reviewed the TTMRA in 2009, in line with a 
requirement in the TTMRA that it be reviewed every five years. The Commission’s 
overall assessment was that: 
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Mutual recognition — under both the MRA and TTMRA — has served the Australian 
and New Zealand economies well. … However, many of the gains have been captured 
and fulfilment of the full potential of the schemes is now stymied by ambiguities and 
omissions in the Acts, and by weaknesses in their implementation. There is also a 
strong case for extending the coverage and scope of the schemes, given the many 
changes that have occurred in the goods and labour markets over the past decade or 
so (PC 2009b, p. xxxviii). 
The Commission recommended a number of ways to improve the TTMRA 
(box 4.1). 
 
Box 4.1 Key Australian Productivity Commission’s recommendations 
for improving the TTMRA 
The Commission recommendations included: 
• Changes should be made to the exemptions of some occupations and goods from 
mutual recognition. For example: 
– the exemption for medical practitioners should be removed for those who have 
gained their medical qualifications within Australia or New Zealand 
– some categories of goods subject to special exemptions from mutual recognition 
across the Tasman should be mutually recognised. Others should continue to be 
special exemptions, while the remainder should be converted into permanent 
exemptions. 
• Amendments to the mutual recognition legislation are urgently needed to remedy 
ambiguities and omissions in the Acts. In particular: 
– mechanisms for regulators and stakeholders to seek advice and declarations 
from the Trans-Tasman Occupations Tribunal should be clarified and/or created  
– requirements for the use of goods, insofar as they prevent or restrict the sale of 
goods, should explicitly be brought into the scope of mutual recognition. 
• Australia and New Zealand should take into account the possible impacts that 
international agreements will have on the mutual recognition framework when 
negotiating future initiatives with third countries. 
• The Cross Jurisdictional Review Forum (the joint Australia–New Zealand 
government body with carriage of mutual recognition) should report annually to 
COAG on its program and achievements. 
Source: PC (2009b).  
 
The joint response of the Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments of 
Australia and the New Zealand Government to these recommendations has not 
been published. However, the Commissions understand that the situation is as 
follows. 
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• The Governments decided that the special exemptions that previously applied 
to five categories of goods should become permanent exemptions. This was 
effected in 2010. 
• As noted in chapter 3, in June 2011 the Governments of Australia and New 
Zealand agreed to establish a joint Australia New Zealand Therapeutic 
Products Agency (ANZTPA). Therapeutic products were previously subject to a 
special exemption from mutual recognition. 
• In April 2010, the Australian Parliament passed the Health Insurance 
Amendment (New Zealand overseas trained doctors) Act 2010, which relaxed 
restrictions on New Zealand citizens and permanent resident doctors who gain 
their first medical degree from a New Zealand or Australian university.  
• Some of the recommendations for legislative change have been rejected and 
others (for example, use of goods requirements and new judicial remedies) are 
still being considered. In some cases, the Governments considered that the 
recommendations could be taken up without recourse to legislation through, for 
example, updating the User’s Guide to the Mutual Recognition Agreement and 
Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement. This work is underway and 
will include case studies and other relevant examples, where they are 
available, to help avoid any remaining ambiguity about how to implement the 
TTMRA (MBIE, pers. comm., 5 November 2012). 
• Advice was taken on possible changes in approach to streamline the legislative 
process, as currently legislation has to be enacted in 10 legislatures. This 
advice has not been acted upon to date, given other priorities. 
• The Cross Jurisdictional Review Forum considered the five-yearly review 
process provided the appropriate means for reporting to COAG on progress 
with mutual recognition matters. In between, reporting to COAG senior officials 
should be on an as-needed basis. 
• Amongst the jurisdictions, there is interest in the review’s recommendations to 
broaden mutual recognition to the direct provision of services in regulated 
occupations (so that registration in one jurisdiction would permit provision of 
services across jurisdictions). Proposed work in this area by the New Zealand 
Government was put on hold pending the conclusion of this joint scoping study. 
• There has been little progress on trans-Tasman occupational mutual 
recognition, pending development of national licensing arrangements for a 
number of occupations in Australia. It was felt that any changes needed to be 
advanced in Australia before their implications for trans-Tasman mutual 
recognition were further explored. That said, examples such as the recent 
mutual recognition of financial advisers suggest that the TTMRA continues to 
generate benefits, and the Commissions did not come across evidence of firms 
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lacking access to adequate information about mutual recognition. Occupational 
licensing is discussed further in the next section. 
In summary, some changes have been made following the recommendations of 
the 2009 review but it appears that, with the exception of work on ANZTPA, other 
priorities on both sides of the Tasman have prevented non-essential work 
involving the TTMRA from being undertaken.  
 
    
 
R4.3 
 
The Australian and New Zealand Governments should give 
priority to implementing those recommendations of the Australian 
Commission’s 2009 review of the Trans-Tasman Mutual 
Recognition Arrangement that were accepted by Governments. 
   
    
It would be unsatisfactory for the next review of the TTMRA, due to begin in 2013, 
to proceed without stakeholders in that review knowing the Governments’ 
response to the 2009 review and any impediments to implementing those 
recommendations that were accepted. To enable stakeholders to contribute 
effectively to the upcoming review, a report outlining progress since the 2009 
review should be published. 
 
    
 
R4.4 
 
Governments should publish a progress report on implementing 
accepted recommendations of the 2009 review of the Trans-
Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement before the next review, 
scheduled in 2013. 
   
    
The national system of occupational licensing 
Where the scope of authorised activities differs across jurisdictions, regulators can 
impose conditions on licensees, in order to define the boundaries of mutual 
recognition. This, however, complicates the task that regulators face and can 
result in labour mobility being lower than otherwise. 
While agreement on a national occupational licensing system within Australia 
would address inter-jurisdictional differences within Australia, it will be some time 
before such regimes are developed across all occupations. Moreover, it may not 
be worth developing licensing regimes for less significant occupations or where 
licensing is only required in a few jurisdictions, or when there is little 
cross-jurisdiction movement (PC 2009b). 
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Even when there is an Australia-wide licensing scheme, New Zealand generally 
will not be part of it, which means that the TTMRA remains important and that its 
interface with Australian licensing needs to be considered. For this reason, the 
Australian Commission’s view in 2009 was that: 
… Given the importance of regulator cooperation in the operation of the TTMRA, 
engagement of New Zealand regulators in the development of new systems in 
Australia appears highly desirable. (PC 2009b, p. 110) 
COAG continues to work on a national occupational licensing system, and the 
New Zealand Government is undertaking a scoping study of occupational 
regulation. Ongoing consultation across the Tasman would allow regulators to 
harness synergies from these separate national developments without 
undermining trans-Tasman mutual recognition. 
 
    
 
R4.5 
 
Australian and New Zealand occupational regulators should 
share knowledge and lessons in developing efficient and effective 
occupational licensing systems. Relevant Australian and New 
Zealand regulators should be included in consultations around 
the development of national occupational licensing systems in the 
other country. 
   
    
The Australia New Zealand Therapeutic Products Agency 
(ANZTPA) 
The ANZTPA — the first trans-Tasman authority to enforce regulation as well as 
set standards — should be fully operational by 2016 (box 4.2). 
Given the difficulties that have been experienced in progressing this project since 
it was first contemplated in 1999 (chapter 3), regular publication of progress 
reports (similar to the six-monthly report published by the TTOIG) would assist 
stakeholders to plan and would signal the need for remedial action if 
implementation schedules slip. 
After the ANZTPA has been set up, it would be useful to review: why this project 
has taken so long; how the barriers to establishing ANZTPA were overcome; and 
whether other approaches could have achieved similar outcomes more quickly. 
Insights from this review should help to channel future efforts towards initiatives 
with the largest net benefits and improve their implementation. 
   
106 Strengthening trans-Tasman economic relations 
 
 
Box 4.2 Towards the Australia New Zealand Therapeutic Products 
Agency 
A three stage approach has been adopted to progressively achieve, over a period of 
up to five years, the goal of a single regulator.  
1. The two countries' regulators, the Therapeutic Goods Administrator (TGA) and 
Medsafe, will immediately begin sharing work and doing more operations jointly. 
This is intended to enhance each country’s regulatory system, through sharing data, 
information and training, and establishing centres of expertise in each country. 
2. Building on this, a single entry point for industry will be established and a common 
trans-Tasman regulatory framework will be agreed. 
During these two preliminary phases, each country will retain its own regulator and 
continue to make its own regulatory decisions. Business should benefit from having 
to comply with only one set of requirements to operate in the two countries. 
3. As operations become increasingly integrated and following a review of progress, 
the single regulator will be established. 
Source: Department of Health and Ageing (2011).  
 
 
    
 
R4.6 
 
Given the long time it is taking to set up the Australia New 
Zealand Therapeutic Products Agency, the Australian and New 
Zealand Governments should publish regular progress reports. 
Once the Agency has been established, the Governments should 
review the lessons for other potential regulatory harmonisation 
initiatives. 
   
    
CER Investment Protocol 
Australia and New Zealand signed a CER Investment Protocol in 2011, but have 
not yet enacted it. The Protocol lifts some investment screening thresholds and 
establishes a legal framework of investor rights. However, various exclusions will 
limit its liberalising effect. 
Despite this, the Protocol offers joint net benefits and should be implemented as 
soon as practicable (supplementary paper C). Section 4.4 discusses the case for 
further liberalisation of trans-Tasman investment restrictions. 
 
    
 
R4.7 
 
The CER Investment Protocol should be enacted as soon as 
practicable.    
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Portability of retirement savings 
In 2009 the Australian and New Zealand Governments agreed to legislate to 
enable residents of either country to transfer their retirement savings across the 
Tasman if they emigrated permanently to the other country (ATO 2011). In New 
Zealand, the Taxation (Annual Rates, Trans-Tasman Savings Portability, 
KiwiSaver and Remedial Matters) Act 2010 enables trans-Tasman portability of 
retirement savings. 
In the draft report, the Commissions noted that the relevant Australian legislation 
had not been enacted. On 22 November 2012, the Australian Parliament passed 
the Superannuation Legislation Amendment (New Zealand Arrangement) Bill 
2012, to establish a trans-Tasman retirement savings portability scheme. 
Standards 
Standards Australia and Standards New Zealand have a working relationship that 
the latter considers is ‘unique in the world’ (sub. 52, p. 1). The formal relationship 
dates back to an Active Cooperation Agreement signed in 1992 and a subsequent 
memorandum of understanding, which recognises joint standards as a means to 
assist trade harmonisation between Australia and New Zealand and between both 
countries and the rest of the world (Standards New Zealand, sub. 52). Joint 
standards now account for 35 percent of the Australian catalogue and 80 percent 
of the New Zealand catalogue (Standards Australia, sub. 44). Standards New 
Zealand contends that the development of robust joint standards for therapeutic 
products could have created the conditions for a smoother transition to 
harmonised regulatory arrangements, and so accelerated the introduction of 
ANZTPA. 
Work is underway in the international standards community to consider how 
standards could contribute to emissions trading schemes. Telstra has argued that 
Australian and New Zealand networks should adopt international standards where 
possible (sub. DR108). 
There is not unfinished business in the standards area in the sense of a 
government commitment that has not been completed. However, development of 
standards is an ongoing process that needs to continue to contribute to economic 
integration between Australia and New Zealand and between both countries and 
the rest of the world. 
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4.2 ‘First freedom’: trade in goods 
Tariffs and rules of origin: remaining issues 
Following reform programs in both Australia and New Zealand dating back to the 
1980s, quotas on imports have all but been eliminated and general tariffs in both 
countries are low — generally 5 percent or less. Two key exceptions are: 
• second hand cars in Australia — which attract a flat rate of A$12 000 in duty 
• various textiles, clothing and footwear (TCF) items in both Australia and New 
Zealand, which attract tariffs of 10 percent — although in Australia these will be 
reduced to 5 percent by 2015. 
Barriers to goods trade across the Tasman are even lower. Through the CER 
agenda, imports from the partner country enter duty free, provided they are 
deemed to have originated in the partner country under the CER rules of origin 
(RoO). 
Both countries also have a range of preferential trading agreements (PTAs) with 
other countries (with overlaps, but also some differences). 
The upshot is that a sizeable proportion of imports into both countries enter 
duty-free, and the protective value of remaining tariffs will continue to be eroded as 
further free trade deals take effect. 
However, tariffs in both Australia and New Zealand continue to generate costs. 
These include administrative costs borne by the customs services, compliance 
costs borne by businesses, and distortions to production and consumption 
incentives. The pockets of remaining high tariffs are also likely to have a 
regressive impact, harming lower income consumers most. The Commissions 
consider that if governments seek to assist any activities or industries in the future, 
assistance should generally take the form of direct and transparent taxpayer-
funded subsidies. Against this background, the goal of free trade in goods with all 
trading partners should be the longer term objective for both countries. 
Policy options 
The main issue for bilateral trade between Australia and New Zealand is the 
distortions and compliance costs that arise from the CER RoO. As the Australian 
Commission found in recent reports, the cost of re-exporting typically exceeds 
5 percent of the value of imports (PC 2004b; 2010). Thus, when tariffs are at 
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5 percent or less, there is little incentive for third parties to engage in re-exporting, 
and so little value in requiring compliance with the RoO. Accordingly, the 
Commissions recommend that CER RoO should be waived for all items for which 
tariffs in Australia and New Zealand are at 5 percent or less. This would reduce 
economic distortions as well as compliance and administrative costs for a 
significant proportion of trans-Tasman trade. 
Following the discussion draft, some participants expressed concern that waiving 
the CER RoO requirements would have adverse side-effects on the administration 
of other government functions, including the application of anti-dumping measures 
and quarantine requirements. As discussed in supplementary paper A, the CER 
RoO are not necessary for these purposes. Another concern was that the waiver 
proposal might enable re-exporting for some items, including high value-added 
products and bulk, homogenous commodities, where the cost of doing so is less 
than the 5 percent average. However, even if some re-exporting were to occur, the 
Australian and New Zealand Governments could respond in a variety of ways 
(supplementary paper A), including by simply welcoming the lower prices and 
added competition that it could bring. 
Building on the waiver initiative, each country could also reduce tariffs that exceed 
5 percent down to that level (by, say, 2015), which would allow the trans-Tasman 
RoO to be waived for these items too. The additional elements of this proposal 
would mainly affect the New Zealand textiles, clothing and footwear industries and 
imports of second hand cars into Australia, to the benefit of consumers of those 
products. The implications for these activities, and related policy issues, could be 
reviewed first. The Commissions see merit in this option, which is discussed 
further in supplementary paper A. 
The Commissions considered, but do not support, the formation of a customs 
union. Under such an arrangement, the partners would need to adopt a common 
external tariff and align other border regulations covering substantially all trade in 
goods. A customs union could bring about reductions in tariffs and abolition of the 
RoO. However, depending on its implementation, tariffs on some items could rise 
and disparities in assistance could widen. It would also restrict the freedom of the 
partners to pursue trade arrangements with third countries. Among other 
concerns, the costs of designing the rules for a customs union could be large. 
Some supporters of a customs union consider that it would increase the countries’ 
combined bargaining power in trade negotiations, but they can already negotiate 
together. 
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R4.8 
 
The Australian and New Zealand Governments should: 
• waive CER Rules of Origin for all items for which Australia’s 
and New Zealand’s Most Favoured Nation tariffs are at 
5 percent or less 
• consider reducing any tariffs that exceed 5 percent to that 
level. 
   
    
Quarantine and biosecurity 
While biosecurity functions are administered by separate national agencies, there 
is a long history of trans-Tasman cooperation (box 4.3). Indeed, New Zealand’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade considers that ‘[t]oday, the overwhelming 
majority of trans-Tasman biosecurity/quarantine issues have been resolved, with 
few remaining outstanding’ (MFAT 2010). 
 
Box 4.3 A cooperative approach to biosecurity 
Biosecurity measures were excluded from ANZCERTA and the Trans-Tasman Mutual 
Recognition Arrangement. 
However, Australia and New Zealand agreed to a Protocol on the Harmonisation of 
Quarantine Administrative Procedures in 1988, which established a basis for closer 
collaboration. The Protocol recognised that further progress towards harmonising 
processes would benefit both countries. The Protocol also commits to the principle that 
biosecurity should not be deliberately used to create a barrier to trade, where this is not 
scientifically justified (Australian and New Zealand Governments 1988). 
A Consultative Group on Biosecurity Cooperation was established in 1999 to provide 
impetus and direction for trans-Tasman biosecurity harmonisation (CGBC 1999). 
Comprising Australian and New Zealand officials, it reports annually to relevant 
Australian and New Zealand ministers, focusing on: 
• streamlining risk analysis approaches in Australia and New Zealand 
• ensuring that biosecurity requirements are based on sound science 
• reviewing the mechanisms for information exchange and other interaction between 
the two countries on biosecurity issues (MFAT 2010). 
There are also extensive trans-Tasman ministerial and government agency interactions.  
 
Despite sharing some similarities, Australia and New Zealand have different 
environments and biosecurity risks. These limit integration and rule out options 
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such as adopting the same quarantine standards for imports from third countries 
and removing quarantine restrictions on a trans-Tasman basis. 
The issue, therefore, is how much additional cooperation is beneficial, given that 
differences in biosecurity restrictions will inevitably remain. Formal and informal 
cooperation, sharing of information and resources, and some collaboration in risk 
analysis, benefit both countries and should continue. The relationship needs to be 
flexible, given that new approaches may be required as new biosecurity risks 
emerge. 
A more collaborative approach to risk identification and analysis is likely to benefit 
both countries. The two agencies have recently begun to undertake some aspects 
of risk analyses jointly. Findings from joint analysis will usually — but not always 
— need to be applied separately in each country. There is also scope for the two 
countries to review risk assessments carried out by their counterparts. The New 
Zealand Customs Service points out that the two customs agencies already 
consider opportunities for trans-Tasman coordination on a case-by-case basis 
(sub. DR114, p. 2). 
The ACTU and NZCTU (sub. DR118, p. 12) suggest that collaboration will 
generate a reasonable balance of benefits in both directions. As the smaller 
partner, New Zealand stands to gain significantly from access to the greater scale 
and capacity of Australia’s biosecurity agencies. For Australia, access to staff with 
complementary experience and knowledge of different environments could be 
worthwhile, while New Zealand also offers ‘flexibility and smaller scale to test 
initiatives and do research’. Both countries are also likely to benefit from pooling 
biosecurity resources, particularly for costly new technology such as testing and 
laboratory equipment. 
 
    
 
R4.9 
 
Where cost effective, quarantine and biosecurity agencies in 
Australia and New Zealand should continue to develop common 
systems and processes, and enhance their joint approach to risk 
analysis. 
   
    
Emissions trading 
Australia is pursuing its target for limiting greenhouse gas emissions through a 
Carbon Price Mechanism (CPM), with supplementary policy initiatives targeting 
areas such as energy efficiency standards. New Zealand is pursuing its target 
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through the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZETS) and a range of 
supplementary policies. 
The cost of reducing emissions is likely to be different between the two countries. 
Opportunities for trade should therefore enable emissions to be reduced at a lower 
cost than would otherwise be possible. Facilitating trade would, however, require 
some harmonisation between the CPM and the NZETS. 
There would be even larger trade benefits from linking the CPM and NZETS into 
multilateral mechanisms, given that other countries may have less costly 
abatement opportunities. The NZETS is linked to the European Union’s emissions 
scheme, and the Australian Government recently announced that the CPM will 
also be linked, with mutual recognition of carbon units to be in effect by 1 July 
2018 (Combet 2012). 
The Australia-New Zealand Carbon Pricing Officials Group has a mandate from 
both governments to work towards linking the CPM and the NZETS. It is well 
positioned to assess the compatibility of the schemes and to deal with the 
complicated legal and practical issues that would result from either country 
pursuing multilateral harmonisation, or more binding treaty arrangements. 
4.3 ‘Second freedom’: trade in services 
The CER Protocol on Trade in Services aims to strengthen the relationship 
between Australia and New Zealand through, for example, both Governments 
treating providers of services from the other country in the same way as providers 
from their own. The Protocol covers all services except those that are explicitly 
excluded. 
Exclusions from the CER Protocol on Trade in Services 
In the case of Australia, the exclusions are: some intrastate air services; limits on 
foreign ownership of broadcasting and television (as set out in the Broadcasting 
Services Act 1992); broadcasting and television (short wave and satellite 
broadcasting); compulsory third-party motor vehicle insurance; specified postal 
services, and coastal shipping cabotage policy. Air services and coastal shipping 
are excluded in the case of New Zealand. 
The impact of the New Zealand exclusions is unlikely to be large. As explained 
below, a Single Australia-New Zealand Aviation Market (SAM) has been in place 
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since 1996 and restrictions on coastal shipping in New Zealand have been largely 
removed. Australian exclusions cover a larger number of significant service 
industries, and so may have greater impact. 
The practical impact of exclusions is that Australia’s market access and national 
treatment obligations under the Protocol do not apply in respect of the excluded 
services sectors or sub-sectors. 
The intention of excluding a service from the Protocol is to support a domestic 
policy objective. For example, specified postal services in Australia have been 
excluded from the Protocol not to limit competition specifically from New Zealand 
suppliers. Rather, exclusion is required because of a policy decision to provide 
Australia Post with a statutory monopoly on specified services, to enable it to 
provide a letter service that is reasonably accessible to all people in Australia on 
an equitable basis.  
The rationales for other exclusions are also founded in Australian domestic policy 
considerations. 
• As a matter of policy, the Australian Government carves out air services from 
all broad-based trade agreements. 
• Compulsory third party motor insurance is excluded from all of Australia’s free 
trade agreements, because state governments have jurisdiction over these 
markets. 
• The Australian Government regulates access to the Australian coastal shipping 
trade. 
• The broadcasting and television exclusion was intended to ensure that New 
Zealand firms and individuals continued to be bound by the then foreign 
investment restrictions under the Broadcasting Services Act 1992. These 
restrictions on foreign investment in Australia’s media sector were removed in 
2006. However, the media remains a ‘sensitive sector’ under the Foreign 
Investment Policy that operates under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers 
Act 1975 (DFAT, pers. comm., 7 November 2012). 
Key questions, therefore, are whether the domestic policy objectives continue to 
be important to the Australian Government and whether the objectives can only be 
achieved by restricting competition. If an objective continues to be important and 
can only be achieved by restricting competition, the restrictions should apply 
equally across Australia and New Zealand. If the restrictions are not warranted, 
they should be removed. 
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From this perspective, it is important to consider whether exclusions from the 
Protocol that were justified on domestic policy grounds when they were included 
on the list, remain justified today, given any subsequent policy changes or market 
developments. Article 20 of the Protocol provides for regular review of the 
operation of the Protocol. The latest published review (exchange of letters) on the 
official website is dated 1995 (DFAT nd), although further reviews were 
undertaken in 1997 and 1999. The exclusions from the Annex have not been 
amended since 1999. 
However, the 2007 CER Ministerial Forum Joint Statement noted that a further 
review would be timely and the 2008 Statement commented that: 
… both countries should continue to look for opportunities to remove or liberalise those 
services still exempted from coverage under the Protocol. (Crean and Goff 2008). 
Exclusions from the Protocol — while possibly justified on domestic policy grounds 
— do have costs in so far as they restrict the gains from trans-Tasman trade in 
services that were seen as justifying the negotiation of the Protocol in the first 
place. Given the potential benefits from trans-Tasman competition, services 
should be removed from the exclusions list unless there are demonstrated net 
benefits from retention. The current review should be completed and published as 
soon as possible. 
 
    
 
R4.10 
 
The Australian and New Zealand Governments should complete 
the review of the exclusions from the Trade in Services Protocol, 
to consider whether retaining each exclusion would generate net 
benefits. The review should be published. 
   
    
Air services 
The close links between the two economies are evident from the more than 40 000 
flights across the Tasman each year (BITRE 2012). 
Air service regulation 
International air services arrangements are governed by a complex system of 
negotiated bilateral rights between countries, contained in air services 
agreements. The air services arrangements between Australia and New Zealand 
are relatively liberal. However, there remains potential for reforms that would 
provide joint net benefits (supplementary paper B). 
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Single Australia-New Zealand Aviation Market 
Even though air services are excluded from the CER Services Protocol, major 
steps have been taken to integrate and liberalise the Australian and New Zealand 
air services markets. A Single Australia-New Zealand Aviation Market (SAM) has 
been in place since 1996 and the Australian and New Zealand Governments 
signed an Open Skies Agreement in August 2002. This agreement enables 
airlines from either country to operate between Australia and New Zealand without 
regulatory restrictions on capacity, frequency and routes. It also enables them to 
operate without these regulatory restrictions within both countries and to third 
countries on routes with an origin or destination in the home country. For airlines 
to take advantage of this agreement, they must meet certain ‘designation’ criteria 
relating mainly to the ownership and control of the airline (NZ PC 2012). 
The Open Skies Agreement makes the trans-Tasman air transport market one of 
the most liberal in the world (Vowles and Tierney 2007). The routes between New 
Zealand and the eastern seaboard of Australia are among the most competitive in 
the region, with passenger services provided by Qantas, Air New Zealand, Jetstar, 
and Virgin Australia. Some third-country carriers, such as Emirates and LAN 
airlines, also provide trans-Tasman services using separate bilateral agreements 
with their home countries. Extensive code sharing arrangements also exist on 
flights across the Tasman. However, Qantas and Air New Zealand carry the 
dominant share of trans-Tasman passengers. Australian airlines (such as Jetstar 
and previously Qantas and Virgin Blue) have also entered the New Zealand 
domestic market. 
Two remaining measures restrict the market. 
• ‘Seventh freedom rights’ for the movement of passengers are denied. These 
would allow carriers to operate services between two foreign countries without 
requiring the carrier to originate or terminate the service in its home country. 
(For example, without seventh freedom passenger rights, Air New Zealand is 
only able to fly between Australia and Singapore if it incorporates a leg back to 
New Zealand.) Granting seventh freedom rights would provide benefits by 
enabling improvements in the range and quality of services from Australia and 
New Zealand to third countries and by exerting downward pressure on airfares. 
• The current airline designation requirements (which determine the airlines that 
can fly under an air services agreement) limit carrier entry to the trans-Tasman 
market and thereby lessen competition. The requirements are inconsistent with 
the policy positions taken recently by the Australian and New Zealand 
Governments. Liberalising designation requirements, including the 
requirements for ownership and control under the Australia-New Zealand Open 
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Skies Agreement, would enable airlines to pursue broader commercial 
opportunities and more tailored ownership structures. The community would 
also benefit from increased competition. 
Removing these restrictions is unlikely to have a major impact on the 
trans-Tasman route, given that competition is already strong. However, the 
restrictions do not serve a worthwhile purpose, and fully liberalising the market 
should produce benefits, particularly on international routes to and from Australia 
and New Zealand. 
 
    
 
R4.11 
 
The Australian and New Zealand Governments should remove 
the remaining restrictions on the single trans-Tasman aviation 
market. 
   
    
Beyond the Single Aviation Market 
Given the complex, restrictive and inefficient regulation of the broader international 
aviation market, reform of international air services is likely to yield larger benefits 
for both countries, including having spillover benefits for trans-Tasman travel. Both 
Governments have committed to pursuing more liberal aviation arrangements and 
would gain from working together, given the international nature of the necessary 
reforms. 
Policy objectives for air services should be clearly defined and focus on improving 
the wellbeing of the community as a whole. At present, Australia’s policy goal for 
international aviation balances the interests of the Australian aviation industry and 
of the broader community (DITRDLG 2009). New Zealand’s aviation objective is to 
help grow the economy and deliver greater prosperity, security and opportunities 
for New Zealanders (MoT 2012). Both Governments should ensure that the 
objective of air services policy is to enhance the wellbeing of the community as a 
whole. 
Negotiating liberal air services agreements continues to offer benefits, given the 
constraints of global air services regulation. Both countries should re-commit to 
pursuing the most open air services agreements possible, by negotiating 
reciprocal open capacity and all air freedoms, including cabotage where 
appropriate. Governments should also seek to remove any remaining regulatory 
impediments to accessing regional airports. Further liberalisation will reduce 
constraints on market entry, and loosen controls on airlines’ rights to service 
particular routes. Greater flexibility and contestability would enhance economic 
efficiency by encouraging airlines to innovate and expand services and/or 
   
Opportunities for further integration 117 
  
minimise their costs, including by operating their networks more efficiently. Under 
these circumstances, consumers could benefit from greater choice of carriers 
and/or services, and lower airfares. 
Both countries have committed to seeking a designation criterion of ‘incorporation 
and principal place of business’ in their bilateral agreements. This is in contrast to 
the more restrictive approach of limiting airline designation to airlines that are 
‘substantially owned and effectively controlled’ by nationals of the designating 
country. In practice, the more liberal designation approach has not always been 
possible. However, both countries should continue to adopt it as their default 
position in negotiations. 
In addition to continuing to revise designation requirements, Australia and New 
Zealand could review their ownership restrictions for national airlines, including for 
Qantas and Air New Zealand. Both countries currently limit foreign ownership in 
national airlines to 49 percent, with various sub-limits on certain investors, such as 
foreign airlines. Both Governments have indicated an intention to change these 
sub-limits, and in the case of Air New Zealand to review them in the context of a 
mixed government/private ownership model. Restrictions on foreign direct 
investment are discussed in section 4.4. 
 
    
 
R4.12 
 
The Australian and New Zealand Governments should: 
• ensure that the objective of air services policy is explicitly 
directed at promoting net benefits for the community  
• pursue the most liberal air services agreements possible, by 
negotiating reciprocal open capacity and all air freedoms, 
including cabotage where appropriate 
• revise designation and ownership requirements. 
   
    
Passenger movement charge 
Introduced in July 1995 to replace the Departure Tax, the Australian Passenger 
Movement Charge (PMC) was intended to recoup the cost of customs, 
immigration and quarantine processing of inward and outward passengers, and 
the cost of issuing short-term visitor visas. The PMC is expected to generate 
A$794 million in 2012-13 (with around 8 percent from trans-Tasman travel), rising 
to over A$1 billion in 2015-16. 
Several study participants called for the removal, restructure or reduction of the 
PMC on Australia-New Zealand routes. The PMC forms part of the cost of the 
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ticket of a person departing Australia for any other country. Participants highlighted 
the potentially disproportionate impact of the charge on trans-Tasman travel, as a 
short and otherwise low-price flight. Reducing or removing the charge for flights to 
New Zealand would see them treated more like an Australian domestic flight. 
There are issues associated with the PMC that go beyond its impact on the 
trans-Tasman route. Legally, it is a tax, levied under the Passenger Movement 
Charge Act 1978 and collected under the Passenger Movement Charge Collection 
Act 1978, with proceeds going to consolidated revenue. At different times, the 
PMC has been found to have over-collected and under-collected the costs of 
providing border services. Most recently, the Review of Australia’s Future Tax 
System concluded that the PMC does not recover all the costs of border services, 
nor does it reflect specific costs (Commonwealth of Australia 2010). 
As a result, the PMC should be replaced with a user charge for services provided. 
While some stakeholders raised concerns about moving to a user charge 
arrangement, this would have benefits. It would: 
• provide greater transparency through requiring border agencies to clearly 
identify the costs of services provided 
• increase users’ awareness of the costs of the service they pay for, increasing 
pressure for efficiency in service delivery 
• be more equitable, as it would require those who use a service to pay for its 
costs. 
Whether the level of the charge should be higher or lower than the current PMC — 
and the consequent impact on travel costs — would depend on whether the 
efficient cost of service provision exceeds or is less than the PMC. 
The New Zealand Government funds the costs of providing biosecurity and 
customs passenger clearance processes out of general revenue, with the costs of 
aviation security services met by the airline industry (Carter 2010). Border services 
for cargo, on the other hand, are fully cost recovered through user charges. The 
New Zealand Government should review the appropriateness of current 
arrangements for funding passenger clearance services, given the potential 
advantages from moving to a cost recovery model. 
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R4.13 
 
The Australian Government should reconfigure the Passenger 
Movement Charge as a genuine user charge for border services. 
The New Zealand Government should review its border 
passenger charges to achieve full and transparent cost recovery, 
in line with existing arrangements for cargo. 
   
    
Sea freight 
Ships carry nearly all of Australia’s and New Zealand’s international trade (by 
volume), including trade across the Tasman. 
International container shipping 
Currently, exemptions from key parts of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 
(CCA Act) (Aus) and the Commerce Act 1986 (CA Act) (NZ) allow ocean carriers 
to form agreements on prices, capacities and schedules. These exemptions reflect 
a view that allowing collusive agreements between ocean carriers is necessary 
because the sector’s characteristics (high fixed costs and economies of scale and 
scope) could otherwise lead to market instability. 
Both Commissions have reviewed the exemptions and recommended removing or 
narrowing them in order to increase competition and enhance productivity (NZ PC 
2012; PC 2005b). These reviews found little evidence that reliable shipping 
services depended on the ability to make collusive agreements or that the 
agreements should be presumed to be in the public interest. The New Zealand 
Commission (2012) also found there would be benefits in coordinating reform of 
the exemptions across Australia and New Zealand. 
For these reasons, the Australian and New Zealand Governments should remove 
the exemptions for ratemaking agreements. The Australian and New Zealand 
Governments should also examine the potential costs and benefits of further 
action, particularly in light of ongoing changes in international practices. This may 
occur in New Zealand through the Government’s current consultation on the 
changes recommended by the New Zealand Commission, and in Australia through 
the scheduled review of Part X, due to occur in 2014. The opportunity and 
potential benefits of trans-Tasman co-ordination are strong reasons to bring 
forward this review. 
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R4.14 
 
The Australian and New Zealand Governments should remove — 
preferably on a coordinated basis — the exemption for 
international shipping ratemaking agreements from legislation 
governing restrictive trade practices. 
   
    
Coastal shipping 
Australian coastal shipping regulations currently require foreign-flagged vessels to 
obtain a licence and to employ crew under Australian conditions and rates of pay 
while engaging in coastal trade in Australian waters. Until recently, if licensed 
ships could not meet all coastal shipping demand, the responsible Minister could 
issue single or continuous voyage permits (lasting up to three months), which 
allowed foreign vessels to operate without having to satisfy cabotage 
requirements. However, a package of changes in 2011 and 2012: included new 
requirements for foreign-flagged vessels to pay award rates in Australian waters; 
abolished single and continuous voyage permits for foreign-flagged vessels; and 
established a new licensing system to protect the domestic shipping industry, with 
tax concessions for Australian registered ships. 
By contrast, restrictions on coastal shipping have largely been removed in New 
Zealand. The Maritime Transport Act 1994 (s. 198) allows international operators 
to compete on coastal routes against domestic operators, provided they do so as 
part of an international voyage and do not operate in New Zealand longer than a 
continuous period of 28 days (NZ PC 2012). 
Protecting domestic shipping from overseas competitors assists the local shipping 
industry at the expense of its customers and, ultimately, the wider community. The 
National Bulk Commodities Group Inc (sub. DR93) and the Cement Industry 
Foundation (sub. DR94) both argued that the new Australian coastal shipping 
regulations will increase freight costs and reduce the competitiveness of local 
industries. The experience in New Zealand suggests that removing restrictions on 
coastal shipping has reduced freight rates, and improved the range and quality of 
shipping options (Cavana 2004). 
The application of different policy approaches to coastal shipping across the 
Tasman provides an opportunity for an independent body to undertake a 
comparative review of the impacts of the two approaches on each economy and 
on trans-Tasman trade. 
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R4.15 
 
When reviewing the restrictions on competition for coastal 
shipping, the Australian Government should adopt a broad cost-
benefit framework and draw on the experience of New Zealand 
with its different regulatory approach. 
   
    
Ports 
While the performance of Australian and New Zealand container ports has 
improved significantly since the early 1990s, large variations within and between 
each country point to scope for further productivity improvements. For example, 
the Australian Commission found that full implementation of the National Reform 
Agenda could improve productivity of container ports by, for example, 3 percent in 
South Australia and 10 percent in New South Wales and Western Australia 
(PC 2006b). 
A range of issues impeding port efficiency in Australia and New Zealand remain. 
For instance, the ACCC and the New Zealand Commission found that limited 
competition, restrictive work practices and behaviours and difficulties in resolving 
multiple objectives in publicly owned ports are impeding productivity and 
innovation (ACCC 2012; NZ PC 2012). 
Given that many factors contribute to efficient port operation, collaborative 
monitoring, data collection and benchmarking of ports’ performance across the 
Tasman would help to identify opportunities to improve productivity. (The benefits 
of benchmarking are discussed in section 4.6.) 
 
    
 
R4.16 
 
Governments should undertake systematic monitoring, data 
collection and benchmarking of ports’ performance in Australia 
and New Zealand, building on existing initiatives. 
   
    
Telecommunications 
Australia and New Zealand have significantly liberalised their telecommunications 
markets, but there remain five potential barriers to integration: 
• differences in regulation and technical standards 
• deficiencies in regulation 
• high prices in Australian and New Zealand mobile roaming markets 
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• restrictions on foreign direct investment 
• regulation of information services over the internet. 
Differences in regulation and technical standards 
Differences in regulations and technical standards between the 
telecommunications markets in Australia and New Zealand can discourage 
integration by increasing compliance and transaction costs for telecommunications 
businesses operating in both markets. It can also be more expensive for 
governments to administer two regulatory systems than a single system. There 
may, however, be sound reasons for some differences in approach. The question 
is whether the regulatory differences exceed those that are justified by the special 
circumstances of each country. 
Regulation of telecommunications markets occurs within the context of national 
competition and consumer protection regimes. The Australian Commission’s 
review of the Australian and New Zealand regimes found that there had been 
significant harmonisation and that the regimes were not significantly impeding 
businesses operating in Australasian markets (PC 2005a). The report noted that a 
transitional approach to further integration could yield some benefits. Two 
Australian parliamentary inquiries in 2006 found that there would be benefits from 
reducing divergence in telecommunications-specific regulation between Australia 
and New Zealand.1 
Telstra and TelstraClear, in a joint submission, noted that recent reform has 
resulted in largely similar laws governing telecommunications in the two countries 
(sub. 48). Telstra suggested that a telecommunications chapter in the CER could 
be one way to ‘lock in’ the current alignment in telecommunications regulation and 
to minimise future deviation between the regulatory regimes (sub. 56). However, 
Telstra also identified some remaining differences in existing telecommunications 
regulation and technical standards that they argued may impose costs or impede 
trans-Tasman operations (sub. 56). Table 4.1 outlines some of these differences. 
                                              
1 The Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade reviewed the 
ANZCERTA agreement, and the Joint Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs investigated opportunities for further harmonisation of legal systems between 
the two countries. 
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Table 4.1 Examples of differences between Australian and New Zealand 
telecommunications regulationa 
Issue Australia  New Zealand  Degree of alignment 
Is there a telco-specific 
competition law? 
Yes – part XIB of the 
Competition and 
Consumer Act 2010. 
No – general 
competition law 
regulates competition in 
telecommunications 
markets. 
Not aligned. 
‘Misuse of market 
power’ offense by a 
carrier or carrier 
service provider  
Offense is subject to a 
‘purpose’ and ‘effect’ 
tests. 
Offense is subject to a 
‘purpose’ test only and 
is interpreted differently. 
Aligned to the extent 
there is a ‘misuse of 
market power’ offense 
with a ‘purpose’ test in 
both countries. 
Enforcement powers 
under competition laws 
The ACCC may issue 
‘competition notices’ to 
stop anticompetitive 
conduct if it ‘believes’ 
such conduct has 
occurred.  
The NZCC cannot issue 
‘competition notices’. 
Not aligned. 
Procedure for deciding 
if a ‘service’ is subject 
to regulation 
The ACCC has the 
power to ‘declare’ a 
service. 
The NZCC 
recommends 
‘designation’ of a 
service to the Minister 
for final decision.  
Aligned but the 
Australian process is 
more independent of 
the political process. 
Penalties for failure to 
provide access to 
networks  
The Federal Court may 
make orders requiring 
compliance and 
imposing penalties. 
Fines up to 
A$10 million for a 
carrier or A$250 000 
for a non-carrier. 
The NZCC may serve a 
civil infringement notice 
imposing a penalty, or 
apply to the High Court 
for a pecuniary penalty 
of up to NZ$300 000. 
Not aligned –
significantly lower 
penalties apply in New 
Zealand. 
a The complete list of differences identified by Telstra can be found in submission 56 on the study website. 
Source: Telstra (sub. 56). 
Telecom NZ concurred with Telstra’s view that the existing regulatory approaches 
in the two countries were broadly aligned (sub. DR102). It stated that it was 
unclear whether the continuing differences were material, noting that they ‘likely 
reflect the different circumstances of the different markets’ (Telecom NZ, 
sub. DR102, p. 1). 
Telstra (sub. 56) identified potential future barriers to trans-Tasman trade in 
telecommunications (and other) services delivered over the broadband networks 
currently under construction in both countries (the National Broadband Network 
(NBN) in Australia and the Ultra-fast Broadband Network in New Zealand). Telstra 
argued that the builders of the networks do not appear to be coordinating technical 
standards that would allow interoperability between networks for access services. 
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… the Local Fibre Companies (LFCs) [in New Zealand] on the one hand, and NBN Co 
[in Australia], on the other, appear to be developing their networks and operational 
support systems (OSS) including wholesale technical interfaces without reference to 
each other. Ideally, the new fibre networks should be deployed to the same or 
interoperable technical standards, thus lowering barriers to developers in both 
countries. (sub. 56, p. 5) 
Telstra argued that alignment should be encouraged through consultation rather 
than by regulation and that this could be undertaken ‘within the context of a CER 
work program’ (sub. DR108). They also noted that as ‘technology takers’ the 
Australian and New Zealand networks should adopt international standards where 
possible. The potential for a lack of coordination in other standards and regulations 
to create barriers to trade in services over the internet is discussed below. 
Deficiencies in regulation 
Deficiencies in domestic telecommunications regulation may limit trans-Tasman 
integration by discouraging carriers in one country from entering and expanding in 
the other. 
Participants in the 2006 Australian parliamentary inquiries mentioned above 
pointed to some deficiencies in competition regulation in New Zealand’s 
telecommunications market. Since then, technological change and New Zealand 
policy reforms have improved competition. Rapid technological change is 
expected to continue to improve contestability in telecommunication services. 
Government policies and regulatory settings in both countries will also have a 
dramatic impact on competition. The structural separation of the dominant fixed 
line carriers in each country should increase retail competition in fixed line 
services. (Telecom NZ ‘demerged’ in 2011, while Telstra has committed to 
structurally separate by 2018.) In addition, governments in both countries are 
funding the construction of fibre optic broadband networks and have committed to 
restrict the network operators to wholesaling basic connectivity services. 
Telstra noted that an agreement between the two countries that entrenched this 
‘wholesale only’ commitment would improve certainty for investors wishing to 
provide telecommunication (and other) services over the networks, and would 
‘underpin the development of a trans-Tasman market’ in such services (sub. 56). 
This scoping study has been presented with little evidence that differences or 
deficiencies in the current regulatory arrangements are significantly impeding 
trans-Tasman integration of telecommunications markets. In recent years, there 
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has been substantial trade in telecommunications services across the Tasman, 
primarily through commercial presence.2 
However, this trade likely represents a relatively small proportion of total 
telecommunications activity in the two countries — estimated to be more than 
A$20 billion in 2010 (ABS 2012c; Statistics NZ, Wellington, pers. comm., 
5 June 2012). In terms of SEM principles (such as creating a seamless, 
‘domestic-like’ experience), Australian and New Zealand telecommunications 
services continue to be produced and consumed largely in segmented markets. 
Telstra and Telstra Clear have proposed that the Australian and New Zealand 
Governments investigate opportunities for further harmonisation of 
telecommunications regulations that could lead to a ‘SEM in telecommunications 
services’ (sub. 48, p. 4). Telstra noted that such a study would require: 
 … comprehensive research and consultation with telecommunications providers and 
other stakeholders on both sides of the Tasman. (sub. 108, p. 3) 
Net benefits may be available from further harmonisation in telecommunications 
regulation. However, a thorough review of the frameworks in both countries would 
be needed to assess where such opportunities exist. To capture any potential 
welfare gains, the Australian and New Zealand Governments should include in the 
next reviews of their respective telecommunications regulations a term of 
reference to examine barriers to trans-Tasman trade in telecommunications 
service and options for their removal. 
 
    
 
R4.17 
 
The Australian and New Zealand Governments should include in 
the next reviews of their respective telecommunications 
regulatory frameworks a term of reference to examine barriers to 
trans-Tasman trade in telecommunication services and options 
for their removal. 
   
    
                                              
2 For trans-Tasman commercial presence trade, in New Zealand, Telstra owned 
100 percent of Telstra Clear (the second largest provider of fixed line and internet 
services in New Zealand) until its sale to Vodafone New Zealand in October 2012, 
while in Australia, Telecom NZ owns 100 percent of AAPT (a provider of business and 
wholesale telecommunication services). For trans-Tasman cross-border trade, two way 
trade was estimated at around A$120 million in 2011 (ABS 2011b). 
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Trans-Tasman mobile roaming 
Mobile roaming (including voice calls, short message services (SMS) and data 
usage) occurs when customers of one mobile network use a network owned by 
another provider. Research has found that international roaming charges paid by 
users in many countries were ‘unreasonably high’ compared with the underlying 
costs of provision, including for Australian and New Zealand users roaming in third 
countries (OECD 2009a; 2011b; ACCC 2005). 
A joint Australia-New Zealand investigation into trans-Tasman roaming prices 
(being undertaken by the Australian Department of Broadband, Communications 
and the Digital Economy and New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment) released a discussion draft in August 2012. It found that there is 
limited competition in the trans-Tasman retail and wholesale roaming market, and 
that while prices and margins have been trending down since 2009 (particularly for 
data roaming), they are still high (DBCDE 2012). 
The two departments are now consulting on a range of options to reduce roaming 
prices including continued monitoring of the markets, requiring more transparent 
provision of price information, requiring operators to provide local-access services 
to roamers, and the imposition of wholesale and/or retail price caps. A final report 
is expected to be released at the end of 2012. The Australian and New Zealand 
Governments have announced that they will consider and respond to the report’s 
findings. 
Foreign investment restrictions 
Both Australia and New Zealand restrict foreign direct investment in 
telecommunications markets (through screening regimes and foreign ownership 
limits on carriers). Such restrictions can impede trans-Tasman and broader 
integration by increasing transaction costs and creating uncertainty for investors. 
Restrictions can also reduce the transfer of skills and technology and restrict 
competition by limiting the entry and operations of new carriers. Enacting the CER 
Investment Protocol, as recommended earlier, will reduce trans-Tasman 
impediments to a limited extent. The merits of further liberalisation in 
telecommunications and other sectors are considered in the next section. 
Trade in services over the internet 
Rapid changes in information technologies and the spread of high speed internet 
have dramatically changed the economics of data transport, storage and 
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processing in recent years. For example, data centres have become the central 
nodes of the internet, exploiting economies of scale to deliver a ‘utility’ model of 
computing that enables businesses and households to access computing services 
and digital content on demand. 
These changes have created opportunities for cross-border trade in many services 
that have traditionally been delivered locally through other means. Opportunities 
include trade in information services (such as data storage and cloud computing), 
information processing services (such as financial, accounting, and health 
services), and entertainment services (such as the provision of digital content 
including television, movies, music and computer gaming). In principle, these 
services can be supplied from any location where it is efficient or convenient to do 
so and consumed anywhere with a sufficiently fast internet connection. 
These types of trade in services can be impacted by a myriad of existing rules that 
regulate the transmission, storage and use of data and digital content (in addition 
to the telecommunications specific rules discussed above that apply to the delivery 
platforms themselves — the broadband networks). For example, governments can 
impose data security requirements on the storage of financial information, privacy 
requirements on the use of health records or restrictions on the types of content 
that can be accessed. While these regulations exist to achieve specific benefits 
(such as avoiding fraud, protecting privacy, or maintaining cultural standards) 
some submissions noted that they can also impose costs and restrictions that limit 
or prevent services trade. 
Telstra (sub. 56) argued that non-telecommunications specific regulations in 
Australia and New Zealand will limit future trans-Tasman trade in services over the 
broadband networks under construction in both countries. 
… there are a range of regulations which may be well outside the ambit of traditional 
telecommunications regulation, for example privacy and confidentiality protections for 
medical records, which could be harmonised … to reduce barriers to the development 
of applications and services that would scale across the Tasman … (sub. 56, p. 6) 
Fujitsu Australia and Fujitsu New Zealand (sub. DR79) noted that privacy and 
financial regulations in both countries limit the offshore transmission and storage 
of commercial trading, financial and citizens’ data, and that this restricts 
trans-Tasman trade in data storage and ‘cloud computing’ services. Fujitsu argued 
that trans-Tasman harmonisation of these regulations would facilitate trade in this 
area. 
Existing domestic regulation designed when trade in services tended to occur 
locally and through more traditional means may not be well suited to addressing 
trade in services over the internet. Differences in regulation between countries that 
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were previously of little importance when cross border trade was more limited may 
now act as barriers to such trade. Regulation that does not appropriately adapt to 
services trade over the internet may lead to new barriers to trans-Tasman and 
wider trade and prevent countries from capturing potentially substantial gains from 
emerging trading opportunities. 
To avoid this, governments should ensure that the regulatory settings applying to 
data and digital content (and other relevant areas) achieve domestic policy 
objectives without unnecessarily impeding internet-based services trade. 
Chapter 5 includes a recommendation that regulatory proposals at the national 
level in Australia and New Zealand should consider opportunities for trans-Tasman 
collaboration that would lower costs and deliver benefits. Regulations that affect 
trans-Tasman trade in services over the internet should be included in such 
collaboration. 
Insurance 
Submissions from the insurance industry raised four issues, which are discussed, 
in turn, below. 
Regulatory harmonisation 
The Insurance Council of New Zealand (sub. 49, and sub. DR96) argued that 
governments need to re-think trans-Tasman regulatory differences, although 
differences in market size and scope mean that ‘Australian regulations and market 
conditions may not be workable, or even appropriate in New Zealand’. In spite of 
these market differences, the Council noted that if the two Governments ‘are 
seriously considering integrating New Zealand and Australia’s insurance markets, 
they need to completely rethink these regulatory differences’ (sub. DR96, pp. 1–2). 
The Commissions have not been able in this scoping study to review the 
advantages and disadvantages of further integrating regulation of the insurance 
industry. However, worthwhile integration would be fostered if future regulations 
affecting the insurance industry that are the subject of national regulatory impact 
statements in either country take account of trans-Tasman impacts (see 
chapter 5). 
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Solvency standards 
In both Australia and New Zealand, standards are in place requiring insurers to 
hold enough capital so that, taking into account the probability of certain risks 
(such as those relating to claims, investments and assets, and catastrophic 
events), the insurer can continue to meet its obligations to its policyholders as they 
fall due. 
The Insurance Councils of Australia (sub. 36) and New Zealand (sub. 49) consider 
that the decision by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ), to increase the 
catastrophe risk capital charge for non-life insurance to a 1 in 1000 years loss 
return period compared with the 1 in 250 year requirement of the Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), has created a material difference 
between the Australian and New Zealand regulatory environments. This 
difference, they suggest, exceeds the difference in catastrophe risk profile 
between the two countries, and will make New Zealand less attractive to 
international insurers and discourage diversified insurers in both markets. 
Insurance Australia Group (sub. 23) made a similar point and added that this 
difference is exacerbated by differences across the Tasman in definitions, 
immaterial prudential requirements and documentation, and overly prescriptive 
compliance and governance requirements. Vero (sub. DR76) considers that the 
disparity in solvency standards should be reviewed. 
New Zealand’s higher catastrophe risk capital charge may discourage Australian 
firms from providing catastrophe insurance in New Zealand. However, the 1 in 
1000 year loss return period has been set in regard to the risks of earthquakes, 
which are a more significant risk in New Zealand than in Australia. Moreover, 
different solvency standards across the Tasman may reflect different attitudes to 
risk as well as differences in the risks themselves. The regulatory impact 
statement that assessed this requirement pointed out that calibrating the 
catastrophe risk at a prudent level is ‘judgmental’ (RBNZ 2012b, p. 22). 
The Commissions are not qualified to comment on solvency standards, but note 
that the reasons for choosing the 1 in 1000 year loss return period have been set 
out in a regulatory impact statement.  
Taxation 
Insurance Australia Group (sub. 23) supports eliminating or reducing insurance 
taxes and charges (fire services levy and stamp duty in Australia and fire services 
levy and earthquake commission levy in New Zealand). The Insurance Council of 
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New Zealand (sub. 49) supports reducing the general levies and taxation placed 
on insurers. 
The fire services levy and stamp duties on insurance in Australia are the 
responsibility of state governments. Other commentators have supported 
removing taxes on insurance. For example, the review of Australia’s Future Tax 
System (Commonwealth of Australia 2010, section E8–1) recommended that: 
… specific taxes on insurance products, including the fire services levy, should be 
abolished. Insurance products should be treated like most other services consumed 
within Australia and be subject to only one broad-based tax on consumption. 
Some state governments are already moving to modify their insurance taxes. This 
decentralised approach may well be more effective than bringing the issue within a 
trans-Tasman framework, and seeking a coordinated approach between 
governments. 
Disclosure requirements 
The Insurance Council of New Zealand (sub. 49) suggests that New Zealand 
should require insurance brokers to declare their remuneration, as is the case in 
Australia. 
The website of the Insurance Council of New Zealand indicates that most persons 
advising on insurance products are deemed to be financial advisers, because they 
offer ‘financial advice’ on contracts of insurance. Financial advisers are regulated 
under the Financial Advisers Act 2008. Sections 22 and 23 (2) (f) of this Act 
require financial advisers to disclose their remuneration to a client before providing 
a service to a retail client or as soon as practicable afterwards. This suggests that 
only insurance brokers who do not provide financial advice are not legally obliged 
to disclose their remuneration. 
Insurance brokers who are members of the Insurance Brokers Association of New 
Zealand are guided by a Code of Professional Conduct that covers: minimum 
standards of ethical behaviour; client care; competence knowledge and skills; and 
professional training (Insurance Brokers Association of New Zealand Inc 2011). 
The Code does not require disclosure of remuneration. This implies that the 
disclosure requirement issue raised by the Insurance Council of New Zealand 
could be addressed by the industry choosing to amend its Code of Professional 
Conduct. 
Alternatively, the New Zealand Government could consider regulation. Before 
regulating, the benefits and costs of requirements for disclosure of remuneration 
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would need to be assessed in the context of the market and prevailing regulatory 
conditions of New Zealand. While the assessment should have regard for 
disclosure requirements in Australia, it should also recognise that these 
requirements have been determined in a different regulatory and market 
environment, and may not necessarily be appropriate in New Zealand. 
4.4 ‘Third freedom’: capital 
Foreign direct investment 
Australia and New Zealand both restrict foreign direct investment (FDI) through 
screening regimes, foreign equity limits on specific businesses and other means. 
The CER Investment Protocol that has been signed, but not yet enacted, will 
reduce some of these restrictions for trans-Tasman investment — primarily by 
raising the monetary thresholds below which some investments will no longer 
require screening. Equity limits in both countries are not affected by the Protocol. 
Under the Protocol, Australia is to apply more lenient screening thresholds for 
some types of investment by New Zealanders. However, screening thresholds for 
‘sensitive sectors’ (such as telecommunications, media and transport) remain 
unchanged. This is similar to the preferential treatment provided to US investors 
under the Australia United States Free Trade Agreement. 
For Australian investment in New Zealand, the Protocol also lifts some screening 
thresholds. However, the effects of this are likely to be modest, because many 
proposals involve some element of ‘sensitive land’, for which the screening 
requirements are unchanged. 
New Zealand’s approach to screening sensitive land appears to be unduly 
restrictive and creates unnecessary uncertainty for Australian and other foreign 
investors. This is because the definition of ‘sensitive land’ captures land that may 
not actually be ‘sensitive’, and screening criteria permit a high degree of discretion 
as to how relevant costs and benefits are weighted. There is scope to improve this 
aspect of New Zealand’s foreign investment policy. 
Given that the effects of the CER Investment Protocol are likely to be limited, the 
two Governments should consider the costs and benefits of further foreign 
investment liberalisation. Restrictions on FDI can bring several types of economic 
costs. 
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• Screening regimes entail administrative costs for governments and compliance 
costs for firms. 
• Restrictions may deter FDI and result in higher cost domestic capital being 
used in its place. 
• Restrictions may deter FDI that would have brought with it firm-specific assets, 
such as human capital, technology and international reputation. This can be 
particularly important in the services sector, where foreign investment 
restrictions can result in less competition, less diversity and innovation and 
higher prices (as foreign service suppliers must enter markets via alternative, 
less efficient, means than FDI — if they enter at all). 
Restrictions on foreign investment can also bring benefits by preventing 
investments that would have adverse effects on competition, the environment, 
national security or local culture in the host country. However, domestic policies 
(for example, competition policy, environment regulation or targeted support for 
cultural activities) are often better placed to deal with these issues. That said, 
foreign investment restrictions do have a role to play, for example, in considering 
issues arising from investment proposals from entities that are owned or controlled 
by foreign governments. 
The OECD’s FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index suggests that Australia and 
New Zealand have more restrictive investment regimes than many other OECD 
countries (OECD 2012b). While there is debate about the methodology and 
content of this index, there is clearly scope to reduce the costs of restrictions, 
which would promote further integration of the Australian and New Zealand capital 
markets, bilaterally and globally. 
An option is for Australia and New Zealand to extend to selected other countries 
the preferential arrangements they have already agreed to provide to each other. 
This would be consistent with the outward-looking approach outlined in chapter 2 
and would follow the historical precedent of Australia and New Zealand liberalising 
trade restrictions with each other first and then with other countries. 
In the context of the trans-Tasman relationship, there is considerable scope to 
move beyond the limited changes in the CER Investment Protocol. The ‘direction 
of travel’ should be towards a broader application of national treatment of investors 
from the other country. There may be legitimate reasons for retaining some 
restrictions (for example, relating to national security or the Treaty of Waitangi), 
but the reasons should be made clear. 
Supplementary paper C provides more detailed information and analysis on 
foreign direct investment restrictions. 
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R4.18 
 
The Australian and New Zealand Governments should consider 
removing remaining restrictions on trans-Tasman foreign direct 
investment. The policy rationale and the costs and benefits of any 
restrictions, including exceptions to national treatment left in 
place, should be made clear. 
   
    
Taxation 
Differences between the tax systems of Australia and New Zealand may influence 
the character and location of economic activities across the Tasman in many 
ways. Study participants pointed to the absence of mutual recognition of 
imputation credits (MRIC) across the Tasman; costs of having to be familiar with 
two different systems (AiGroup, sub. 38); issues with dividend and interest 
withholding tax (Australian Bankers’ Association, sub. 37); and tax residency 
issues (Fielding, sub. 41), taxation of non-resident employees and tax base 
integration (The Corporate Taxpayers Group (New Zealand)) (sub. DR65). 
Mutual recognition of imputation credits 
The lack of trans-Tasman recognition of imputation credits was the biggest 
concern for a number of participants, including: the Australia New Zealand 
Leadership Forum (subs. 58, DR70 and DR120); Australian Bankers’ Association 
(sub. 37); Corporate Taxpayers Group (sub. 35); New Zealand Venture Capital 
Association (sub. 32); Temperzone Holdings Limited (sub. DR63); Auckland 
Chamber of Commerce (sub. DR63); Contact Energy (sub. DR63); and Peter 
Ferguson (sub. DR63). They support the introduction of mutual recognition of 
imputation credits, and some also acknowledge the complexities involved and that 
the issue has been on the agenda for more than 20 years. 
What is the issue? 
In both Australia and New Zealand, shareholders are entitled to ‘imputation’ (in 
New Zealand or ‘franking’ in Australia) credits on dividends, when companies have 
paid corporate income tax. When tax is paid on corporate income at the company 
level, dividend recipients can credit this tax against their personal (or institutional) 
income tax liability. Imputation credits only apply domestically: Australian 
shareholders, for example, can use imputation credits from Australian-sourced 
income from local companies, but cannot use imputation credits arising from 
company income earned and taxed in New Zealand.  
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This means that the overall tax rate faced by a top-tax-rate Australian investor in a 
New Zealand company is 60.4 percent compared to 45 percent for income from an 
Australian company. For a top-tax-rate New Zealand investor in an Australian 
company, the comparable figures are 53.1 and 33 percent. This amounts to a 
significant tax wedge between domestic and trans-Tasman investment. 
This has adverse consequences for investment allocation between Australia and 
New Zealand, creating: 
… a home bias in investment decisions: even though from a pure economic 
perspective an investment opportunity looks a better bet in the destination economy, 
the impact of the tax policy determines that it makes sense to forego that opportunity 
and put money into a potentially less efficient investment domestically. 
As a result, trans-Tasman resource decisions are distorted: resources are not being 
allocated to their optimal locations. (ANZLF sub. 58, attachment, p. 4) 
The combined effect of taxing company and personal income in this way creates 
incentives to minimise tax through choice of business organisational form 
(incorporated or unincorporated); financial structure (debt or equity), and 
distribution policies (earnings retention or distribution). While such arrangements 
can lessen tax-induced investment misallocation, setting up these structures 
involves some costs. They can also unnecessarily complicate management of 
businesses and reduce financial resilience.  
The lack of mutual recognition of imputation credits is unlikely, however, to affect 
the investment decisions of all firms. Many large firms in both countries can 
access global capital markets for equity finance. For such firms, dividend 
imputation does little to affect their cost of capital and hence their incentive to 
invest:  
For companies with access to the international stockmarket, an imputation system has 
no impact on the cost of corporate capital and hence no impact on investment 
incentives. … Indeed, on those assumptions the only effect of the system is to transfer 
ownership of shares in domestic companies from foreign to domestic shareholders. 
(Sorensen and Johnson 2009) 
In other words, the absence of MRIC may only affect the investment choices of 
those firms in Australia and New Zealand without access to global capital markets 
that are or are contemplating operating across the Tasman, and is less likely to 
affect the cost of capital for large firms with such access. There would, however, 
be a shift in the ownership of such firms toward shareholders who can benefit from 
MRIC. In the short term, there would be upward pressure on share prices brought 
about by increased demand from those shareholders.  
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A possible solution: mutual recognition of imputation credits  
One possible solution to the challenges facing smaller companies that cannot 
access global equity markets is to extend the imputation system described above 
across the Tasman (see supplementary paper F). Each country would recognise 
the imputation credits attached to the dividends distributed by companies in the 
destination country to shareholders resident in the home country. Shareholders 
would then face the same marginal tax rate on income generated by equity 
investments in both countries. For those firms whose cost of capital is not set in 
global capital markets, this would remove the tax-induced incentive to invest in the 
home economy. This could result in efficiency gains as investment funds are 
allocated between Australia and New Zealand on their economic merits, rather 
than according to their taxation consequences. As under current arrangements, 
equity investments to and from third countries would not benefit from trans-
Tasman recognition of imputation credits. 
More two-way investment, and penetration by the firms of each economy of the 
markets of the other, could also deliver dynamic efficiency gains through, for 
example, increased competition or technology transfer. It would also reduce the 
costs of tax mitigation arrangements, outlined above. 
MRIC also involves trans-Tasman income transfers 
The full consequences of introducing MRIC would, however, be more complicated 
than these static and dynamic efficiency effects. An evaluation of MRIC needs to 
take account of other potential effects. 
The initial effect of introducing MRIC would be to increase returns to existing 
owners of trans-Tasman capital and reduce tax revenues in the countries 
recognising the imputation credits. The share prices of companies in each country 
that do not have access to global equity markets would rise, reflecting the increase 
in the expected after-tax income from dividends. Before allowing for the effects of 
any capital movements induced by MRIC or possible changes in company 
distribution policies, using Australian Bureau of Statistics data on trans-Tasman 
investment, the reduction in tax revenues might be in the vicinity of 
NZ$135-NZ$220 million for New Zealand and NZ$190-NZ$750 million for 
Australia. Based on Statistics New Zealand data, the reduction in tax revenues 
might be in the vicinity of NZ$100-NZ$160 million for New Zealand and 
NZ$275-NZ$1015 million for Australia (supplementary paper F). The larger 
reduction in Australian tax revenue occurs because Australian investment in New 
Zealand is larger than New Zealand investment in Australia. 
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These changes are, however, only the initial impacts. MRIC can be thought of as 
the combination of the unilateral application of imputation credits by each country. 
For example, introducing imputation credits in Australia for company tax paid in 
New Zealand would increase the after-tax returns to Australian owners of capital 
invested in New Zealand. Some Australian capital would relocate to New Zealand 
in search of higher returns. 
By making investment across the Tasman more attractive, MRIC would transfer 
some of the benefit of the tax reduction from one country to the other. This 
happens because the movement of capital shifts a part of the company tax base 
from one country to the other. The movement may also affect the relative returns 
to capital and to other factors (such as labour and land) in each country. In turn, 
this will have second-round effects on revenues from company and income taxes. 
The asset price impacts of MRIC would be instantaneous; the impacts on real 
investment and associated relative prices would take more time. Box 4.4 describes 
the channels through which these effects would operate. In addition, introducing 
MRIC would require each Government to increase other taxes, reduce spending or 
increase debt. 
 
Box 4.4 Allocative and distributional effects of MRIC 
The effects of MRIC can be explained by considering unilateral recognition by either 
Australia or New Zealand of the tax credits of the other. MRIC is simply the 
combination of unilateral recognition by both countries.  
Firms accessing domestic equity markets 
For firms that cannot access global equity markets, additional equity from the trans–
Tasman partner would tend to drive down their cost of capital, and thus encourage 
additional investment. This reallocation of capital to higher valued uses across the 
Tasman would generate efficiency gains. The changes in relative prices that induce 
this shift would have a series of distributional consequences. 
In the destination economy:  
• increased returns to complementary factors as the increase in the capital stock 
increases their productivity, mirrored by a reduction in returns to substitutable 
factors (notably capital, both domestic and foreign owned) 
• an increase in company and income tax revenue from the increased output and 
income. 
In the source economy: 
• decreased returns to complementary factors as their productivity decreases with 
reduced capital 
(Continued next page)  
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Box 4.4 (continued) 
• a decrease in company and income tax revenues as output and income falls and 
imputation credits are recognised. 
Therefore, unilateral recognition of imputation credits results in a gain to the destination 
economy and a loss to the source economy. 
Firms accessing global equity markets 
For firms whose capital costs are set in global equity markets, an increase in after-tax 
returns to trans-Tasman investors would simply result in an increase in their trans-
Tasman ownership relative to ownership by third-country investors, but would not 
induce additional net national investment. Hence, it is possible that increased trans-
Tasman capital flows would not affect the total stock of capital in the destination 
economy, because new capital replaces existing capital. Similarly, it is possible that the 
reduction in capital in the source country would be replaced by capital from other 
sources. If this happens, economic activity and factor returns would remain unchanged 
and there would be no efficiency gains from MRIC. There would, however, be an 
increase in post-tax returns to equity holders. 
The net effects 
The effects of MRIC in practice, therefore, will depend on the pre-existing levels of 
trans-Tasman investment, the share of firms with access to global equity markets, the 
relative magnitudes of investors’ and firms’ responses to changes in after-tax returns, 
and the extent to which those responses shift returns in each country between capital 
and other factors. Assessing the balance of these forces needs to be explored through 
quantitative analysis.  
 
Unilateral recognition of imputation credits almost certainly would reduce the 
income of the country adopting it and benefit its partner (Benge and Slack 2012). 
How the effects outlined in box 4.4 net out when there is mutual recognition 
depends on the existing amount of investment owned by each country and located 
in the other, and the magnitude of changes in incentives (returns to capital owners 
and cost of capital for firms) and reactions to them, all of which are uncertain. 
There are also potential gains from dynamic effects associated with the net 
increase in investment and avoidance of tax mitigation costs and complexities. In 
principle, each country could gain or one could gain while the other loses. 
What can modelling indicate about the effects of MRIC? 
For this study, the Commissions used modelling to gain insights into the efficiency 
and inter-country distributional effects of MRIC and to understand the key drivers 
of these effects. 
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Model results hinge on model structure, with different models invariably giving 
different ‘answers’. For these reasons, the Commissions drew on two models and 
conducted extensive sensitivity and scenario analysis given uncertainty about 
parameter values and crucial behavioural responses such as the: 
• investment responses of firms when their cost of capital changes. If investment 
by firms is not responsive to changes in the cost of capital, there will be little 
change in output or income 
• responsiveness of capital owners to changes in post-tax returns across the 
world. This is related to the share of firms that have access to global capital 
markets. When the responsiveness is low, imputation credits largely result in 
domestic transfers to the owners of capital, and output effects are small, 
consistent with a large share of firms with access to global equity. A high 
responsiveness is consistent with a low share of firms with access to global 
equity 
• substitutability between capital and other inputs in production processes. The 
more substitutable they are, the less will relative prices change and the larger 
the investment responses and efficiency gains. Conversely, the lower the 
scope for substitution, the smaller the efficiency gain and the larger the change 
in relative prices 
• share of profits that is distributed as dividends to shareholders and the share of 
credits claimed by taxpayers, which are affected by imputation credit policies. 
The larger the proportion of dividends, and the greater the eligibility of 
taxpayers to claim imputation credits, the larger the impacts on output, income 
and taxation revenue. 
The modelling analysis was particularly helpful for tracing through the static or 
‘allocative’ efficiency impacts from these behavioural responses. The Centre for 
International Economics (CIE) undertook modelling on behalf of the Australian 
New Zealand Leadership Forum, which suggested that under a particular set of 
assumptions, MRIC would improve the allocation of trans-Tasman capital and in 
turn increase gross domestic product (GDP, a measure of economic activity within 
a country) by NZ$94 million per year in Australia, NZ$196 million per year in New 
Zealand and NZ$290 million per year for both countries combined (sub. 58). The 
CIE did not report the impacts on gross national income (GNI, a closer proxy for 
national economic welfare). 
The Commissions also explored the economic impacts of MRIC on GNI, GDP and 
tax revenues in both countries and, in particular, the sensitivity of MRIC impacts to 
key parameters and assumptions. For this purpose, the Australian Commission 
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developed the SMRIC model (PC 2012) (supplementary paper G) and the 
Commissions conducted a technical workshop (PC 2012c). 
The Commission’s modelling indicated that, to the extent MRIC drives down the 
cost of capital for investment across the Tasman, it unambiguously improves the 
allocation of capital, producing trans-Tasman efficiency gains. This leads to an 
increase in trans-Tasman economic activity as measured by GDP, ranging from 
zero to in the order of US$300 million per year, depending on assumptions about 
investors’ responses to MRIC and assumptions about data, dividend distribution 
and credit redemption rates. Increases in trans-Tasman GNI are of the same order 
of magnitude as the GDP gains. In both the CIE and Commission modelling, the 
dynamic efficiency gains, given their nature, were not quantified. 
The Commission’s modelling also provided insights into the distribution between 
Australia and New Zealand of the gains and losses from MRIC. These impacts are 
especially sensitive to model parameters and assumptions for, inter alia, corporate 
profit distribution policies and imputation credits claimed. Other major drivers are 
the initial stocks of Australian capital in New Zealand and vice versa, and the 
investment responses to MRIC in each direction. 
The modelling analysis offers several useful observations about the broad 
distributional impacts of MRIC. Firstly, it shows that the larger the gains to one 
country the larger the losses to the other. This simply reflects that trans-Tasman 
efficiency gains from MRIC are the sum of the gains and losses generated by each 
country’s unilateral recognition of imputation credits. Secondly, in most scenarios 
modelled in SMRIC, Australia would incur a larger reduction in tax revenue than 
New Zealand and a net loss of GDP and GNI. This outcome reflects Australia’s 
relatively larger existing stocks of capital in both Australia and New Zealand, the 
larger amount of Australian capital that shifts to New Zealand in response to MRIC 
and hence its correspondingly larger tax-revenue and factor-income losses. 
Thirdly, for MRIC to lead to increased GNI in both countries, there would need to 
be markedly asymmetric responses in each country. 
Supplementary paper G offers an in depth sensitivity analysis of the gains and 
losses from MRIC in each country, based on the SMRIC model. 
Models are a tool for providing insights by capturing many of the effects of policy 
changes in a stylised way. By their nature they do not replicate all of the complex 
interactions in and between economies. For example, as noted, the modelling 
abstracts from the potential dynamic effects of increased net investment flows. 
Hence, in forming their judgement on MRIC, the Commissions have taken account 
of a broad range of factors, some included in the modelling and some not. 
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Conclusions 
MRIC would be expected to lead to a more integrated capital market and improved 
trans-Tasman allocative efficiency. The analysis undertaken for this study supports 
this finding. It also concludes that the allocative gains from more efficient capital 
allocation may be relatively small. MRIC is more likely to reduce the cost of capital 
for smaller than larger firms, as the latter already access global capital markets. 
There are also potential dynamic efficiency gains associated with MRIC, to the 
extent that additional investment across the Tasman results in increased 
penetration of the markets of each economy by the firms of the other. The size of 
these gains depends on the extent to which competition and innovation would 
increase. These effects, by their very nature, are virtually impossible to quantify.  
The Commissions’ analysis demonstrates that MRIC could lead to net income 
transfers between Australia and New Zealand, and that these are likely to be 
larger than the allocative efficiency gains. 
A possible outcome is for one country to experience a loss in its GNI at the same 
time that there is a greater gain for the other, leading to a trans-Tasman gain 
overall. 
Principally because Australian investment in New Zealand is larger than New 
Zealand investment in Australia, it is probable that Australian income transfers to 
New Zealand would be greater than transfers the other way. It is possible that both 
Australia and New Zealand's GNI would rise, but this would require markedly 
asymmetric investment responses. 
This study’s analysis of MRIC, to the best of the Commissions’ knowledge, is more 
comprehensive than any undertaken in the 20 years that this issue has been 
debated. Nevertheless, uncertainty about the distribution of the welfare effects of 
MRIC for the two countries remains and is unlikely to be resolved by further 
economic analysis. 
MRIC would entail significant tax transfers within each country, from governments 
to shareholders. These would require increased taxes or reduced government 
spending, irrespective of the size of efficiency gains. 
As explained in chapter 2, in cases where a policy initiative would provide trans-
Tasman net benefits but would likely involve a net cost for one country, the 
Commissions’ approach is not to recommend that initiative, but to report the 
finding for consideration by Governments. 
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Such considerations could include whether there are means by which the 
efficiency gains of MRIC can be captured, while both countries experience an 
increase in GNI. As noted, it is not possible to predict precisely the distribution of 
the welfare effects. 
One approach would be for the two Governments to share the fiscal cost of the 
credits recognised. This would acknowledge that the problem MRIC is trying to 
resolve is two governments each claiming taxing rights to what is a single pool of 
‘trans-Tasman’ income. 
The Commissions have not been in a position to design, or test the feasibility of, 
these kinds of approaches. This would need to be undertaken by the two tax 
agencies and Treasuries. Other aspects of the trans-Tasman tax arrangements 
could be considered in parallel. 
In the Commissions’ view, the long-standing debate about MRIC needs to be 
settled. Achieving that will depend importantly on resolving the distributional 
questions. 
One option is for the Governments to initiate a process, preferably with a clear 
deadline, for determining whether there is an efficient, equitable and robust 
mechanism that would ensure an acceptable distribution of the gains from MRIC. 
On the other hand, if Governments conclude that such a mechanism is infeasible, 
they should announce that MRIC will not go ahead, rather than allow ongoing 
debate on an issue that cannot be resolved, and could complicate progress on 
other business taxation improvements. 
 
    
 
F4.1 
 
Mutual recognition of imputation credits (MRIC) would be 
expected to result in a more integrated capital market and 
improve trans-Tasman economic efficiency. 
However, MRIC would lead to a greater fiscal cost for Australia 
than New Zealand and to some income transfers between 
Australia and New Zealand. Australian transfers to New Zealand 
could be expected to be greater than transfers the other way, 
although their precise magnitude is impossible to predict. A 
probable outcome would be a net income loss for Australia. 
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The Australian and New Zealand Governments should either: 
• initiate a process, preferably with a clear deadline, for 
determining whether there is an efficient, equitable and robust 
mechanism that would ensure a satisfactory distribution of the 
gains from MRIC; or 
• if they consider that such mechanisms are infeasible, 
announce that MRIC will not go ahead. 
   
    
Other tax issues 
The Corporate Taxpayers Group (New Zealand) (sub. DR65) considered that the 
tax implications arising from the presence of employees providing services in the 
other trans-Tasman jurisdiction is a significant barrier to the conduct of business 
across the Tasman. Issues arise when the presence of a company and its 
employees triggers the rules for classifying an Australian business or its 
employees as having a taxable presence in New Zealand, thereby requiring the 
filing of New Zealand income tax returns (and vice versa for a New Zealand 
company and its employees in Australia). As a result, companies have a purely 
tax-driven incentive to move staff in and out of both countries to try to ensure they 
remain within specified exemption periods. Fonterra (sub. 14) and Australian 
Industry Group (sub. 38) also noted the taxation-related costs to business of 
transferring staff across the Tasman. 
This issue relates to the double taxation arrangements between Australia and New 
Zealand. Any changes to these arrangements would need to be made on a 
reciprocal basis and would therefore be a matter of negotiation and agreement 
between Australia and New Zealand. The next review of the arrangements is due 
to commence by March 2015. 
 
    
 
R4.20 
 
Taxation of non-resident employees should be considered when 
the double taxation arrangements between Australia and New 
Zealand are next reviewed. 
   
    
Corporate Taxpayers Group also considered that current taxation law provides 
incentives for Australian investors to take 100 percent ownership of New Zealand 
businesses, rather than a lower level of ownership. It suggested that this can result 
in the ‘crowding out’ of New Zealand minority investment and that, from a tax 
policy perspective, a tax system should be neutral regarding the level of ownership 
that investors acquire. 
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Despite this issue having some connection with imputation credits, it is not 
specifically a trans-Tasman matter. The Commissions note that the Inland 
Revenue Department is talking to Corporate Taxpayers Group about the issue in a 
broader context. 
The Australian Bankers’ Association (sub. 37) expressed concerns about New 
Zealand dividend and interest non-resident withholding taxes. Neither of these is 
specifically a trans-Tasman issue; however they do relate to the division of taxing 
rights between the country from which the income is sourced and the country of 
residence of the taxpayer. As previously set out, this is a core issue in the mutual 
recognition of imputation credits. There may be opportunities in the next review of 
double taxation arrangements between Australia and New Zealand to make an 
overall assessment of the balance of this division and, at the same time, consider 
the issues raised by the Australian Bankers’ Association. 
Banking 
Prudential regulation 
The Australian and New Zealand banking systems are closely linked, with 
predominant Australian ownership of New Zealand’s banking institutions. Almost 
90 percent of New Zealand bank assets are owned by Australian banks. This 
constitutes around 15 percent of the total assets of Australian banks 
(Bollard 2011; Doan et al. 2006). 
The frameworks for prudential regulation in Australia and New Zealand have 
broadly the same high-level objectives of promoting the safety, stability and 
efficiency of their respective financial systems. Both country’s banking supervision 
operates within the framework established by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision. 
However, there are some differences in approach. 
• The Australian framework emphasises risk-based supervision by the Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) and has a depositor-preference regime 
covering deposits in Australia for all locally incorporated authorised 
deposit-taking institutions (ADIs). This is in addition to the disclosure and other 
requirements imposed on banks under the Corporations Act 2001 in Australia. 
• The New Zealand regime places comparatively more emphasis on disclosure, 
and on the legal responsibilities of banks' boards of directors for what is 
disclosed. This is in addition to the disclosure and other requirements imposed 
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on all companies under the Companies Act 1993. New Zealand does not have 
a depositor preference regime. The RBNZ's supervision is intended to 
complement and not duplicate APRA’s oversight of the New Zealand 
operations of Australian-owned banks. 
In the event of an Australian-owned bank failing — either the New Zealand 
subsidiary or the parent bank in Australia — there would be trans-Tasman failure 
management issues to resolve. These involve some matters where national 
interests could differ. The Australian depositor preference regime means that 
without some form of ‘ring-fencing’, New Zealand depositors could be 
disadvantaged. Whether or not to use taxpayer funds to support a distressed bank 
is a matter for the respective governments to decide. 
So that each country has some ability independently to manage a bank failure, the 
regulators in both countries require the (major retail) banks to operate at 
arms-length from their parent/subsidiary banks in the other country. This includes: 
• local incorporation requirements 
• requirements that the separate banks in each country maintain core operational 
capabilities that would be resilient to the failure of service providers, including 
of a parent or subsidiary to which core functions are out-sourced. This limits, for 
example, the scope for trans-Tasman banks to use a single IT platform to serve 
the operational needs of the banking group across both countries (ANZ, 
sub. 50) 
• limits on provision of funding (and other intra-group credit exposures) between 
the parent bank in Australia and the subsidiary in New Zealand (and vice 
versa). 
Given the extensive Australian ownership of New Zealand’s banks, steps have 
been taken to harmonise, where appropriate, the prudential standards that apply in 
each country, and to establish arrangements that would assist in the handling of 
the failure of a trans-Tasman bank. 
Ministerial and officials’ meetings in 2004 resulted in the pursuit of an ‘enhanced 
home-host’ model for supervision, which aims to avoid imposing unnecessary 
compliance and operating costs on banks, while preserving national autonomy in 
approaches to bank crisis and failure management. Also, the Trans-Tasman 
Council on Banking Supervision (TTCBS) was established, with the role of 
promoting ongoing coordination, cooperation and harmonisation of trans-Tasman 
banking regulation, while maintaining the safety, stability and efficiency of both 
financial systems. This ongoing work has led to significant progress. 
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On the advice of the TTCBS, in 2006 each country passed legislation that requires 
the respective prudential regulators to consider the impact of their actions ‘across 
the Tasman’ (APRA 2011; Doan et al. 2006). Specifically, the legislation requires 
that each regulator: support the other in meeting their statutory responsibilities 
and, to the extent practicable, avoid any action that would be likely to harm 
financial system stability in the other country; or, to the extent considered 
practicable given the urgency of the situation, to consult with the other before 
taking such action. 
Further to those statutory provisions, in September 2010, the TTCBS agencies 
signed a Memorandum of Co-operation on the management of trans-Tasman bank 
distress (Financial Stability Board 2011), and in 2011-12 a trans-Tasman crisis 
management exercise was conducted to test the arrangements. 
Submissions received by the Commissions support further integration of bank 
supervision to achieve as much alignment as possible in supervisory standards 
and to reduce compliance costs. Commercial banks noted that current and 
proposed differences in approaches to prudential regulation and bank failure 
management create additional operational costs, while also increasing the costs of 
raising funds from overseas and the ability of Australian banks to invest in New 
Zealand. Examples provided included New Zealand’s open bank resolution and 
outsourcing policies, differences in each country’s implementation of the Basel III 
reforms and APRA’s proposed changes to related party exposure limits and 
related entities (Australian Bankers’ Association, sub. 37; ANZ, sub. 50; New 
Zealand Bankers’ Association, sub. 24). 
The RBNZ (sub. 12) noted that harmonising New Zealand’s regulatory regime with 
Australia’s is an ongoing task. While there may be benefits from integrating 
approaches to prudential regulation, there are also important benefits from New 
Zealand being able to pursue a regime suited to its own circumstances. In 
particular, the RBNZ (sub. 12) considers that New Zealand needs the capacity to 
manage bank failures and crises affecting banks with large scale operations in 
New Zealand. This is so that the interests of the New Zealand economy and New 
Zealand customers of banks can be adequately protected in a crisis, when the 
interests and judgments of New Zealand and Australia, and the respective 
Governments, may differ. 
Prudential regulation is constantly evolving, with significant developments 
occurring in multilateral fora in response to the global financial crisis. The most 
notable case is the Basel III capital reforms. While there are differences in the 
proposed implementation of these reforms in Australia and New Zealand 
(Australian Bankers’ Association, sub. 37 and sub. DR11; ANZ, sub. 50; New 
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Zealand Bankers’ Association, sub. 24), regulators in both countries are working to 
align regulatory rules and supervisory practices where sensible. They have also 
improved information sharing, crisis preparedness and cooperation considerably in 
recent years (RBNZ, sub. 12). 
 
    
 
F4.2 
 
The Trans-Tasman Council on Banking Supervision is well 
positioned to progress any work relating to the further integration 
of Australian and New Zealand prudential regulation. 
   
    
Banking: international transfer fees 
Some submissions (Cole, sub. 4; Fonterra Co-operative Group, sub. 14) raised the 
matter of the fees for and delays involved in transferring funds and making 
payments across the Tasman through the banking system. These issues arise 
because transfers occur across different national payments systems. 
The standard fee for sending funds by bank telegraphic transfer appears to be 
between NZ$20 and NZ$25 (possibly with additional fees applied by the receiving 
bank). The Commissions are not in a position to assess whether the fees are 
excessive, nor whether fees charged to frequent customers (for example, 
exporters and importers, or firms with a trans-Tasman business presence) are 
lower than the standard fee. 
However, developments in technology are enabling banks, and a range of other 
providers, to provide payments services at lower cost, at least for ‘retail’ amounts. 
These include facilities that enable funds to be transferred cross-border from 
person to person using stored value cards, and internet-based payment channels. 
These developments suggest that technology and competition may reduce the 
fees for trans-Tasman payments over time. 
Financial services 
Australian investment is prominent in New Zealand’s wider financial services 
sector — which includes wealth management (including superannuation), 
insurance and the securities market. 
Australian and New Zealand financial sector regulators have broadly similar 
principles and objectives, but with some differences. Regulators in the two 
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countries share a strong commitment to remove or reduce regulatory barriers that 
unnecessarily inhibit the flows of capital between the two countries (ASIC 2010). 
Integration has been pursued through unilateral initiatives and mutual recognition, 
where appropriate. 
• Mutual recognition of securities offerings has allowed offer documents that 
comply within one country to be offered in the other (ASIC 2010). 
• Mutual recognition of arrangements for financial advisers will enable them to 
work in both countries — subject to their qualifications and experience 
(ASIC 2012). 
• The Financial Markets Authority (FMA) recently implemented an Effective 
Disclosure Guidance regime modelled on an Australian scheme, after 
extensive consultation with ASIC (FMA, sub. 57). 
Some submissions suggested that further trans-Tasman integration in financial 
services regulation may lower compliance costs for financial institutions operating 
in each market (Business NZ, sub. 40; FMA, sub. 57; ICA, sub. 36; IAG, sub. 23; 
Nottage, sub. 55). The FMA (sub. 57) noted that differences in institutional 
arrangements impede further trans-Tasman integration of financial services, and 
that more comprehensive integration is desirable. For example, it supports cross-
membership of the FMA and ASIC (sub. 57). 
4.5 ‘Fourth freedom’: cross border 
movement of people 
Short term travel across the Tasman 
Trans-Tasman travel by Australian and New Zealand citizens 
There are over 2 million trips per year across the Tasman by Australian and New 
Zealand residents, and trans-Tasman arrivals are the largest source of visitors to 
both countries. Fast-track border entry processes can reduce the costs and 
waiting times of trans-Tasman travel for eligible Australian and New Zealand 
citizen passengers. The Australian and New Zealand Governments have 
introduced reciprocal fast-track entry for Australian and New Zealand ePassport 
holders, under their SmartGate systems (ACBPS 2012a, b and c). 
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The Australian Customs and Border Protection Service and the New Zealand 
Customs Service have undertaken a trans-Tasman trial at Gold Coast airport, 
aimed at further integrating Australia’s and New Zealand’s SmartGate systems 
(ACBPS 2012b). The trial commenced in July 2011, and operated for 12 months. 
Further integration of the two countries’ SmartGate systems would simplify 
customs and immigration checks for eligible travellers. Australia could usefully 
adopt SmartGate for departures as well as arrivals. Traditional checks by customs 
officers could then be better targeted at higher-risk passengers (Evans 2010). 
The benefits of SmartGate will be constrained if it is only available at major 
airports. However, the costs of the infrastructure used to operate SmartGate, as 
well as other operating costs, should be factored into decisions about how widely 
and when it is implemented. 
 
    
 
R4.21 
 
The Australian and New Zealand Governments should progress 
the further roll out of SmartGate and associated systems where it 
is cost effective to do so, focusing on departures from Australia 
and major regional airports. 
   
    
Trans-Tasman travel by other citizens 
Many foreign visitors to this region travel to both Australia and New Zealand. In the 
year ending March 2012, 51 percent of all tourists from the Republic of Korea and 
71 percent of all tourists from China visited both Australia and New Zealand 
(MBIE 2012). More than four in every ten arrivals into New Zealand travel from 
Australia, according to the Tourism and Transport Forum (sub. 25). 
A single trans-Tasman tourist/visitor visa, enabling travel to both Australia and 
New Zealand, would reduce the inconvenience and cost, and thereby increase the 
attractiveness, of such travel for people who currently require separate visas to 
visit the two countries (for example, nationals from the People’s Republic of 
China). The Tourism and Transport Forum (sub. DR107) also submitted that such 
a visa would encourage higher international tourist numbers for trans-Tasman 
major sporting events (for example, the 2015 Cricket World Cup). 
This proposal would have fiscal implications for both countries, but these could be 
offset through the use of a cost recovery model. (The Australian Government is 
already moving towards a cost-recovery model for visa-related charges.) The two 
Governments would also need to agree on an appropriate sharing of the costs and 
revenues. 
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R4.22 
 
The Australian and New Zealand Governments should consider a 
‘trans-Tasman tourist visa’ for citizens from other relevant 
countries who wish to travel to both countries. The charges for 
this visa should be based on a cost-recovery model, with agreed 
sharing of revenue and costs. 
   
    
Long term trans-Tasman residents 
There is a long history of both short and longer term movement of people as well 
as permanent migration between Australia and New Zealand, facilitated by the 
Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement (TTTA) and the TTMRA. 
The flows of New Zealanders and Australians in each direction were relatively 
even until the early 1970s. However, following the TTTA and as Australia’s 
economy and wage levels started to grow more quickly than New Zealand’s, the 
flows of citizens responded accordingly. There are now estimated to be around 
480 000 New Zealand-born people living in Australia, compared to around 65 000 
Australian-born people living in New Zealand. 
Empirical studies consistently show that the net effects of migration on the 
receiving country are small and positive, with the so-called ‘migration surplus’ 
larger for skilled immigrants (PC 2011). While the focus for source countries tends 
to be on ‘brain drain’ and ‘hollowing out’ issues (chapter 2), the net effects of 
emigration depend on the skill level of replacement immigrants and return 
migration of emigrants, who often bring back additional skills and know-how 
(Coppel, Dumont and Visco 2001). Box 4.5 illustrates the effect of a 1 percent 
increase in trans-Tasman migration to Australia from New Zealand on gross 
national product and gross national product per worker in both economies. 
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Box 4.5 Modelling the effects of trans-Tasman migration 
The ANZEA model (box 2.9) was used to simulate the effects of a 1 percent increase in 
the number of New Zealanders working in Australia. This translates into a movement of 
approximately 3 000 workers, equivalent to a 0.13 percent decrease in the supply of 
labour in New Zealand and a 0.02 percent increase in the supply of labour in Australia.  
The trans-Tasman wage differential is allowed to adjust in response to this movement. 
The migrating workers are assumed (i) to have similar qualifications as Australians 
(and New Zealanders who remain in New Zealand), and (ii) to be accompanied by a 
typical family (the structure of families in Australia and New Zealand is similar). The 
new demand for goods and services (for example, schools and health) generated by 
the migrants is assumed to be similar to that generated by Australians. The analysis 
abstracts from foreign remittances (as these have been a small fraction of income 
earned by New Zealanders abroad) and does not account for the impacts on other 
sources of migration. The modelling does not allow for replacement migration or return 
migration. 
The increased supply of labour in Australia allows output and income to expand, while 
the reverse occurs in New Zealand (see below table). Output per worker in Australia 
declines as more workers are spread across the existing capital stock, while the 
converse occurs in New Zealand. 
Table Illustrative effects of trans-Tasman migrationa,b 
Percentage changes relative to base 
 Australia New Zealand 
Gross National Product (GNP) 0.01 -0.08 
GNP per worker -0.01 0.06 
a 1 percent increase in New Zealand labour in Australia. b Sensitivity analysis did not produce ranges that 
are significantly different from the results reported. 
Source: Australian Commission estimates.  
 
Long term residents in Australia 
While migration can improve the allocation of resources and increase aggregate 
economic output, open access to taxpayer funded resources is generally not 
desirable from the receiving country’s perspective. Hence, access limits to social 
security and/or residency arrangements are appropriate. 
Over time and incrementally, the Australian Government has limited the access of 
various cohorts of New Zealand migrants to social security and Australian 
permanent residency and citizenship, in response to various developments. As a 
result, social security arrangements for many New Zealand citizens have become 
relatively complex. Some individuals and their families who have lived in Australia 
for a considerable time are denied, or have limited access to, some social safety 
nets. 
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Eligibility for social security 
Australian and New Zealand citizens living in the other country can access a 
variety of social payments and supports, and medical benefits. 
Arrangements for Australian citizens living in New Zealand are relatively simple 
and rarely leave individuals and families without access to a safety net. They have 
the same social security entitlements as New Zealand citizens, provided waiting 
periods (generally around 2 years) have expired. Moreover, they have immediate 
access to publicly funded health and disability services if they can demonstrate an 
intention to live in New Zealand for two or more years. Budgetary costs of some 
benefits are shared between the two Governments, in proportion to the time an 
individual spends in each country. 
New Zealand citizens living in Australia have immediate access to family 
payments (such as Family Tax Benefit, Baby Bonus, Child Care Benefit, and 
Parental Leave Pay), and health care under Medicare Australia. But they also face 
various limitations on access to social security (supplementary paper D), which 
were introduced to limit the cost to taxpayers. 
The result is that social security treatment of New Zealand citizens in Australia sits 
somewhere between the treatment of temporary residents and of newly-arrived 
permanent residents. For example, non-Protected Special Category Visa (SCV) 
holders (generally New Zealanders who arrived in Australia after 26 February 
2001; box 4.6 and box D.2 in supplementary paper D) have less generous social 
security entitlements than newly arrived permanent resident visa holders to 
Australia, but have more generous social security entitlements than temporary 
resident visa holders. 
Because non-protected SCV holders have no or restricted access to some 
Australian welfare payments (namely Newstart, Youth and Sickness Allowances 
and Special Benefit) they have limited options if they require such support. They 
can return to New Zealand, or seek permanent Australian residency and/or 
citizenship. The latter course was made more difficult following changes 
introduced in 2001, which require New Zealand citizens to go through the same 
process as other applicants for permanent residency and citizenship (DIAC 2011). 
In Australia, permanent residency is a prerequisite for citizenship, and permanent 
residency visas are subject to selection criteria and quotas. 
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Box 4.6 Visa arrangements for Australian and New Zealand citizens 
Australia 
On entering Australia, under the TTTA New Zealand citizens are considered to have 
applied for a temporary entry visa and, subject to health and character considerations, 
are automatically provided with a temporary entry visa, which is recorded electronically. 
Unlike other temporary visas, this visa — known as Special Category Visa (SCV) 
subclass 444 — has no time limit while the holder is a New Zealand citizen. 
Under current social security legislation, SCV holders are either Protected or non-
Protected SCV holders. Protected SCV holders generally arrived prior to 26 February 
2001, while non-Protected SCV holders generally arrived after that date. 
New Zealand 
On entering New Zealand, Australian citizens and people who hold a current Australian 
permanent residence visa or a current Australian resident return visa are automatically 
granted a residence visa. 
Sources: DIAC (2010); Immigration New Zealand (nd).  
 
There are challenges within both the ‘demand-driven’ and ‘supply-driven’ 
pathways to Australian permanent residence and citizenship, for a growing cohort 
of New Zealand citizens who have arrived since 2001. 
• Australia’s ‘demand-driven’ pathway is largely met through employer 
sponsorship. While New Zealand holders of subclass 444 visas are exempt 
from the skills and English language capability criteria under the two visa 
categories in the Employer Sponsored Migration program, they are generally 
not exempt from the requirement that applicants be under 50 years of age and 
are not eligible for the Temporary Residence Transition stream (DIAC 2012). 
Also, for some individuals and employers, the A$3060 application fee may be a 
significant ‘post-border’ transaction cost. 
• The ‘supply-driven’ pathway is now based on a framework of developing 
‘specialised skills’. In practice, the new process means that ‘supply-driven’ 
applicants are sorted on the basis of their points test scores. The mark will vary 
each year so that the volume of invited applications roughly balances the 
annual allocation of these skilled visas (Cully 2011). 
Accordingly, a proportion of New Zealand citizen residents, who may have been 
working in Australia for many years, may not be employed in an occupation that is 
defined as ‘in need’ and on the Skilled Occupation List when they seek to become 
permanent residents. Indeed, the ease with which New Zealand citizens can be 
employed by Australian businesses to meet their specific needs also means that 
   
Opportunities for further integration 153 
  
these occupations may never be defined as ‘in need’ or, if they were, may no 
longer be defined as ‘in need’ at the time of the New Zealand citizen’s application. 
As at 30 June 2011, there were around 240 000 New Zealand citizens in Australia 
who had arrived after 26 February 2001 (DIAC, pers. comm., 13 April 2012). 
Based on its analysis of passenger cards, the Australian Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship (sub. DR126) estimated that between 40 and 
60 percent of adult, New Zealand citizen, permanent and long term arrivals would 
be eligible to apply for a permanent visa. This suggests that the remaining non-
Protected SCV holders (that is, between 100 000 and 144 000 people) would be 
ineligible for a number of safety net payments and social policy supports. In 
addition, Protected SCV holders are not eligible to access some types of state and 
territory government social support (for example, HECS-HELP loans and disability 
supports) (see below). 
The Commissions have not been able to quantify the number of people who have 
been unable to access safety net payments. However, submissions from a 
considerable number of individuals and community groups have provided many 
examples of difficulties to this and other studies (boxes D.4 and D.5 in 
supplementary paper D). A particular concern is that SCV holders are eligible for 
Commonwealth supported higher education places but are not eligible for the 
accompanying student loan arrangement (known as HECS-HELP) and the 
associated study-related social security payments. Similarly, within the vocational 
education and training system, SCV holders are not eligible for student loans 
(known as VET FEE-HELP). 
There is a strong case for providing more information to New Zealand citizens 
before they arrive in Australia, to ensure that the conditions applying to social 
security payments and social policy supports are transparent and readily 
understood. This is because the ‘domestic like’ travel experience under the TTTA, 
combined with the unlimited duration of the temporary visa, may lead some 
individuals to misconstrue the potential ‘post-border’ costs when considering 
staying for long periods in Australia. Some submissions suggested that many 
non-Protected SCV holders were unaware before and after arrival of limitations on 
access to some Australian benefits. There are various options for improving the 
information available to new arrivals from New Zealand. 
 
    
 
R4.23 
 
The Australian and New Zealand Governments should give clear 
and coordinated, whole-of-government advice to Special 
Category visa holders in Australia, and New Zealand citizens 
contemplating residence in Australia, both before and after 
arrival, on their obligations and entitlements. 
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There may be concerns that easing non-Protected SCV holders’ access to 
Australian social security payments and social policy supports may impose a fiscal 
burden on Australia. Further work is needed to assess these complicated effects. 
Analysis of the fiscal risks from trans-Tasman movements need to account for 
offsetting tax revenues as well as other considerations. For example, in 2001 
social security outlays directed to New Zealand citizens living in Australia were 
estimated to be A$1 billion, compared to an estimated tax revenue of A$2.5 billion 
collected from this group as a whole in that year (MFAT 2011). And based on a 
partial analysis in 2000, the NZIER (2000) estimated that New Zealand citizens 
living in Australia generated direct fiscal benefits for Australia of around A$3000 
per person, at that time. Whether the net benefits for Australia (taking into account 
a wide range of costs and benefits) generated by this group of migrants is higher 
than would be generated by other groups of migrants is difficult to gauge. It 
requires a judgment by government based on a wide range of considerations. 
Permanent residency and citizenship 
As noted, the more limited pathways to Australian permanent residence and 
citizenship for some members of this group compound the problem for 
non-protected SCV holders. For many SCV holders living long term in Australia, 
access to citizenship is the key to gaining access to social policy payments and 
supports and the ability to vote across all Australian jurisdictions. Moreover, the 
undesirable social outcomes experienced by a small but growing share of these 
‘indefinite temporaries’ may develop into a point of irritation within the trans-
Tasman relationship. 
The Commissions understand that both Governments are aware of the situation 
and that the Australian Government is working towards a resolution (Gillard 2012). 
 
    
 
R4.24 
 
The Australian Government should address the issues faced by a 
small but growing number of non-Protected Special Category 
Visa holders living long term in Australia, including their access to 
certain welfare supports and voting rights. This requires policy 
changes by the Australian Government, including the 
development of a pathway to achieve permanent residency 
and/or citizenship. 
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Student loans 
New Zealand citizens resident in Australia have access to Commonwealth-
assisted university places but not to HECS-HELP. Hence, even if an alternative 
pathway to Australian permanent residency and/or citizenship were developed for 
long term resident New Zealand citizens, there would remain a cohort of young 
New Zealand citizens whose access to HECS-HELP, VET FEE-HELP and other 
study-related assistance would depend on their parents obtaining Australian 
permanent residency and/or citizenship. This process inevitably takes time and 
money. In some cases, parents will not seek to obtain permanent residency and 
citizenship for themselves and their children. 
One option — suggested in many submissions — could be to give the children of 
New Zealand citizens, who have been living in Australia for a minimum period of 
time, access to HECS-HELP (and VET FEE-HELP). However, it may be 
problematic for the Australian Government to provide access for HECS-HELP to 
New Zealand citizens ahead of Australian permanent residents, who are not able 
to access HECS-HELP unless they become Australian citizens. That said, the 
barriers to HECS-HELP (and VET FEE-HELP) are lower for Australian permanent 
residents than for non-Protected SCV holders. 
Student loan arrangements in both countries also have debt collection 
arrangements. Broederlow (sub. DR88) suggested that both Governments ‘… 
allow each other’s countries to pursue outstanding debts whereby residents return 
to their country of origin’ (p. 10). Green (sub. DR85) also suggested that a bilateral 
agreement could be developed to enable student loan repayments to be collected 
in both countries. 
Subject to the usual cost-benefit analysis, the Commissions support this approach 
within the context of an international tax agreement with New Zealand. 
 
    
 
R4.25 
 
The Australian Government should seek to improve access of 
New Zealand citizens to tertiary education and vocational training 
through the provision of student loans, subject to a waiting period 
and appropriate debt recovery provisions. 
   
    
A single trans-Tasman labour market? 
The free mobility of labour within a single economic market enables labour 
resources to work where their marginal product is highest. At the same time, it is 
important to limit incentives for government transfer shopping and the negative 
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social consequences arising from long term residence without citizenship in 
another country. 
Any formal agreement to a single labour market should optimise net benefits for 
the participating countries, taking into account a broad range of considerations and 
factors affecting the wellbeing of their communities. These include the benefits of 
labour mobility, access to social security and social policy supports and voting 
rights. Moreover, as migration is a significant component of a single labour market 
(as are occupational licences), participating countries have a mutual interest in 
each other’s policies in these areas. 
Given the previous Australian and New Zealand Governments’ agreement to a 
single trans-Tasman labour market (through the TTTA which subsequently 
underpinned the CER and the SEM), some new principles governing access to 
social security would seem appropriate along with arrangements governing 
migration policy. These inter-related issues are discussed, in turn, below. 
A new framework for access to social security 
Principles might usefully be developed to guide the treatment of New Zealand 
citizens who are long-term resident in Australia. Based on European Union 
experience and certain characteristics of an integrated labour market 
(supplementary paper D), some possible principles are: 
• Policy independence — the country in which a person lives should determine 
the social security legislation under which the person is covered. 
• Prevention of government transfer shopping — access to social security should 
not encourage migration of citizens from one country to another. Waiting 
periods to prevent this should apply in most circumstances. 
• Equal Treatment — individuals should have the same rights and obligations as 
citizens or permanent residents in the host country, subject to the relevant 
waiting periods or other initial conditions. 
• Portability — each country should have its own portability rules for the 
payments that each country covers. 
Historically both Australia and New Zealand have benefited from labour mobility, 
both informally as well as formally through the TTTA, CER and SEM. There is a 
risk, however, that this arrangement may become increasingly problematic for both 
countries. While the Commissions’ recommendations have the potential to 
ameliorate the anomalous economic and socially marginal outcomes for some 
long term trans-Tasman residents, a ‘watching brief’ remains important. 
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Accordingly, the Commissions support the development of a broad framework 
around which to determine access to social security within the context of the CER, 
the SEM and the TTTA. 
Migration policy 
The above principles nevertheless contain inherent tensions. For example, in 
principle, equal treatment could only be implemented if Australia’s and New 
Zealand’s migration and citizenship programs were aligned with respect to 
nationals from third countries. This is because migration is the key point of entry to 
the labour markets for both countries. Seeking to maintain an integrated labour 
market between two countries, with a growing gap in incomes per person, will 
inevitably push the focus of attention in this direction. Lloyd (sub. 5) observed: 
As with trade policy, both countries have retained independent screening of potential 
immigrants from outside the Tasman area. Differences in immigration criteria and 
assessment methods mean that there is a possibility of “people deflection” analogous 
to trade deflection. This occurs if potential immigrants wanting to emigrate to one 
Tasman country are prevented to do so by that country’s assessments but are able to 
enter the other Tasman country and after acquiring residence and citizenship to then 
move to their country of first choice. Because of its higher per capita incomes and 
larger established immigrant population, this means in practice emigrants going first to 
New Zealand then to Australia. (p. 11) 
The extent of future ‘back door migration’ is difficult to assess, although there is 
evidence that New Zealand’s current policy settings may be effectively managing 
the risks of such migration (DIAC, sub. DR126). While fully aligning migration 
policies to achieve a single trans-Tasman labour market may be desirable, in 
practice it would be possible to implement the principle of ‘equal treatment’ without 
this alignment, provided that there is ongoing cooperation, trust and engagement 
over migration and citizenship policy with respect to nationals from third countries. 
The Commissions understand that there is considerable engagement between 
immigration officials of the two nations, including an annual formal bilateral forum 
(ANZIF), and project and program activity under the auspices of the ‘Five Country 
Conference’ (which also includes the UK, Canada and the United States). In 
addition, officials engage regularly in dialogue and cooperation on both policy and 
operational issues and areas of interest. 
The impacts on national security would need to be considered in parallel with any 
consideration of migration policies. 
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R4.26 
 
Within the context of CER, the Single Economic Market (SEM) 
and the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement (TTTA), the 
Australian and New Zealand Governments should: 
• review, and make more explicit, the principles governing 
access to social security 
• further develop bilateral engagement on migration policies. 
   
    
Fiscal risks for New Zealand Superannuation 
New Zealand Superannuation (NZS) is the New Zealand Government’s flat-rate, 
non-means tested basic age pension. Eligibility is conditional on an age and 
residency requirement — one must have reached 65 and have lived in New 
Zealand for at least 10 years since the age of 20, with at least five of these after 
the age of 50. There are no specific contributions or work-related requirements. 
Dale et al. (2011) noted the fiscal risks to NZS from the return migration of New 
Zealanders: 
In the future, with an increasing state pension age in Australia, a harsher income test, 
and because ‘totalisation’ can be applied under the Social Security Agreement, it may 
become relatively attractive for New Zealanders to return home to retire, especially if 
New Zealand does not increase the state pension age. This would increase the burden 
on the working age population of New Zealand, without the benefit of the earlier tax 
contribution from these retirees. (pp. 8–9) 
These factors may also make it attractive for some Australian citizens to retire in 
New Zealand with their privately managed superannuation monies, which would 
also not be subject to means testing (abatement) under NZS rules. 
4.6 Government and regulatory services 
Opportunities for coordination 
Integrating markets for goods, services, labour and capital requires coordination in 
many parts of the public sector. While the Australian and New Zealand 
Governments are sovereign entities, coordination between them is extensive and 
takes many forms, as described in chapter 3. 
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Such coordination can reduce compliance costs for trans-Tasman businesses, 
enable more effective regulation of business activity that crosses borders and, in 
the case of joint bodies, increase economies of scale. However, coordination may 
also impose administrative costs and reduce local accountability and flexibility. 
In the private sector, the profit motive drives innovation, inter-firm cooperation and 
decisions about firm size and scope. In government agencies, however, the profit 
motive is typically absent, so there is a need to think differently about how to 
promote integration of government functions. Governments can, for example, 
motivate agencies to consider coordination by attaching greater weight to such 
coordination when setting Ministerial expectations and performance measures for 
agencies. 
 
    
 
R4.27 
 
The Australian and New Zealand Governments should 
encourage government agencies to consider opportunities for 
trans-Tasman coordination in service delivery and regulation on a 
case-by-case basis. 
   
    
Joint action in multilateral fora 
In some circumstances, there may also be benefits from the Australian and New 
Zealand Governments taking coordinated action in multilateral fora. Where both 
countries have a shared interest or objective, coordination may reduce the cost of 
representations or increase the chances of achieving an international outcome 
favourable to both countries. However, as noted above, coordination may also 
impose administrative costs and reduce local accountability and flexibility. 
Telstra and Telstra Clear note a possible example of this type of cooperation. 
Recent coordination by Australian and New Zealand regulators and industry 
representatives, to develop and promote an Asia-Pacific approach to using the 
radio spectrum frequencies freed up by the switch from analogue to digital 
television, led to a trans-Tasman plan being adopted by Asian-Pacific regulators 
(sub. 48). 
There may be other cases where such coordination can generate joint benefits 
(see chapter 5). For example, Australia and New Zealand could work together to 
promote a multilateral air services reform agenda. 
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Performance benchmarking 
Government services 
Regular monitoring and reporting of government service and program results is a 
key component of evidence-based public management and identifying 
opportunities to improve public sector performance (Wholey and Hatry 1992). 
Performance monitoring can: 
• provide transparent indicators of policy performance, enabling assessment of 
whether and how well program objectives are being met 
• promote analysis of the effectiveness of relationships between agencies and 
programs, enabling governments to better coordinate policy within and across 
agencies 
• help clarify government objectives and responsibilities and inform the wider 
community about government service performance 
• encourage ongoing performance improvements in service delivery and 
effectiveness, by highlighting improvements and innovation (SCRGSP 2010). 
Both countries separately undertake performance monitoring, benchmarking and 
reporting. Examples are New Zealand’s quarterly reports on the performance of 
District Health Boards (Ministry of Health 2012), the performance measurement 
framework developed for Auckland Metropolitan Crime and Operational Support 
(Alach and Crous 2012) and the Department of Infrastructure and Transport’s 
(2011) ‘Waterline’ report, which measures performance in Australia’s five main 
ports. Both countries also participate in international reports such as OECD’s 
Education at a Glance (OECD 2012a). 
Benchmarking may enable governments to learn from or adopt the practices of 
their counterparts, as was suggested above in the case of ports. Where one 
country already benchmarks a particular service, it may be cost effective for the 
other government to ‘borrow’ or adopt their data collection and reporting 
mechanisms, rather than develop entirely new methods. 
Trans-Tasman benchmarking may be particularly useful: 
• for government services for which there are potentially significant gains from 
improved effectiveness or efficiency 
• when New Zealand and Australian government service providers have similar 
objectives, against which performance can be compared using the same 
performance indicators 
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• when data for performance indicators is already collected in both countries or, if 
it is not being collected, the cost of doing so would be less than its value. 
Report on Government Services 
The Report on Government Services (RoGS) is an important source of 
performance data in Australia. This annual publication (prepared since 1995 under 
the auspices of COAG) compares the efficiency and effectiveness of 
Commonwealth and State/Territory government services such as education, 
health, justice, emergency management, community services and housing. The 
Australian Commission compiles the report and chairs a Steering Committee 
comprised of senior representatives from Australian, State and Territory 
Governments. 
There is evidence that RoGS has contributed to improved equity, efficiency and 
effectiveness of government services, and the accountability of service providers 
to governments and the public. It does this by providing meaningful, balanced, 
credible, comparative information about government services, which can facilitate 
the development of improved policy or management practices (box 4.7). 
 
Box 4.7 Improving government services through benchmarking 
There is evidence that the information in RoGS has played a significant role in 
informing policy development across a broad range of services. 
In the education sector, RoGS was instrumental in the introduction of standardised 
national testing of student learning outcomes. 
In the health sector, RoGS illustrated the beneficial impact of the introduction of ‘case 
mix’ funding by Victoria on the average cost of hospital separations. Over time, other 
jurisdictions introduced some form of activity based costing of hospital services, and 
the approach is now being adopted at a national level. 
In the justice sector, RoGS illustrated the significant efficiency gains associated with 
Victoria’s use of electronic courts for minor traffic infringements, which has been 
adopted by other jurisdictions.  
Source: Productivity Commission and Forum of Federations (2012).  
 
New Zealand produces The Social Report annually, which reports 43 indicators in 
ten key policy areas such as health, economic standard of living, and safety and 
social connectedness (Ministry of Social Development 2010). The Social Report 
includes a similar set of information to RoGS, although RoGS includes a more 
detailed range of indicators in a wider range of policy areas. 
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Given that similar information in each country is published separately, both 
countries would benefit from greater integration of performance reporting. 
Publication of comparable information, in the same format, with a single source 
would enable direct comparison between jurisdictions. Three main reasons for 
reporting comparative performance information across jurisdictions are: 
• to verify high performance and identify agencies and service areas that are 
successful 
• to enable agencies to learn from peers that are delivering higher quality and/or 
more cost effective services 
• to generate additional incentives for agencies and services to improve 
performance (SCRGSP 2010). 
For New Zealand, RoGS presents a well-established performance monitoring 
system, which is more detailed and comprehensive than most current reporting in 
New Zealand. Australia would also benefit from New Zealand’s participation in 
RoGS, as an additional benchmark would create the potential for State and 
Federal Governments to learn from policies and programs delivered in a different 
context. 
The costs of producing RoGS include the Australian Commission’s expenditure 
(approximately A$2.8 million per year), and part-time assistance from around 20 
Steering Committee members, 180 working group members and over 200 data 
providers. 
While these costs can be exceeded by the benefits from even small improvements 
in the service areas covered by the RoGS — because the areas covered are so 
large — the costs of performance benchmarking are not trivial. Hence, it is 
important that the additional benefits from New Zealand’s participation in the 
RoGS — additional to the benefits already generated from other regular reports — 
exceed the additional costs. Focusing on a small number of areas — initially at 
least — may be prudent. Options include New Zealand independently expanding 
its own parallel report to include areas not covered in The Social Report, and 
becoming involved in benchmarking some or all of the government services 
covered by the RoGS. The Australian experience through RoGS has been that a 
mix of policy and pragmatism has guided the selection of service areas for 
reporting. 
The benefits of trans-Tasman benchmarking within the RoGS are strong in 
principle, and more detailed work should be undertaken to determine how best to 
proceed. Factors for consideration include the extent to which RoGS performance 
indicators are applicable in both jurisdictions, the availability of robust data, and a 
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suitable approach for New Zealand to participate in the existing RoGS governance 
structure. 
Regulatory benchmarking 
In February 2006, COAG agreed that all governments would aim to adopt a 
common framework for benchmarking, measuring and reporting the regulatory 
burden on business. Since that time, the Australian Commission has undertaken 
benchmarking studies of seven regulatory regimes. 
Such benchmarking can shed light on where and how differences in the costs of 
complying with regulation might be reduced. 
The increased transparency afforded by benchmarking would also increase 
government accountability for the design, administration and enforcement of 
regulation. Indeed, it could help promote greater ‘yardstick’ competition among 
jurisdictions, whereby there is more careful assessment of regulation to ensure that it 
is efficient and does not disadvantage a jurisdiction’s performance. (PC 2007, p. xx) 
In its exploratory study of the scope for regulatory benchmarking, the Australian 
Commission suggested that in the longer term, the benchmarking program could 
potentially include New Zealand for some areas of regulation, given the similarity 
in institutional arrangements between the two countries and the emphasis on 
trans-Tasman harmonisation. This would facilitate greater benchmarking of 
regulation, including at the Commonwealth level (PC 2007, p. xxx). 
The only study involving New Zealand so far has been of food safety regulation 
(PC 2009a). Benchmarking against agreed performance targets was able to be 
undertaken because amendments to the food standards code in Australia and 
New Zealand are managed by the same regulatory agency (Food Standards 
Australia New Zealand) (PC 2007, p. 71). 
Some regulatory benchmarking topics would not be suitable for a trans-Tasman 
approach; for example, when regulatory objectives differ between Australia and 
New Zealand. However, there will be instances where a trans-Tasman approach 
will provide insights for both countries about opportunities to improve regulation. 
COAG’s Business Regulation and Competition Working Group should take into 
account opportunities for trans-Tasman cooperation when developing topics for 
regulatory benchmarking studies. 
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R4.28 
 
The Australian and New Zealand Governments should seek 
beneficial opportunities to undertake joint benchmarking. In 
particular, they should determine an appropriate approach for 
New Zealand to participate in the Report on Government 
Services produced under the auspices of COAG, and also in 
regulatory benchmarking studies undertaken in Australia. 
   
    
4.7 Options that should not proceed  
The Commissions have identified some areas where further integration is not 
justified. 
• As discussed in chapter 2, excluding political union as a realistic option also 
rules out or limits the scope for some economic integration initiatives that would 
require adherence to common political and policy positions, such as common 
monetary and fiscal policies. 
• The considerable differences between the two countries’ tax systems indicate 
that harmonisation is not a viable option. 
• For reasons discussed earlier in the chapter, the Commissions do not support a 
customs union. 
• The TTOIG has determined that some components of the business law reform 
program are not worth pursuing. 
Regulatory areas where there are significant differences among Australian states 
are also unlikely to be promising candidates for integration with New Zealand, 
although the Commissions would not permanently rule out such areas. 
Monetary union 
The possibility of a monetary union between Australia and New Zealand has often 
been raised in the past and was discussed in a number of submissions. 
Determining which economies might benefit from forming a monetary union is a 
complicated task (Mundell 1961), and the available research provides only an 
overview of the benefits and costs entailed (RBNZ, sub. 12). 
On the benefits side, monetary unions remove the exchange rate risk on trade 
between member countries and permit easier price comparisons. This potentially 
increases investment and trade, and facilitates specialisation and productivity 
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growth (Mundell 1961; Rose 2008). However, the consequent increases in trade 
are generally small (Cote 1994). This would probably be the case for Australia and 
New Zealand, since Australia accounts for only 23 percent of New Zealand’s 
merchandise exports (table 1.1), and New Zealand accounts for a much smaller 
share of Australia’s trade. 
On the costs side, in forming a monetary union, a country surrenders autonomy 
over monetary policy and exchange rate flexibility, which are important tools for 
macroeconomic stabilisation. This means that in the event of an economic shock 
to New Zealand, but not to Australia (or vice versa), adjustment through the 
exchange rate or through monetary policy would no longer be possible. Instead, 
adjustment would need to occur through prices, wages and employment. 
Adjustment through these channels is typically slower and can result in more 
volatile prices and output (Rose 2008; RBNZ, sub. 12). The size of such effects 
depends in part on the frequency of asymmetric shocks and on how synchronised 
are the business cycles of the economies within a monetary union. Business cycle 
synchronisation will itself depend on policy settings, the structure of the economies 
and their resilience to economic shocks. 
Studies of whether to form a trans-Tasman monetary union suggest that the 
potential costs would outweigh the benefits. For example, Drew et al. (2001) and 
Hall (2005) found that if New Zealand had adopted Australia’s monetary policy in 
the 1990s, aggregate output in New Zealand would have been slightly higher, but 
at the cost of higher inflation and more volatility in both output and inflation. 
McCaw and McDermott (2000) and others have also shown that a common trans-
Tasman monetary policy would have increased volatility. 
Further, there are few instances where monetary union has worked effectively 
without some degree of political union. 
Overall, the Commissions do not consider that the prerequisite conditions for a 
trans-Tasman monetary union exist — a view that is shared by most participants in 
the study (box 4.8). 
 
    
 
F4.3 
 
The prerequisite conditions for a trans-Tasman monetary union 
do not exist.    
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Box 4.8 Participants’ views about a trans-Tasman monetary union 
Tying New Zealand’s fortunes to Australia’s currency would result in monetary policy being 
driven by Australian conditions with decisions made by the Reserve Bank of Australia. 
Clearly this may not always be appropriate for New Zealand, particularly when economic 
conditions are different and when experiencing divergent business cycles. (FFNZ, sub. 33, 
p. 5) 
Available research for New Zealand does not provide conclusive answers about the 
economic desirability of a currency union with Australia. While currency union with Australia 
could provide many important benefits, the loss of autonomous monetary policy would 
expose New Zealand to the possibility of increased inflation and output volatility in general 
and larger adjustment costs in the event of significant New Zealand-specific shocks. As 
such, the sustainability of a currency union will depend on the effectiveness of alternative 
adjustment mechanisms like price and wage flexibility and particularly common fiscal 
arrangements in helping the economy cope with shocks. Because currency union 
membership involves the loss of monetary autonomy (and possibly fiscal sovereignty), the 
decision to enter into a currency union must ultimately be determined within a broader 
economic and political context. Maintaining effective union-wide fiscal arrangements may be 
difficult without significant steps toward political integration. (RBNZ, sub. 12, p. 3) 
I see no material net benefits for the short through to medium term if pursuing any of the 
other level 4 elements of Common Currency, Common Monetary Policy or Common Fiscal 
Policy. (Hall, sub. 31, p. 1) 
We [Lloyd and Seng 2006] concluded that a case for monetary union has not been 
established and that is still my view. (Lloyd, sub. 5, p. 5)  
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5 Making it happen 
 
Key points 
• The Commissions have identified a wide range of integration initiatives that offer 
significant joint net benefits. 
• Economic integration between Australia and New Zealand is well advanced and 
some of these new initiatives will be more complex and challenging. 
• Successful implementation requires sound governance arrangements, including the 
capacity for ongoing evaluation and review. 
• CER governance arrangements have been light-handed and pragmatic. They have 
worked reasonably well. There is scope to build on them to match the more complex 
policy challenges that lie ahead and enhance capacity for evidence-based policy. 
• Recommendations cover: 
– a clearer leadership and oversight role within CER 
– regulatory proposals at the national level should consider opportunities for trans-
Tasman collaboration that would lower costs and deliver benefits  
– opportunities for coordinated action in regional and multilateral fora 
– five-yearly public reviews of CER’s achievements and direction.  
 
Implementation of a policy can be a formidable challenge, regardless of how good 
it looked on the ‘drawing board’. Effective implementation requires governance 
arrangements that are suited to the task. This chapter looks at existing 
arrangements for the leadership, implementation and management of CER 
reforms. It considers whether improvements could be made in the light of 
experience, and to better match the requirements of an evolving CER agenda. 
5.1 The forward agenda 
In chapter 4 the Commissions proposed completing some unfinished CER 
business and a set of new initiatives deemed worthwhile on the basis of available 
evidence. The chapter categorised the proposed initiatives into the markets for 
goods, services, capital and labour. Closer integration and benchmarking of 
government services were also explored. 
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Taken as a whole, these proposals amount to a substantial forward agenda for 
CER, and one that contains ongoing challenges if the two countries are to 
maximise joint net benefits. 
That said, CER initiatives need to take their place alongside domestic reforms and 
participation in broader regional or multilateral initiatives. It is outside the scope of 
this study to compare relative priorities within this wider landscape. The task here 
is to identify CER initiatives that are worth pursuing in their own right. 
Many of the proposed initiatives would reduce impediments to trade in services. 
Compared to conventional border restrictions on merchandise trade, these can 
pose special challenges for reform. For one thing, the impediments often arise as 
an unintended by-product of pursuing a domestic policy objective. This may be a 
social or environmental objective not seen primarily in economic terms, or not 
publicly accepted as a legitimate subject for international negotiation. The 
impediments themselves are typically regulatory and can involve multiple 
interacting dimensions. 
This places a premium on governance arrangements for CER that can play an 
effective role in marshalling evidence, establishing priorities and monitoring 
outcomes. Such arrangements can also help provide a coherent agenda and 
support its communication and public acceptance. 
Cohesive political leadership and effective communication are key to the 
successful implementation of reforms (Tompson and Dang 2010). This is likely to 
be more difficult where two Governments are involved. Yet the past achievements 
of CER indicate the scope to implement the forward agenda successfully. 
Good processes are a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for good outcomes. 
Acharya and Johnston (2007, p. 264) have examined a number of regional 
international institutions and found that their design is a deliberate and complex 
process that reflects multiple factors. They conclude that ‘institutional design does 
affect the nature of cooperation, especially when it comes to the realization of their 
[the parties’] initial goals’. 
It is timely to ask whether CER’s governance remains fit for purpose, given the 
30-year evolution of CER, changes in external circumstances and the types of 
initiatives in the forward agenda. 
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5.2 Past and current governance of CER 
CER governance can be characterised as light-handed and pragmatic. It has been 
held up as a workable alternative to EU-style integration with its grander visions 
and powerful supra-national institutions (Leslie and Elijah forthcoming). 
The key CER decision-making processes remain within the respective 
Governments of Australia and New Zealand. While no Ministers have formal 
responsibility for the trans-Tasman relationship, the two Prime Ministers hold de 
facto ministerial responsibility for CER and meet periodically. There are also 
regular trans-Tasman meetings at ministerial and departmental levels, which drive 
efforts to coordinate and integrate. 
At the level of government officials, the Trans-Tasman Outcomes Implementation 
Group (TTOIG) has served since 2009 providing oversight and coordination of a 
program to integrate Australian and New Zealand business laws as part of the 
Single Economic Market phase of CER. It consists of senior officials jointly chaired 
by the Australian Treasury and the New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation 
and Employment. It oversees and reports six-monthly on progress towards 
achieving 28 outcomes across nine areas of business law (section 4.1 has more 
detail) and has been largely successful in keeping the program on track. 
The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) is another important component 
of CER governance arrangements (box 5.1). In some areas, CER reform has 
taken its cue from the efforts of COAG to remove barriers to create a ‘seamless 
national economy’ within Australia. One example is FSANZ, the trans-Tasman 
joint agency for food standards, which grew from the Australian national food 
standards developed through COAG. 
Ministers from both Governments attend the annual Australia-New Zealand 
Leadership Forum, where business and government leaders come together to 
focus on CER. 
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Box 5.1 New Zealand’s participation in the Council of Australian 
Governments 
New Zealand Ministers have had observer status at relevant COAG Ministerial 
Councils for nearly two decades. Full membership was recommended in a 2008 report 
by the Australian House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs. The Australian Government accepted this recommendation in 
relation to Ministerial Councils that consider matters where New Zealand has an 
interest. When the new COAG structure was put in place in 2011 New Zealand was 
invited to (and opted to) join the Ministerial Councils and Fora detailed below. 
Standing Councils Select Councils Legislative and  
Governance Fora 
Community and Disability Services Climate Change Consumer Affairs 
Energy and Resources Housing and Homelessness Food Regulation 
Environment and Water Immigration and Settlement  
Health Women’s Issues  
Law and Justice Workplace Relations  
Police and Emergency Management   
Primary Industries   
Regional Australia   
School Education and Early 
Childhood 
  
Tertiary Education, Skills and 
Employment 
  
Transport and Infrastructure   
New Zealand does not participate in the Select Councils on Disability Reform and Gambling  
Reform or in the Fora on Corporations, Gene Technology and the Murray-Darling Basin. 
 
Sources: NZ PC and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.  
 
Benefits of light-handed CER governance 
As described in chapter 3, progress on CER has been incremental and pragmatic. 
This style has generally worked well, in that it has: 
• delivered significant integration with broad public support in both countries 
• taken into account political, cultural and social preferences 
• had relatively low transition and administrative costs. 
An early examination of trans-Tasman integration (Holmes 1995) noted its low 
administrative costs and a relative absence of bureaucracy: 
There has been no need for the creation of a regional bureaucracy like the European 
Union’s, or to devote large amounts of official time to managing the operation. (p. 47) 
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In its review of Mutual Recognition Schemes, the Australian Commission 
commended TTMRA as a ‘low maintenance’ system that does not establish a new 
bureaucracy or require repeated updating (PC 2009b). 
Trans-Tasman governance differs markedly from arrangements in the EU, where 
member states have delegated monitoring and some rule-making functions to 
supranational institutions, notably the European Commission and the European 
Court of Justice (box 5.2). CER also differs from the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, which has several administrative bodies, and other regional trading 
arrangements (Lloyd 1996). A closer comparator is the arrangements of the Nordic 
countries (box 5.2). 
 
Box 5.2 Differing styles of governance of economic integration 
The European Union (EU) stands out for the breadth and depth of its economic 
integration. Trans-Tasman integration bears both similarities to and important 
differences from European integration. Both regions aim to achieve a single market for 
goods, services, labour and capital. In both, the principle of mutual recognition by 
member states of each other’s national regulations, standards and qualifications has 
been important in furthering integration. In the EU this has proven relatively easy for 
goods, but more difficult for services. 
The designers of the EU created supranational institutions — the European 
Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice. These 
function alongside the inter-governmental European Council. Member states have 
ceded some decision-making powers to these supranational institutions, which have 
wide authority and can create policies and laws that have ‘direct effect’ in the member 
states. 
Australia and New Zealand have created some joint institutions — the Joint 
Accreditation System of Australia and New Zealand (JAS-ANZ); Food Standards 
Australia New Zealand (FSANZ); and the planned Australia New Zealand Therapeutic 
Products Agency (ANZTPA) — but their authority is limited to specific issue areas. The 
two Governments also maintain some (ministerial) control over these institutions. 
The Nordic countries — Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden — share a 
long history of cooperation and cultural and linguistic similarities. This smaller group of 
similar countries has more in common with CER, in contrast to the greater size and 
diversity of the EU (27 member states). 
The Nordic Council of Ministers is the inter-governmental body of Nordic cooperation. It 
brings together Ministers from national governments with a focus on policy cooperation 
in areas such as culture, leisure and media; economy, business and working life; 
education and research; and environment and nature. 
(Continued next page)  
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Box 5.2 (continued) 
The Nordic Passport Union enables passport-free movement of Nordic citizens and 
establishes their right to live, work and study with full equality with nationals in other 
Nordic countries. The public information service ‘Hello Norden’ is an initiative that 
provides information to potential migrants about rules relating to living, studying and 
working in other Nordic countries.  
 
Too light-handed? 
‘Kiwi-Aussie pragmatism’ (as a roundtable participant described it) in CER 
governance appears to have served the two countries well thus far. However it has 
had some downsides. 
A number of commentators and reviews have expressed concerns about the 
fragmented and ad hoc character that CER has sometimes displayed. They point 
to the absence of an oversight role, lack of cohesion, and cyclical variations in 
activity (box 5.3). 
 
Box 5.3 Perspectives on CER governance 
A number of participants in the study, as well as commentators and reviews, have 
expressed concerns about CER governance: 
… the absence of a single goal statement is a problem for making progress… At the 
moment there is a list of outstanding issues that are being addressed in various ways, but no 
real sense of impetus. (Nicklin, sub. 11, p. 2–3) 
… there have been variations over time in the pace at which the overall integration agenda, 
and individual issues within that agenda, have been pursued. (Scollay, Findlay and 
Kaufmann 2011, p. 4) 
Certainly ministerial level engagement provides leadership and a semblance of co-
ordination. However, it is an open question whether these provide the necessary degree of 
capacity for change. (Mahony and Sadleir, sub. 28, p. 3) 
… there does not seem to be one driving force behind the implementation of CER. 
(JSCFADT 2006, p. 20) 
A key success factor will be ensuring that governance doesn’t focus on a long list of 
activities, but is instead focused on the achievement of high-level objectives. (New Zealand 
Customs Service, sub. DR114, p. 3) 
… we suggest … a trans-Tasman institution to monitor, engage and support ANZCERTA as 
a vehicle for deepening the economic and social aspects of this relationship. Such an 
institution might have the character of a steering committee… (Mahony and Sadleir, 
sub. DR95, p. 1)  
 
    
Making it happen 173 
  
The Commissions have been struck by the number and variety of the different 
parts of what could loosely be called the ‘CER enterprise’. There is no overall 
design or management, which makes it a major task to document the many 
agencies and players involved and their interactions. 
5.3 Strengthening CER governance 
Despite the largely positive past experience, the likely more complex and 
challenging nature of CER’s future suggest that improvements could usefully be 
made to CER’s governance arrangements. These improvements should be in 
keeping with the past light-handed and flexible approach and build on existing 
institutional structures. They should strengthen oversight and enhance support for 
an evidence-based approach to policy. 
The Commissions consider that key opportunities for improving CER governance 
are: 
• clearer leadership and oversight of CER 
• regulatory proposals at the national level should consider opportunities for 
trans-Tasman collaboration that would lower costs and deliver benefits  
• coordinated action in the pursuit of beneficial regional and multilateral 
integration, and greater leverage in global rule making and standard setting 
• five-yearly public reviews of CER’s direction and achievements. 
Clearer leadership and oversight of CER 
The current decentralised model of CER governance risks fragmenting the 
integration agenda leading to lapses in continuity and direction. Policy areas and 
associated governance arrangements are diverse. No single minister or agency is 
responsible for setting the overall agenda, overseeing the relationship, and 
monitoring progress and performance. 
TTOIG comes closest to performing an oversight role. However, TTOIG focuses 
on a program of business law reform which is due to be completed in 2014. In 
addition, TTOIG’s co-chairs are senior officials in the departments with direct 
responsibility for delivery of most of the outcomes (the New Zealand Ministry of 
Business, Innovation and Employment and the Australian Treasury). This has 
been important in facilitating good progress towards these outcomes. 
   
174 Strengthening trans-Tasman economic relations 
 
The ACTU and NZCTU see merit in a more representative oversight body 
(sub. DR118): 
The Trans-Tasman Outcomes Implementation Group is too narrowly constituted to 
oversight changes affecting the welfare of citizens of both countries. … We call for 
establishment of a broadly representative oversight body in which unions and non-
government organisations are recognised with a place at the table. (p. 25) 
Leadership and oversight of the CER agenda as a whole could usefully 
encompass responsibility for setting direction and priorities, communication of key 
messages, monitoring progress, and holding officials to account. These would 
arguably enhance the profile and momentum of CER, better guide its future 
‘direction of travel’ (see Finding 2.1), and quickly and effectively identify and 
address issues as they arise. But the benefits would need to be weighed against 
the costs of additional bureaucracy. 
Change could be realised in different ways. Possibilities include having a senior 
Minister in each country with overall responsibility for CER, an enhanced role for 
the annual CER Ministerial Forum, or a partnership between government and non-
government organisations. A surer way forward would be to build stronger 
administrative support for the annual meetings that already take place at the 
highest political levels — between the two Prime Ministers, between the Treasurer 
(Australia) and the Minister of Finance (New Zealand), and at the CER Ministerial 
Forum. 
For this purpose, a group of senior, trans-Tasman officials could be designated to: 
• operate along the lines of TTOIG, but have coverage of all CER issues 
• continue and broaden TTOIG’s existing monitoring function 
• improve continuity of institutional knowledge about CER 
• provide foresight about future opportunities and challenges. 
The core membership of the group would likely come from the departments of 
prime minister and cabinet, treasury, foreign affairs and business in each country, 
with others involved according to agenda priorities, for example from social welfare 
or border-control agencies. 
This group’s responsibilities should include monitoring issues relating to the 
common trans-Tasman labour market and the associated movement of people. It 
is important to promote a more integrated treatment of the various problems that 
can arise with cross-border movement of workers and their families and which can 
impact on efficiency, fairness and sustainability. The issues currently include 
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pathways to citizenship, eligibility for some forms of state support and the interplay 
of tax obligations and access to benefits (see section 4.5). 
 
    
 
R5.1 
 
The Australian and New Zealand Governments should create 
clearer leadership and oversight of CER, including of issues 
relating to the trans-Tasman labour market and associated 
movement of people. The enhanced leadership and oversight 
should build on existing governance arrangements and the 
annual meetings of Prime Ministers and other Ministers. 
   
    
Regulatory proposals should consider trans-Tasman 
implications 
When either country is introducing new or modified regulations, the opportunity to 
design the changes in a way that lowers transaction costs for businesses and 
people operating across the Tasman could be overlooked. This is another risk of 
the current fragmented governance arrangements. Two examples where 
regulations differ, but could have been aligned, are internet copyright violations 
and film censorship classifications. 
New areas of regulation at the national level constantly arise (for example ‘cyber 
bullying’, privacy laws relating to social media) and there could be gains from a 
more collaborative approach across the Tasman. 
Regulatory impact analysis (RIA) processes are well developed in each country 
and are required for all significant new regulations and modifications of existing 
ones. The RIA could be an appropriate point for the responsible government 
agencies to consider whether trans-Tasman collaboration or alignment would bring 
tangible gains. The choice among options would still need to be based on an 
overall cost-benefit test. 
The COAG Best Practice Regulation Guide requires officials to seek and include 
comments from the New Zealand Treasury’s Regulatory Impact Analysis Team 
(RIAT) on any trans-Tasman issues. This worthwhile step should include 
assessment of whether there is scope for beneficial trans-Tasman regulatory 
alignment. But many national regulatory proposals are developed outside of 
COAG  and hence avoid COAG’s requirement for trans-Tasman scrutiny  yet 
have potential trans-Tasman dimensions. 
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Some areas already have a co-ordinating body, such as the Trans-Tasman 
Council on Banking Supervision (banking and prudential regulation) and FSANZ 
(food safety). There could be gaps in other areas, particularly if they do not have a 
history of collaboration. A way to cover these gaps would be a prompt in the RIA 
guidance material for Australian and New Zealand national proposals. The New 
Zealand Treasury is intending to include such a prompt in the next edition of its 
RIA Handbook. 
A further and stronger step would be for the Office of Best Practice Regulation in 
Australia and the RIAT in New Zealand to comment critically on draft Regulatory 
Impact Statements that, in their assessment, overlook significant opportunities to 
reduce, or avoid raising, barriers to trans-Tasman commerce. 
 
    
 
R5.2 
 
Regulatory proposals at the national level should consider 
opportunities for trans-Tasman collaboration or alignment that 
would lower costs or deliver benefits for businesses and people 
active on both sides of the Tasman. 
   
    
Facilitating joint action 
Chapter 3 noted the outward-looking nature of CER and its ability to act as a 
building block for Asia-Pacific integration. As Sir Frank Holmes noted some years 
ago: 
Cooperation between the two countries in developing external relationships must 
inevitably assume increasing importance in their bilateral dealings with one another. 
(Holmes 1995, p. 32) 
CER governance arrangements are likely to influence the way in which Australia 
and New Zealand interact with the wider region and how often they work 
collaboratively to pursue their aspirations in the region and more widely. 
Australia and New Zealand acted together in negotiations with the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to eventually form the ASEAN-Australia-New 
Zealand Free Trade Area (section 3.2). Close cooperation and joint approaches 
have occurred in other cases (for example, overseas development assistance in 
the Pacific and the ‘Cairns Group’ in WTO trade rounds). 
There are benefits from working jointly where appropriate opportunities arise. 
However, as noted earlier (section 4.3), Australia and New Zealand should retain 
discretion about when they negotiate jointly or individually with other countries 
(thus removing one argument for a Customs Union). Working jointly may prove 
    
Making it happen 177 
  
beneficial where the two countries can exert greater leverage by coordinating their 
stances in multilateral fora such as the WTO, and in rule-making and standard-
setting bodies for areas such as customs, biosecurity, telecommunications, 
intellectual property and aviation. 
It is important that the two countries stay alert to such opportunities for coordinated 
action. 
 
    
 
R5.3 
 
The Australian and New Zealand Governments should continue 
to identify and take opportunities for coordinated action to 
achieve beneficial regional and multilateral integration, and 
greater leverage in international rule making and standard 
setting. 
   
    
Regular reviews 
Reviewing the effectiveness of major programs is an important part of good 
governance. The monitoring, evaluation and review of CER can be improved. This 
can be achieved through adopting guidelines for appropriate evaluation of 
initiatives, evidence-based policy making, and by periodic reviews of CER’s 
outcomes and direction. It is important to learn whether initiatives are achieving 
their intended benefits and whether there are unintended effects. Such feedback 
can also help build the evidence base for improving policy settings and developing 
new initiatives. 
There is little research on CER reforms and their effects to date, apart from in the 
merchandise trade area. 
Current mechanisms for the evaluation of CER initiatives are quite fragmented. 
Each of the multitude of agreements between the two countries tends to contain a 
clause requiring some form of review. For example, the 2011 CER Investment 
Protocol states that ‘The Parties agree to meet in or shortly after the first year of 
entry into force of this Protocol, and regularly thereafter, to review the operation of 
this Protocol.’ However, there is no consistent approach to such reviews, which 
have varied in quality and frequency. As a general rule, any significant trans-
Tasman initiative should include a commitment to cost-effective evaluation. 
Good evaluation of CER policies and comparisons of policy effectiveness across 
Australia and New Zealand depend on the availability of good data. Motu 
Economic and Public Policy Research (2012) is investigating the merits of New 
Zealand developing a longitudinal household panel survey along the lines of the 
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Household, Income and Labor Dynamics in Australia survey (HILDA). There could 
be a case for the two Governments to support these surveys and coordinate and 
synchronise them in ways that help build a CER evidence base for policy 
evaluations and research on topics such as trans-Tasman people movement. 
There is also merit in formal reviews that examine the overall health of CER. 
These were to be conducted ‘in house’ as part of the annual CER Ministerial 
Forum, led by Trade Ministers (Australian High Commission, New Zealand 2012). 
The character of these meetings can pre-dispose them to focus on immediate or 
short-term issues. Further, they have limited capacity to commission or consider 
more substantive analysis. 
As Leslie submitted (DR111, p. 3), reviews also provide opportunities for public 
engagement on CER and to promote transparency. 
Much integration of the Australian national and trans-Tasman markets has been 
achieved on a foundation of ‘executive’ and ‘cooperative’ federalism. This ‘cooperative’ 
federalism takes place within the structures of COAG, its ministerial councils and 
standing committees of officials. … these structures represent only the executives of 
the various jurisdictions involved. Without strong measures to enforce transparency, 
decision-making in these bodies might also be used to shield decision makers from 
public accountability for their actions. Transparency of decision-making is necessary to 
maintain democratic accountability with regard to who has made decisions and why 
they have done so. This is especially important in issue areas surrounding market 
integration that are potentially political but often technocratic in nature.  
The original ANZCERTA was formally reviewed in 1988, 1992 and 1995. There 
would be merit in re-introducing comprehensive CER reviews conducted publicly 
at around five-yearly intervals. These reviews should focus on the broad direction 
of the CER agenda and draw together what has been learnt from the individual 
project evaluations and other relevant research conducted in the interim. 
 
    
 
R5.4 
 
The Australian and New Zealand Governments should undertake 
five-yearly public reviews of CER to take stock of what has been 
achieved and learnt, and to ensure that the agenda remains 
relevant and forward looking. 
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A Stakeholder engagement 
Roundtables 
Melbourne, 20 April 2012 
ANZ 
Australian Confederation of Commerce and Industry 
Australian Industry Group 
Business Council of Australia 
Food & Beverage Importers Association 
Medicines Australia 
Pharmaceutical Industry Council 
Shipping Australia 
Auckland, 16 May 2012 
Air New Zealand  
ASB Bank 
Fletcher Building 
Australia New Zealand Leadership Forum 
Fonterra 
Institute of Finance Professionals New Zealand Inc 
QBE Insurance (International) Limited 
Westpac Institutional Bank 
Wellington, 16 May 2012 
Business NZ 
Manufacturing and Export NZ 
Ministry for the Environment 
New Zealand Bankers’ Association 
New Zealand Council of Trade Unions 
New Zealand Trade and Enterprise 
Pacific Fibre 
Tourism Industry Association 
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Melbourne, 15 October 2012 
Accord Australasia 
ANZ 
Australia New Zealand Leadership Forum 
Australian Bankers’ Association 
Australian Food and Grocery Council 
CPA Australia 
Fonterra 
Food & Beverage Importers Association 
Shipping Australia 
Standards Australia 
Telstra 
Tourism and Transport Forum 
Canberra, 16 October 2012 
Australian Customs and Border Protection Service 
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry 
Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy 
Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations 
Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs  
Department of Finance and Deregulation 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
Department of Immigration and Citizenship 
Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education 
Department of Infrastructure and Transport 
Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
Intellectual Property Australia 
The Treasury 
Canberra, 16 October 2012 
Christel Broederlow 
Kalesi Toga — Pacific Island Reference Group 
Jimaima Le Grand — Pacific Island Reference Group 
Vicky Va’a — Pasifika Pioneers, Pacific Indigenous Nations Network & Nerang Neighbourhood 
Centre 
Auckland, 24 October 2012 
ASB Bank Limited 
Australia New Zealand Leadership Forum 
Blackburn Croft & Co Limited 
Fletcher Building Limited 
Fonterra Co-operative Group Limited 
Independent Maori Statutory Board 
Institute of Finance Professionals NZ Inc 
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NZ Private Equity & Venture Capital Association  
NZ Shippers’ Council Inc 
NZ Superannuation Fund 
Westpac New Zealand 
Wellington, 24 October 2012 
Business NZ (Export NZ and Manufacturing NZ) 
Corporate Taxpayers Group 
Federated Farmers of New Zealand 
Insurance Council of New Zealand 
New Zealand Council of Trade Unions 
New Zealand Food & Grocery Council 
New Zealand Institute of Patent Attorneys 
New Zealand Law Society 
New Zealand Law Society (Intellectual Property Law Reform Committee) 
Telecom 
Victoria University of Wellington 
Vodafone 
Wellington, 25 October 2012 
Commerce Commission 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 
Financial Markets Authority 
Inland Revenue Department 
Ministry for Primary Industries 
Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
Ministry of Social Development 
New Zealand Trade and Enterprise 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
The Treasury 
Technical workshop 
Mutual recognition of imputation credits, Melbourne, 31 October 2012 
Matt Benge — Inland Revenue Department of New Zealand 
Peter Crone — Business Council of Australia 
Lee Davis — The Centre for International Economics 
Matthew Gilbert — New Zealand Treasury 
Emma Grigg — Inland Revenue Department of New Zealand 
Tingsong Jiang — The Centre for International Economics 
Peter Lloyd — University of Melbourne 
Tony McDonald — Australian Treasury 
Bob Officer — Acorn Capital 
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Robin Oliver — OLIVERSHAW 
Lucas Rutherford — Australian Treasury 
Peter Swan — University of New South Wales 
John Yeabsley — New Zealand Institute of Economic Research 
Presentations 
Murray Sherwin and Jonathan Coppel 2012, Strengthening economic relations between Australia 
and New Zealand: Joint study, presented to the Australia New Zealand Leadership Forum, 
Sydney, 13 April. 
Gary Banks 2012, Whither trans-Tasman economic relations?, presented to CEDA’s State of the 
Nation Conference, Canberra, 18 June. 
Lynne Dovey 2012, Presentation to the Australia and New Zealand Customs High Level Steering 
Group, Auckland, 15 August. 
Visits 
Auckland Chamber of Commerce 
Australian Council of Trade Unions 
Australian Department of Finance and Deregulation 
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
Australian Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
Australian Department of the Treasury 
Australian High Commission, New Zealand 
Australia and New Zealand Customs High Level Steering Group 
David Walker, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
Dr Tom Richardson, AgResearch 
Federation of Māori Authorities 
Fonterra 
Financial Markets Authority 
Kea New Zealand  
Māori Economic Development Panel 
New Zealand Inland Revenue Department 
New Zealand Bankers’ Association 
New Zealand Council of Trade Unions 
New Zealand Customs Service 
New Zealand Institute of Economic Research 
New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment 
New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
New Zealand Ministry of Health 
New Zealand Shippers' Council 
New Zealand Trade and Enterprise 
New Zealand Treasury 
OLIVERSHAW 
Paul Hamer, Victoria University of Wellington 
Peter Mumford, Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment 
PricewaterhouseCoopers New Zealand 
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Professor Jacques Poot, University of Waikato 
Professor Klaus Zimmerman, Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn University 
Reserve Bank of Australia 
Simon Murdoch, former New Zealand High Commissioner to Australia and former Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade 
Simon Power, former Minister of Commerce, New Zealand 
Sir Michael Cullen, former Deputy Prime Minister and former Minister of Finance, New Zealand 
Telstra 
TelstraClear 
Vodafone NZ 
Submissions 
Company/Individual/Organisation Sub No. 
  Accord Australasia Limited 54 
Action Key Trust Foundation 39 
Air New Zealand DR100 
Alison Green DR85 
Anglicare Southern Queensland DR112 
ANZ 50 
Attorney-General's Department DR129 
Auckland Chamber of Commerce 42, DR80 
Australia New Zealand Leadership Forum 15, 58, DR70, 
DR120 
Australian Bankers’ Association Inc 37, DR110 
Australian Council of Trade Unions & New Zealand Council of Trade Unions  17, DR118 
Australian Customs and Border Protection Service DR127 
Australian Financial Markets Association 9 
Australian Food and Grocery Council 22, DR119 
Australian Industry Group 38 
Australian Multicultural Council DR113 
Australian Peak Shippers Association Inc DR109 
Baldwins Intellectual Property 45, DR104 
Bob Catley 1 
Bottom-line Ownership and Management Services 19 
BusinessNZ 40, 59 
BusinessSA 8 
Cement Industry Federation DR94 
Chapman Tripp DR84 
Christchurch International Airport Limited 21, DR87 
Christel Broederlow DR88 
Colin Rayner DR78 
Contact Energy DR86 
Corporate Taxpayers Group (New Zealand) 35, DR65 
   
184 Strengthening trans-Tasman economic relations 
 
Company/Individual/Organisation Sub No. 
  CPA Australia 53 
David Faulkner DR67, DR72, 
DR128 
David Greig DR123 
Department of Immigration and Citizenship DR126 
Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary 
Education 
DR73 
Department of Tourism, Major Events, Small Business and the 
Commonwealth Games 
DR131 
Doug Calhoun 29 
Family Business Australia 3 
Federated Farmers of New Zealand 33 
Financial Markets Authority 57 
Fonterra Co-operative Group 14 
Fujitsu Australia and Fujitsu New Zealand Limited DR79 
Geoff Cole 4 
Germana Merle Nicklin 11 
Greg Cutbush and Malcolm Bosworth 51 
Greg Mahony and Chris Sadleir 28, DR95 
Heinz Wattie’s Limited DR122 
Institute of Finance Professionals New Zealand Inc DR92 
Insurance Australia Group  23 
Insurance Council of Australia 36, DR106 
Insurance Council of New Zealand 49, DR96 
International Container Lines Committee (New Zealand) DR105 
IP Australia DR89 
Joel Krose 2 
John Fielding 41 
John Leslie DR111 
Joseph Qiangfu Jin 7, 27 
Lima Berking DR71 
Lindsay Clarke 60 
Luke Nottage 55 
Mark Naber DR61 
Ministry of Transport DR99 
Moeroa Moeara DR91 
Multilink Community Services Inc. and the CAMS Network DR90 
Murray Newth DR125 
National Bulk Commodities Group Inc DR93 
New Zealand Bankers’ Association 24 
New Zealand Customs Service DR114 
New Zealand Food and Grocery Council 34 
New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants DR116 
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Company/Individual/Organisation Sub No. 
  New Zealand Institute of Patent Attorneys Incorporated 30, DR77 
New Zealand Law Society 6 
New Zealand Manufacturers and Exporters Association DR97 
New Zealand Privacy Commissioner 16 
New Zealand Shippers’ Council Inc 46, DR83 
New Zealand Private Equity & Venture Capital Association Inc 32 
Nga Hapu o Niu Tireni/Treaty of Waitangi Partners (On behalf The Hapu of 
New Zealand/Tiriti o Waitangi) 
20 
Nuplex Industries Limited 47 
Office of the Australian Information Commissioner 10, DR74 
Pacific Communities Council of Far North Queensland DR115 
Pacific Island Reference Group DR82 
Pacific Steel Group DR124 
Pasifika Pioneers, Pacific Indigenous Nations Network and Nerang 
Neighbourhood Centre 
DR81 
Peter Ferguson DR66 
Peter Lloyd 5, DR62 
Pharmaceuticals Industry Council 43 
Qantas Airways Limited DR117 
QUT–Griffith University DR75 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand 12 
Robin Oliver DR130 
Shipping Australia Limited DR68 
Standards Australia 44 
Standards New Zealand 52 
Stokes Partners International 18 
Tania Voon DR69 
Te Kahui Rongoa Trust DR103 
Telecom NZ DR102 
Telstra Corporation 56, DR108 
Telstra Corporation and TelstraClear Limited 48 
Temperzone Holdings Limited 13, DR63 
Tim Kirby DR64 
Tourism and Transport Forum 25, DR107 
Townsville Maori and Pacific Island Family Reference Group; Assisted by 
TMSG 
DR98 
Universities Australia 26 
Vero Insurance New Zealand Limited DR76 
Viv Hall 31 
Vodafone New Zealand Limited DR101 
Winstone Wallboards Limited DR121 
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